Sierra Club v. United States Postal Service

Decision Date01 November 1973
Docket NumberNo. C-71-1840 SW.,C-71-1840 SW.
PartiesSIERRA CLUB, a California non-profit corporation, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, Clark W. Maser, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty. by Richard F. Locke, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

I.

On November 9, 1970, the Sierra Club ("the Club") was notified by the San Francisco Postmaster that his office was considering revocation of the special third class postage rate. The preliminary reason given for the action at this time was a change in the Club's income tax exemption under Section 501(c) (4) (of the Internal Revenue Code). The Club filed a timely appeal for reconsideration with the Postal Service ("the Service"). The appeal was denied by the Director, Office of Mail Classification ("OMC"), United States Post Office in February, 1971. In July, 1971 the Club was notified that its special second class postage rate had also been revoked by the OMC. On October 8, 1971 a suit for judicial review was commenced to compel the Service to reinstate the special second and third class mailing rates and to refund all excess postage fees. Subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, the defendants agreed to and did temporarily rescind the revocation and refund the excess postage paid, and the plaintiff agreed to stay further action on the law suit pending appeal to the OMC. It was agreed by the parties that the special non-profit rates could not be withdrawn solely by reason of the change in the Club's income tax exempt status, but rather the only issue on appeal to the OMC would be whether the Sierra Club is an "educational organization" within the meaning of 39 C.F.R. Sections 132.1 and 134.

Representatives of the Club met with the OMC on November 11, 1971 and were given an opportunity to present all relevant material to substantiate their claim. Additional data was later submitted by the Club as part of their case. Their efforts, however, failed to bring about any change and on March 14, 1972, the Service sustained the revocations, having found that the Club is not an "educational organization" within the meaning of 39 C.F.R. Sections 132.1 and 134.

On July 13, 1972 the Club filed an amended complaint reflecting the above developments. Defendants answered and moved for summary judgment. Hearing on the motion was held February 27, 1973. The principal argument of the Club was that the OMC had failed to consider all the documents and samples of literature the Club submitted during its review. Defendants requested and were granted leave to submit a supplemental affidavit to illustrate that the list the Director of the OMC had given as items relied upon by him in making his decision was not exclusive and that indeed all of the submitted material had been considered.

II.

Defendants urge this Court to sustain the Postal Service's determination on the grounds that the Service is given broad discretion in matters of mail classification and that it acted within that discretion in making its determination. Plaintiff asserts that defendants committed an abuse of discretion in finding, first, that the Club is primarily a "conservation" group, and secondly, even assuming the propriety of that finding, that "conservation" and "education" are mutually exclusive functions. The Club further argues that summary judgment is improper at this stage because material facts are still in controversy and that a trial de novo is required to develop a complete picture of the educational essence of the Club.

The court finds there are no facts in controversy and that the standards for judicial review of administrative agencies have been met. Thus, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

III.

Judicial review is granted to the courts by 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. This review is not omnipotent, but rather is restricted by principles of case and statutory law. Courts are loathe to substitute their judgment for that of an agency, but public policy dictates interference by the courts in some situations. The Administrative Procedure Act states that administrative action is reviewable "except to the extent that — (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 5 U.S.C. 701 (1964). This chapter has been broadly construed by the courts so as to permit judicial review of agency action wherever possible. Judicial review is limited only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809. A reading of 39 U.S.C. § 4554 suggests no such congressional intent to preclude judicial review, and it is therefore permitted under these facts.

Having accepted jurisdiction, it now falls upon the court to ascertain the scope of judicial review to be applied in this situation. In matters dealing with the qualification of mailers for certain mailing status, the Third Circuit has adopted a very narrow scope of review. American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588 (3rd Cir. 1971); Doelka Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 227 F.2d 44 (1955). Basically, the determination of mailing status by the Postmaster is an exercise of discretion and will not be interfered with by the courts unless clearly wrong. Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 24 S.Ct. 595, 48 L.Ed. 894; Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F.Supp. 1015 (D.D.C.1944), reversed on other grounds 80 U.S.App.D.C. 145, 151 F.2d 49, affirmed Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 66 S.Ct. 456, 90 L.Ed. 586; Dell Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 198 F.Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1961), affirmed sub nom. Dell Publishing Co. v. Day, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 303 F.2d 766 (1965). Nevertheless, in American Bible Society, supra, 446 F.2d at page 597, Judge Van Dusen said that "within that narrow zone of reviewability over the Postmaster General's actions which this court does possess, a federal court can reverse actions which are so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to an abuse of discretion, or which are contrary to the Constitution."

These judicial guidelines must be reconciled with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, supra. Plaintiff erroneously contends that under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 706, a trial de novo is mandated. Plaintiff places substantial reliance on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). In that case, the Court did sanction a de novo hearing under Section 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F), but set forth the only two circumstances in which it was appropriate: (1) where the action is adjudicatory...

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4 cases
  • NATIONAL RETIRED TCHRS. ASS'N v. US Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 76-157.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • April 7, 1977
    ...the regulation) was arbitrary and capricious. Cf. National Rifle Association v. USPS, 407 F.Supp. 88 (D.D.C.1976) and Sierra Club v. USPS, 386 F.Supp. 1102 (N.D.Cal. 1973), affirmed, 549 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1976) (arbitrary and capricious standard used by courts in reviewing adjudicatory, n......
  • National Rifle Ass'n of America v. US Postal Service, Civ. A. No. 75-303.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • February 2, 1976
    ...Cir. 1971); Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 227 F.2d 44, 46-47 (1955); Sierra Club v. United States Postal Service, 386 F.Supp. 1102, 1104 (N.D.Cal.1973); Dell Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 198 F.Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Dell Publishing Co. v.......
  • Sierra Club v. U.S. Postal Service, 74-1830
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • December 15, 1976
    ...that the Postal Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in this case, and did not, therefore, commit an abuse of discretion. 386 F.Supp. at 1105. Upon a review of the record, we agree with the district court that no such abuse has been shown. Sierra Club's contention that the Postal......
  • In re Exclusion of Cost of Indemnity From Registered Mail Rate Payable By Federal Agencies, B-114874.115
    • United States
    • Comptroller General of the United States
    • July 6, 1979
    ...inapplicability of our settlement authority, the opinion of GAO would not bind either the USPS or the prc. See sierra club v. U.S. Postal service, 386 F.Supp. 1102 (n.D. 1973), affirmed 549 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1976). In addition, subchapter ii of chapter 36 of the postal reorganization act ......

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