Sifuentes v. Laser Access LLC
| Decision Date | 10 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-144 |
| Parties | DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES III, Plaintiff, v. LASER ACCESS LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Hon Jane M. Beckering
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff David Angel Sifuentes III, a frequent filer in this Court filed a pro se complaint against his former employer on February 6, 2023, alleging that it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), failed to give adequate notice of a permanent layoff, failed to provide him due process, and committed negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress when it terminated his employment. Sifuentes further alleges that Defendant invaded his privacy by installing cameras inside its facility.
On February 8, 2023, I granted Sifuentes's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6.) Accordingly, I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on this review, I conclude that the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Sifuentes alleges that on June 21, 2022, he received a call from Defendant's human resources department informing him that he was going to be laid off from his job permanently beginning that day. The caller told Sifuentes that he and another employee had been selected for layoff. Sifuentes alleges that he had never received a write-up prior to that time, had never been disciplined, and had completed his work assignments on time to the best of his ability. He alleges that the only explanation he was given was “due to rate,” apparently meaning failure to meet the production rate. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.2.) Sifuentes admits that sometimes he would not make his rate, but he claims that this was due to the machine being down and not working. He claims that some of the machines were poorly maintained and needed repair. In addition, he alleges that Defendant placed cameras everywhere around the shop, including near the machines, to look for reasons to discipline employees when the machines went down. (Id.)
Sifuentes alleges that Defendant violated the ADEA because he was over 40 and was laid off due to his productivity rate, “which productivity over 40 is protected under the [ADEA].” (Id. at PageID.3.) Next, he alleges that he was laid off without due process and fair and adequate notice. (Id.) Next, Sifuentes alleges that Defendant violated his right to privacy at the work place by installing cameras inside and outside machines and in break areas and the breakroom. Finally, he alleges claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress because he is “very mad, angry, and sacred [sic], worried, nervous and has trouble sleeping and scared of what [Defendant] will tell are [sic] inform other employers.” (Id. at PageID.4.)
Sifuentes seeks $250,000.00 in actual damages and $300,000.00 in exemplary, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.[1] (Id.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
Because Sifuentes is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleading more liberally than is usually the case for formal pleadings lawyers draft. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But this liberal pleading standard “is not without its limits, and does not ‘abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.'” Clark v. Johnston, 413 Fed.Appx. 804, 817 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, “[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed.Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). To require otherwise “would not only strain judicial resources . . . but would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Sifuentes first alleges that Defendant violated the ADEA when it terminated his employment. The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA using circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of the protected class, meaning he was at least 40 years old; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was replaced by a substantially younger employee. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.308, 312 (1996); Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 2008). Alternatively, a plaintiff may satisfy the fourth prong by adducing evidence that similarly situated non-protected employees were treated differently. See Sperber v. Nicholson, 342 Fed.Appx. 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coomer v. Bethesda Hosp., Inc. 370 F.3d 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff is not required to allege an indirect-evidence prima facie case of discrimination under this framework at the pleading stage. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must still “allege sufficient factual content to make a claim for relief plausible.” Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 516 F.Supp.3d 711, 722 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
Here, Sifuentes fails to state a claim for age discrimination upon which relief may be granted. Other than his allegation that he was over 40 years old when the alleged discrimination occurred, he alleges no fact suggesting that he was discharged because of his age. That is, Sifuentes does not allege that he was replaced by a substantially younger individual, or even that he was replaced. In addition, he does not allege that he was treated differently from non-protected employees. See Williams v. Scan Source, No. 2:17-cv-02578, 2018 WL 5218011, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2018) (). In short, Sifuentes fails to allege a single fact suggesting that his age played any part in Defendant's decision to discharge him. Finally, to the extent Sifuentes alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate his age-related performance issues, he fails to state a claim because, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, “the ADEA contains no reasonable accommodation analysis.” Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 224 F.Supp.2d 905, 914 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) ( that “the standard for an ADEA claim is more exacting than the standard for [an] ADA claim, as the ADEA does not allow for ‘reasonable accommodation'”).
Therefore, I recommend that this claim be dismissed.
Sifuentes alleges that Defendant failed to provide him fair and adequate notice of the discharge. To the extent he intends to allege a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment the claim lacks merit. In order to establish a due process violation, a...
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