Sigcho-Lopez v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections
| Decision Date | 24 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 127253 |
| Parties | Byron SIGCHO-LOPEZ, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Adolfo Mondragón, of Mondragon Law Group, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Michael C. Dorf, of Law Offices of Michael C. Dorf, LLC, of Skokie, for appellee 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization.
No brief filed for other appellee.
¶ 1 Byron Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago's 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections (Board), alleging that his predecessor's campaign committee, the 25th Ward Regular Democratic Organization (Committee), unlawfully paid personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez's complaint, and Sigcho-Lopez filed for administrative review in the appellate court. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the Board's dismissal. 2021 IL App (1st) 200561, 448 Ill.Dec. 435, 176 N.E.3d 1232. This court allowed Sigcho-Lopez's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), and for reasons other than those set forth by the Board and the appellate court, we affirm the appellate court's judgment and the Board's dismissal.
¶ 3 On July 20, 2000, the Committee ( 10 ILCS 5/9-1.9 (West 2000) ) filed its statement of organization as required by section 9-3 of the Election Code (id. § 9-3) in order to support the candidacy for public office of Sigcho-Lopez's predecessor, Daniel Solis. When the Committee registered with the Board, Solis was listed as its chairman, and Grace Perales was listed as its treasurer.
¶ 4 In succeeding Solis as alderman of Chicago's 25th Ward, Sigcho-Lopez was sworn into that office on May 20, 2019. Solis did not seek reelection to retain his aldermanic position in 2019 or his Democratic committeeman position in 2020, and the last time he ran for office was in 2016 when he ran for committeeman. As of February 19, 2020, at a hearing before the Board, the Committee remained active.
¶ 5 Beginning in June 2016, while serving as alderman and Democratic committeeman of Chicago's 25th Ward, Solis began cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in their investigation of alleged political corruption by Illinois public officials. Acting at the direction of the FBI and DOJ, he recorded conversations with other Illinois public officials. The Committee states in its brief that Solis's assistance contributed to the indictment of at least one public official and other individuals on federal corruption charges and that his assistance is ongoing.
¶ 6 When the FBI requested Solis's assistance, he retained the law firm of Foley & Lardner LLP. On May 21, 2019, the Committee paid $220,000 to Foley & Lardner LLP for legal fees the Committee states were related to Solis's cooperation with the FBI. On July 15, 2019, the Committee disclosed "legal fees" as an expenditure in its quarterly report filed with the Board ( 10 ILCS 5/9-10(b) (West 2018)).
¶ 8 On October 17, 2019, Sigcho-Lopez filed a complaint with the Board alleging that "[t]he expenditure of May 21, 2019, in the amount of $220,000, to the law firm of Foley & Lardner LLP for the criminal defense of Daniel Solis against federal allegations of corruption" violated campaign disclosure and regulation provisions of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(3)). In the complaint, Sigcho-Lopez alleged that the $220,000 payment by the Committee was "for a personal debt that [was] neither campaign-related nor for governmental or political purposes directly related to a candidate's or public official's duties and responsibilities." Sigcho-Lopez requested the Board to find that, by paying Solis's personal debt with campaign funds, the Committee had violated section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (id. ); to assess a $220,000 civil penalty against the Committee for the amount paid to Foley & Lardner LLP; and to levy a $500 fine on each of its officers, Solis and Perales, for knowingly making an expenditure in violation of section 9-8.10 of the Election Code (see id. § 9-8.10(b)).
¶ 9 On January 8, 2020, a closed preliminary hearing was held to determine whether the complaint had been filed on "justifiable grounds" such that the matter should proceed to a public hearing. See id. § 9-21. At the closed hearing before the Board's hearing officer, Sigcho-Lopez argued that, even if the use of campaign funds to pay for a politician's criminal defense constituted an "expenditure" as defined by section 9-1.5(A)(1) of the Election Code (), it was nonetheless expressly prohibited as an expenditure for repayment of a personal debt pursuant to section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(3)).
¶ 10 The Committee countered that section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code does not specifically prohibit the use of campaign money to pay for legal fees. See id. § 9-8.10(a). The Committee also contended that Solis's cooperation with the FBI rendered the legal fees an appropriate campaign expenditure and not a personal debt prohibited by section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(3)). According to the Committee, Solis's obligation to pay legal fees in relation to his cooperation with federal authorities would not have existed irrespective of Solis's responsibilities as Chicago alderman and chair of the city council's zoning committee, and thus, the legal fees were not personal in nature. The Committee asserted that the FBI would not have sought Solis's cooperation if he had not held the official positions that provided the opportunity to communicate with other officials in whom they were interested.
¶ 11 The Committee noted that Solis had not been indicted or charged with any crime but that he was cooperating with the federal government. The Committee contended that Solis acted as "an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions" by cooperating and acting on behalf of the federal government in his official capacity and, thus, the expense for legal fees was appropriate pursuant to section 9-8.10(c) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(c)).
¶ 12 On January 14, 2020, following the closed hearing, the hearing officer filed his written report containing suggested findings of fact and recommendations. Addressing whether the payment for Solis's legal defense was an expenditure as defined by section 9-1.5(A)(1) of the Election Code (id. § 9-1.5(A)(1)), the hearing officer concluded that "money spent on defenses as presented in this case can be an acceptable use of campaign funds." The hearing officer further stated that "[m]ore importantly, since [section 9-8.10(a) of the Election Code] does not contain a specific prohibition against using campaign funds for legal expenses, *** these types of expenditures can be made."
¶ 13 Addressing whether the payment of legal fees was prohibited as a payment for satisfaction or repayment of a personal debt, the hearing officer found that the word "debt" in section 9-8.10(a)(3) of the Election Code (id. § 9-8.10(a)(3)) refers only to a specific type of debt, i.e. , debt from personal loans, as identified in the subsection. Concluding that money spent on a legal defense is separate and different than debt related to personal loans, the hearing officer recommended that Sigcho-Lopez's complaint "be found not to have been filed on justifiable grounds and [that the] *** complaint be dismissed." On February 18, 2020, the Board's general counsel sent a memorandum to the Board in which he stated that he had reviewed the hearing officer's report and concurred with the recommendations contained therein.
¶ 14 On February 19, 2020, in the course of the Board's closed hearing, the Committee argued that the record revealed only that federal investigators directed Solis to wear a wire and take certain actions. The Committee asserted that nothing "is more of a public service function than [when] the FBI asks you to do something and you do it."
¶ 15 During the hearing, Board chair Charles W. Scholz asked acting general counsel Bernadette Matthews to confirm the Board policy on the expenditure of campaign funds for legal fees. Matthews responded that, although she had not previously dealt with a formal complaint, the payment of legal fees from campaign funds was questioned consistently and it was "just generally accepted as something that can be considered an expenditure." Matthews stated that two bills were before the General Assembly prohibiting the payment of legal fees from campaign funds to defend criminal charges. Board member William M. McGuffage stated that the expenditure of funds for a criminal defense was not prohibited under the Election Code because it was connected with Solis's position as a public official and related to his future candidacy. McGuffage believed that, although reprehensible, the payment of legal fees from campaign funds to defend criminal activity was not prohibited under the current legislation. Board member William R. Haine stated, "We don't have any authority to add to what the General Assembly says are the prohibited uses." Vice chair Ian Linnabary stated, "I find it absolutely reprehensible that a candidate can use [his] campaign fund to defer *** weekly expenses in association with criminal defense."
¶ 16 The Board nevertheless adopted the recommendation of the general counsel and hearing officer and found that the complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds. On March 19, 2020, after ratifying its decision, the Board issued its written final order adopting the recommendations of its general counsel and the hearing officer and dismissed Sigcho-Lopez's complaint.
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