Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms Inc., No. 03-6104.

• Decision Date: 28 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-6104.
• Citation: 387 F.3d 1167
• Parties: SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEABOARD FARMS INC. and Seaboard Corporation, Delaware corporations, and Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership, a Delaware partnership, Defendants-Appellees. Tyson Foods Inc., Amicus Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

387 F.3d 1167

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEABOARD FARMS INC. and Seaboard Corporation, Delaware corporations, and Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership, a Delaware partnership, Defendants-Appellees Tyson Foods Inc., Amicus Curiae.

No. 03-6104.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

October 28, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Robin J. Cauthron, Chief Judge.

Barclay B. Rogers (Patrick Gallagher and David Bookbinder with him on the briefs), Sierra Club, San Francisco, CA, for Appellant.

Ellen B. Steen (Richard E. Schwartz and Kirsten L. Nathanson with her on the brief), Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee.

Judith A. Villines, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Frankfort, Kentucky, and Laura D. Keller, James W. Taylor, and W. Blaine Early, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Lexington, KY on the brief for Amicus Curiae.

Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

HENRY, Circuit Judge.

Sierra Club, Inc. appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, Seaboard Farms Inc., Seaboard Corporation, and Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership (together, "Seaboard"), who own and operate a pig-farming operation in western Oklahoma. This case turns on the meaning of the word "facility" as used in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act's section 103(a) ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).

CERCLA's Section 103(a) sets out various reporting requirements for the release of hazardous substances from a facility; here we focus on the ammonia emissions from Appellee's concentrated animal feeding operation located in western Oklahoma. CERCLA's statutory definition of this term is somewhat turbid, but, when read with other provisions nearby, is unambiguous. The district court found that the term "facility" should be narrowly construed so as to apply to each individual barn, lagoon, and land application area as an individual facility. We are led to the contrary conclusion because another part of the statute's text provides a catch-all provision that encompasses Seaboard's entire production site. Therefore, we reverse the district court order and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Seaboard Corporation, a publicly traded Delaware corporation, wholly owns Seaboard Farms, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, and, through two single-member limited liability corporations, owns Shawnee Funding Limited Partnership (collectively, "Seaboard"). Seaboard owns and operates the Dorman Farm, in Beaver County in western Oklahoma, which comprises two farms located on contiguous sections of land, Dorman North and Dorman South. Each farm includes eight buildings and uses a common waste management system. Together, Dorman North and Dorman South house approximately 25,000 swine. Each building is separated by 40 to 100 feet.

At issue are the emissions from Dorman Farm's waste management system, which includes several lagoons, barns, and land application areas. Sierra Club alleges that Seaboard knew of the Dorman Farm's ammonia emissions and failed to report them as required under CERCLA. Arguing that the ammonia emissions from the Dorman Farm exceeded CERCLA's "reportable quantity" ("RQ") of one hundred pounds per day, Sierra Club maintains that Seaboard had a duty to comply with § 103(a)'s immediate reporting requirements. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (designating reportable quantities of hazardous substances).

In response, Seaboard argues that Sierra Club misconstrues the definition of the word "facility." Seaboard maintains that the Dorman Farm houses numerous individual facilities, in each of the various lagoon, barns, and land application areas. Under this theory, because each lagoon, barn, and land application area is a separate facility, Seaboard is obligated to report under § 103 only if the ammonia emissions for each individual facility exceed one hundred pounds per day.

The district court initially agreed with Seaboard's reasoning, based on an EPA manual. The district court concluded that "facilities [we]re intended to be separate buildings, structures... lagoons," Aplt's App. vol. II, doc. 16, at 8 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed Feb. 5, 2002), but it nevertheless concluded that Seaboard was required to "aggregate the amount of ammonia being released at the Dorman Sow Farm in order to determine if [it was] required to report the emissions under CERCLA." Id. at 10. In reviewing Seaboard's motion to reconsider, the district court reexamined the record, reversed its earlier ruling regarding aggregation, and granted the reconsideration. In so doing, the court determined that Seaboard "should not be required to aggregate amounts of ammonia release from separate facilities at Dorman which did not meet the RQ limit." Id., doc. 23, at 4 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed July 18, 2002).

Subsequent to this ruling, the parties entered into a Consent Decree that addressed all of Sierra Club's claims, with the exception that Sierra Club could appeal the district court's ruling on the question of Seaboard's liability for failure to report ammonia emissions under § 103(a) of CERCLA. In making this determination, the primary issue before us is whether or not the district court's interpretation of the term "facility" is correct.

II. DISCUSSION

In interpreting § 103, we must first determine whether the plain language of the statute is ambiguous. Suspecting that the EPA might have an opinion as to what a "facility" means in § 103, we invited the agency to participate by submitting a brief. It declined, because of insufficient time to work with the Department of Justice and prepare a brief before scheduled oral argument; it offered to consider our invitation post-argument. Because we hold the term to be unambiguous, and we need not defer to the EPA's interpretation, no further assistance is necessary. Our holding is supported by the text of the statute, its remedial purpose, and caselaw that has construed the term "facility" in other contexts.

A. Standard of Review

"We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard applied by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)." Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir.1997). Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the movant bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-movant may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. Id.

B. Section 103(a)

"[T]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 103 of CERCLA requires that

Any person in charge of a vessel or an offshore or an onshore facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any release (other than a federally permitted release) of a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in quantities equal to or greater than those determined pursuant to section 9602 of this title, immediately notify the National Response Center established under the Clean Water Act [33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.] of such release. The National Response Center shall convey the notification expeditiously to all appropriate Government agencies, including the Governor of any affected State.

42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (emphasis supplied). Ammonia (NH4) is a hazardous substance under § 102 of CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. The EPA-defined reportable quantity for ammonia is one hundred pounds per day.

As to the term "facility," we will not extrapolate a definition when one has been provided in the text of the statute. CERCLA defines "facility" as

(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9) (emphasis supplied).

C. Is the Statute Unambiguous?

We must first determine whether the statutorily-defined term "facility" is unambiguous. That is, we must decide, using the analytic framework set out in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Pharmanex v. Shalala, 221 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If so, that is the end of the matter, and Congress' clear intent controls. If the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific issue before us, then we must defer to the agency's interpretation, if it is based on a permissible construction." Id.

We agree with the district court that the definition appears clear, concise and straightforward, delineating examples of facilities in subpart (A) ("any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A)). Thus, Seaboard argues that each barn (or lagoon) is a separate facility, and unless the emissions from each barn exceed one hundred pounds per day, no reporting is required. But we also conclude that the statute provides a catch-all provision in subpart (B) ("any site or area where a hazardous...