Sifuentes v. Brazelton

• Decision Date: 18 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13–17603.,13–17603.
• Citation: 815 F.3d 490
• Parties: Miguel Galindo SIFUENTES, Petitioner–Appellee, v. P.D. BRAZELTON, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

815 F.3d 490

Miguel Galindo SIFUENTES, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.P.D. BRAZELTON, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 13–17603.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2015.

Submission Vacated June 24, 2015.

Filed Feb. 18, 2016.

Resubmitted Feb. 10, 2016.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peggy S. Ruffra, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, John H. Deist (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent–Appellant.

Denis P. Riordan, Donald M. Horgan (argued), Riordan & Horgan, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner–Appellee.

Before: DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges and JAMES A. TEILBORG,^* Senior District.

OPINION

IKUTA

, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question whether the California Court of Appeal made an unreasonable determination of the facts in affirming the trial court's application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)

. On trial for first degree murder of a police officer, Miguel Sifuentes challenged the prosecutor's decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors. The trial court concluded that Sifuentes had not carried his burden of showing the prosecutor acted in a purposefully discriminatory way, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a Batson determination, see Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir.2012), we conclude that the California Court of Appeal's decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We also conclude that the trial court's decision to preclude Sifuentes from responding to the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of habeas relief.

I

On December 11, 1998, Sifuentes, Ruben Vasquez, and Hai Minh Le robbed an Outback Steakhouse in Dublin, California. Sifuentes entered the restaurant by himself, and asked for a table. He told the server he was waiting for friends and ordered a soda. About a half hour later, when Sifuentes declined to place an order, he was presented with a bill. He told the server that he needed to get some money from his car, and headed for the exit.

As soon as Sifuentes approached the door, Vasquez and Le entered. Le pulled out a pellet gun and forced a departing customer to return to the restaurant. Sifuentes was also armed with a pellet gun. Brandishing their weapons, Vasquez, Sifuentes and Le spread out through the restaurant and forced the customers and employees into the kitchen. In the kitchen, Vasquez demanded money and fired his nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol into a fryer. The manager led Vasquez into his office, where Vasquez stuffed his pockets with money from the cash drawer. An employee managed to call 911, but had to hang up before reporting the robbery. When the restaurant phone rang, Vasquez ordered the manager to tell the police that everything was OK, or Vasquez would shoot him. The manager did as ordered. Then Vasquez, Sifuentes, and Le began forcing the employees and customers into the restaurant's walk-in refrigerator. Before being shut into the refrigerator, an employee activated a security device.

Deputy Sheriff Angela Schwab responded to the 911 call and went into the restaurant to confirm the manager's statement that there was no problem at the restaurant. Once she entered, she was surprised by Vasquez, who pointed his gun at her, hit her in the face, and took her gun. Le put a gun to her back, and he and Sifuentes walked her to the back of the restaurant. Sheriff Deputy John Monego arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. As he entered the restaurant, Vasquez shot him. Monego fell to the ground, and Vasquez shot him multiple times where he lay, killing him. Vasquez, Sifuentes, and Le fled the scene and were apprehended shortly afterwards.

The three defendants were tried jointly. The prosecutor charged Sifuentes and Le with first degree felony murder. Cal.Penal Code § 189

(felony murder includes a murder that is committed by the defendant or an accomplice during the commission of a specified dangerous felony). During voir dire, the prosecutor focused on the potential jurors' views on the death penalty, and specifically whether they felt they could sentence a defendant to death if the defendant did not "actually commit the shooting." The prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove thirty-three jurors, nine of whom were black. The empaneled jury included one black juror and one black alternate. The prosecutor stated for the record that he would have accepted a black female juror excused by the defense, as well as a black male juror, but that juror had failed to appear in court.

Sifuentes and his co-defendants made three objections during jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)

, and the analogous California case, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978), based on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove nine black jurors.¹ After each Batson motion, the trial judge determined that the defendant had made a prima facie case of discrimination, and asked the prosecutor for an explanation. As explained in more detail below, after Sifuentes's first Batson motion, challenging the prosecutor's strike of Jackson, Norman, and Jasper, and second Batson motion, challenging the prosecutor's strike of Webster and Massey, the trial court did not permit defense counsel to respond to the prosecutor's explanation. The trial court did permit rebuttal for the third Batson motion, during which Thompson, Gibson, Barnes, and Skruggs were excluded. After each challenge, the court determined that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing each juror were race neutral and not discriminatory.

Sifuentes and his two co-defendants were each convicted of first degree murder, and Sifuentes was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in January 2006, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied review in May 2006. In 2007, Sifuentes petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on several grounds, including that the state court unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting his Batson challenge to nine prospective jurors, and that the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in precluding him from rebutting the prosecutor's explanation for his strikes. After a number of stays and refilings, the district court granted Sifuentes relief on his claim as to two jurors, Thompson and Gibson, and denied Sifuentes's other claims. The state timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

and 2253.

II

On appeal, the state claims that the district court erred in its analysis of Sifuentes's Batson claim with respect to jurors Thompson and Gibson. Sifuentes argues that the district court did not err, and that, even if it did, the habeas petition should be granted because the peremptory strikes of six other jurors involved purposeful racial discrimination. Alternatively, Sifuentes argues that we can affirm the district court because the state court violated Batson in preventing him from rebutting the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations. Our analysis of these arguments requires an understanding of both the applicable Batson framework and the framework for evaluating a habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254

.

A

We begin with the applicable Batson framework. As Batson explains, "the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges ... is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause," which "forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race." Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712

; see also Davis v. Ayala, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2208, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015). "[A]s in any case alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," the key question is "whether the defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State." Batson, 476 U.S. at 90, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

To answer that question, Batson adopted a burden-shifting approach similar to that used in other civil rights cases. Id. at 94 & n. 18, 106 S.Ct. 1712

. First, the defendant must "make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination" by providing some evidence, such as the disproportionate exclusion of jurors of a certain race, that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Id. at 93–94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation" for striking the juror. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination" on the part of the prosecutor. Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (Miller–El I ) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). "The opponent of the strike bears the burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation." Ayala, 135 S.Ct. at 2199.

The trial court's determination whether the prosecutor has intentionally discriminated "turn[s] on evaluation of credibility." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712

. This type of credibility determination relies on the trial court's "evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility," and is a "pure issue of fact" that lies "peculiarly within a trial judge's province." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364–65, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Recognizing that "peremptory challenges are often the subjects of instinct, and that race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror's demeanor," the Court...