Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-35120,89-35120
• Citation: 909 F.2d 1350
• Parties: , 59 USLW 2112, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,081 SIERRA CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRONIC CONTROLS DESIGN, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1350

909 F.2d 1350

31 ERC 1789, 59 USLW 2112, 20 Envtl.

L. Rep. 21,081

SIERRA CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRONIC CONTROLS DESIGN, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89-35120.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 11, 1990.

Decided Aug. 1, 1990.

Victor M. Sher, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant.

Amelia S. Salzmans, Anne H. Shields, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for amicus.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before GOODWIN, Chief Judge, and FERGUSON and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

GOODWIN, Chief Judge:

Sierra Club, Inc. appeals the refusal to enter a proposed consent judgment in its citizens' suit against Electronic Controls Design (ECD) for alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act" or "the Act"), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365 (1988). We reverse.

On February 23, 1987, the Sierra Club filed a citizens' suit against ECD under section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, 703 F.Supp. 875, 875-76 (D.Or.1989). The complaint alleged that ECD violated section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1311(a), by discharging pollutants from its printed circuit board manufacturing plant into the Molalla River via Milk Creek, in violation of the terms of ECD's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. ¹

On September 30, 1988, the parties filed a Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment. In the proposed judgment, ECD agreed to: (1) comply with the terms of its NPDES permit and to terminate all discharges if it violates its permit after June 1, 1989; (2) pay $45,000 to various identified private environmental organizations for their efforts to maintain and protect water quality in Oregon; (3) pay additional sums to these organizations if ECD violates its permit between September 1, 1988, and June 1, 1989; and (4) pay $5000 to the Sierra Club for attorney and expert witness fees. In the consent judgment ECD did not admit any violation, and none was established.

The United States filed an objection to the proposed consent judgment, ² arguing that the proposed judgment was illegal because it contained no requirement that ECD make payments to the U.S. treasury. The Clean Water Act authorizes the imposition of civil penalties only if paid to the federal treasury. The district court concluded that the payments to be made under the proposed consent judgment were civil penalties within the meaning of the Act and therefore refused to enter the order. Sierra Club, 703 F.Supp. at 876-77.

Recognizing "that Congress encourages settlements that put money directly to use in protecting the environment", the court also reasoned that a settlement could dictate that money be "channeled towards environmental projects, but perhaps not through private entities [such as those in this proposed consent judgment]." Id. at 877-78. Accordingly, the court indicated that it would approve a consent judgment designating the Oregon Water Quality Program as the "civil penalty recipient." Id. at 879.

JURISDICTION

As a threshold issue we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear this timely appeal. As a general rule, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over final decisions of the district court which "end the litigation on the merits". See Van Cauwenberghe v. Baird, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 1949-50, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). Congress has created certain exceptions. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1), the courts may hear appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions...." In 1981, the Supreme Court held that an interlocutory order denying a motion to enter a consent decree providing injunctive relief may be appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a) as an order refusing an injunction. See Carson, 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993. See also EEOC v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 796 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.1986) (adopting the Carson analysis), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 874, 93 L.Ed.2d 829 (1987).

In Carson the Court effectively set forth a tripartite test to determine when an order denying a motion to enter a consent judgment may be appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1). First, the interlocutory order must have the practical effect of denying an injunction. Id., 450 U.S. at 83-84, 101 S.Ct. at 996-97. Second, the order must have "serious, perhaps irreparable consequences." Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996. Finally, the order must be one that can be "effectually challenged" only by immediate appeal. Id.

The United States does not contest that the proposed consent judgment contained injunctive relief. It argues instead that injunctive relief was not denied because the district court stated its willingness to accept the judgment's injunctive aspects. According to Carson, however, an order need only have the "practical effect" of denying an injunction to be appealable. Carson, 450 U.S. at 83, 101 S.Ct. at 996. Because the court refused to enter the entire consent judgment, its denial had the practical effect of denying an out-of-court settlement containing injunctive relief.

We also find that the district court's refusal to enter the proposed consent judgment may result in serious and perhaps irreparable harm that can be challenged effectively only by immediate appeal. Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996. Like the appellant in Carson, the Sierra Club was denied the injunctive relief settled upon until the case is finally resolved. See also Durrett v. Housing Auth. of the City of Providence, 896 F.2d 600, 602 (1st Cir.1990) (serious consequences found where denial of consent decree would delay improvement of substandard housing). Moreover, if the district court were correct in characterizing the payments required by the proposed consent judgment as civil penalties, unlawful under the Clean Water Act, further settlement negotiations between the parties could not continue unless the ECD agreed to pay penalties to the U.S. treasury. If we were to deny review of the rejection of the proposed consent judgment at this juncture and allow the case to continue to trial, the validity of the consent judgment could be moot and unreviewable following a final judgment on the merits. The loss of an opportunity to effectively challenge an order that denies the parties injunctive relief "plainly has 'serious, perhaps irreparable consequences.' " Carson,

                450 U.S. at 86, 101 S.Ct. at 997. 3   We therefore conclude that jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). 4
                

THE MERITS

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act authorizes any citizen to commence an action against any person who is alleged to be in violation of the Act. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365(a). A citizen can seek injunctive relief and civil penalties. Id. See generally J. Miller, Citizens Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Sec. 8.4, 89 (1987); 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, Special Report at 51-59 (Sept. 4, 1987). The district court held that the monetary payments agreed to in the settlement were civil penalties within the meaning of the Act and that all civil penalties must be paid to the federal treasury. The court therefore concluded that the settlement was illegal.

We agree with the district court that if the payments required under the proposed consent decree are civil penalties within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, they may be paid only to the U.S. treasury. We disagree, however, that the payments are civil penalties. No violation of the Act was found or determined by the proposed settlement judgment. When a defendant agrees before trial to make payments to environmental organizations without admitting liability, the agreement is simply part of an out-of-court settlement which the parties are free to make.

The Supreme Court has stated on two occasions that civil penalties imposed by a court in a citizens' suit under the Clean Water Act must be made payable to the U.S. treasury. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53, 108 S.Ct. at 379 ("If the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 n. 25, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623 n. 25, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) ("Under the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act], civil penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the court. Sec. 505(a), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365(a).") See also Sierra Club v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th Cir.1987) ("any penalties recovered from [a citizens' suit] are paid into the United States Treasury") (quoting Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F.Supp. 440, 449 (D.Md.1985)). ⁵ Because the monetary payments required under the proposed consent judgment will not go to the U.S. treasury, the district court was correct in concluding that if they are "civil penalties" they violate the Clean Water Act. ⁶

While it is clear that a court cannot order a defendant in a citizens' suit to make payments to an organization other than the U.S. treasury, this prohibition does not extend to a settlement agreement whereby the defendant does not admit liability and the court is not ordering non-consensual monetary relief. "[C]onsent decrees bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts." Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3073, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986).

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