Sifers v. Horen

• Decision Date: 07 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 38,38
• Citation: 385 Mich. 195,188 N.W.2d 623
• Parties: Letha SIFERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Roger W. Siefers, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H. Solomon HOREN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 623

188 N.W.2d 623

385 Mich. 195

Letha SIFERS, Administratrix of the Estate of Roger W Siefers, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H. Solomon HOREN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 38.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 7, 1971.

Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, Jackson, for plaintiff and appellee.

Anderson, Patch, Potter & Patch, Jackson for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Justice.

We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan Statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan Legislature to expend to its full potential Limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over non residents. ¹

Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively.

The statute uses the phrase 'The transaction of Any business within the state.' (Emphasis added). When we keep in mind that we are dealing not with General jurisdiction which is provided for in another part of the statute (M.C.L.A. 600.701; M.S.A. 27A.701) which would expose a non resident to suit in Michigan for any cause wherever it arose, but rather with Limited jurisdiction which exposes a non resident to suit in Michigan only for a cause which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction we see no Federal Constitutional question.

The courts of those states having 'longarm' statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on 'the transaction of any business within the state,' have generally construed their statutes as extending the state's jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.

Colorado: Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court In and For City and County of Denver (1968), 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783; Illinois: Koplin v. Thomas, Haab and Botts (1966), 73 Ill.App.2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646; Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co. (1967), 80 Ill.App.2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12; Tennessee: Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. Russell (D.C.E.D.Tenn., 1966), 261 F.Supp. 145.

The phrase 'transaction of any business' is construed as broader than 'doing business.' New York: Simonson v. International Bank (1964), 14 N.Y.2d 281, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 200 N.E.2d 427; Illinois: Lurie v. Rupe (1964), 51 Ill.App.2d 164, 201 N.E.2d 158, cert. denied Rupe v. Wallace, 380 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 1108, 14 L.Ed.2d 154; Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co. (D.C.Ill., 1957), 156 F.Supp. 564.

It can scarcely be doubted that the negotiations in Michigan resulting in defendant's retainer come witnin the concept of the transaction of 'any' ² business.

Neither does any valid basis for distinction for this consideration appear from the fact that the retainer involved a professional relationship.

In our view the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the case and applied the sounder rule.

We vote to affirm.

T. M. KAVANAGH, C.J., and BLACK, ADAMS, T. G. KAVANAGH, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

SWAINSON, Justice.

This case involves the construction to be given to the Michigan long-arm statute (M.C.L.A. § 600.705, subdivisions (1) and (2) (Stat.Ann.1962, Rev. § 27A.705, subdivisions (1) and (2))). The statute provides in pertinent part:

'The existence of any of the following relationships between an individual or his agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such individual and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such individual or his representative arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships:

'(1) The transaction of any business within the state.

'(2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.'

The parties stipulated to an agreed statement of facts. We adopt, and partially set forth, this statement of facts from Sifers v. Horen (1970), 22 Mich.App. 351, 352--354, 177 N.W.2d 189, 190:

'Defendant is a resident of and a duly licensed attorney-at-law in the State of Kentucky, who, in May, 1963, appeared at a Seminar of Lawyers at Saginaw, holding himself out to be a specialist in personal injury and negligence law and practice, and lectured to Michigan Lawyers on the subject, said Seminar continuing for some three days.

'The attorney for plaintiff in this cause, who had been retained by plaintiff in the original case, which was required to be filed in Kentucky, conferred with defendant at Saginaw as to the claim for death of plaintiff's son and, upon defendant's representations that he was fully qualified and competent to represent plaintiff in the Courts of Kentucky in such action, retained defendant for such purpose, by letter agreement dated November 7, 1963, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked Exhibit E. ¹

'After said defendant had filed the action in the Kentucky Court, he again appeared in Michigan at a Seminar of Michigan lawyers on personal injury law, this time at Detroit and, at his request, the attorney for plaintiff went to Detroit with plaintiff and her husband, where they met with defendant, who discussed the pending case with them, preparing their testimony, and advising them concerning their case, as attorney for plaintiffs, in preparation for the trial thereof.

'The case was tried at Louisville, Kentucky, in December, 1965, in the course of which trial, plaintiff claims defendant in the case offered to pay plaintiff the sum of $27,500.00 in settlement of the claim for death of her son, which offer defendant Horen advised plaintiff should not be accepted and, acting upon such advice, the settlement offer was rejected and a verdict was thereafter returned for defendant in said action and judgment entered thereon.

'Defendant filed an appeal from said judgment, but thereafter failed to take the necessary steps in prosecuting said appeal in accordance with the rules and laws of the state of Kentucky governing such appeals, which failure was concealed from the attorney for plaintiff by the refusal of defendant to answer written inquiries made to defendant in June, July, September, October and December, 1966, during which time defendant, by his inaction and refusal to inform plaintiff's attorney thereof, allowed the rights of plaintiff in said appeal to lapse and plaintiff's attorney learned, from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in February, 1967, that said appeal had been dismissed on October 11, 1966.

'On April 14, 1967, plaintiff filed suit against defendant in the Circuit Court for the County of Jackson, Michigan, to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by decedent's estate as the result of defendant's handling of said lawsuit in Kentucky. In her Complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant 'was guilty of negligence, gross negligence and fraudulent conduct in failing in the performance of his duties in the representation of said Estate and in the prosecution of said appeal, as a direct and proximate result of which said appeal was dismissed on motion of defendant without hearing on the merits.' A summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon defendant by registered mail on December 11, 1967, this service being made by order of Court under GCR 1963, 105.8.'

Defendant moved for accelerated judgment contending that the Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction. The trial court denied defendant's motion ruling that plaintiff had shown a sufficient basis for limited personal jurisdiction over defendant under M.C.L.A. 600.705(2). Further, the court ruled that there was no basis for limited personal jurisdiction under M.C.L.A. 600.705(1).

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court in denying the motion for accelerated judgment, but, in so doing, reversed the trial court's holding that there was no jurisdiction under M.C.L.A. 600.705(1). The Court of Appeals upon such determination held that it was unnecessary to decide whether there was jurisdiction under M.C.L.A. 600.705(2). We granted leave to appeal, 383 Mich. 822.

The issue involved is whether the Jackson county circuit court has jurisdiction over the defendant under either M.C.L.A. 600.705(1) or (2), given the facts stipulated to in this case.

I.

On order to determine jurisdiction in this case, we must attempt to ascertain the legislative purpose of the long-arm statute. Perhaps the best discussion is found in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, where the court upheld jurisdiction of the Colifornia courts over a Texas insurance company which held only one policy within the State of California. The court stated concerning long-arm statutes generally (pp. 222--223, 78 S.Ct. p. 201):

'Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.'

Because of the above recognized changes in commercial conditions, Michigan residents are subject to solicitation by out-of-state concerns for a wide variety of products and services. The legislature, in enacting the statute, has attempted to provide Michigan residents a local remedy for injuries arising out of such transactions.

We will first deal with plaintiff's claim under subdivision (2): 'The doing...