Siglin v. Smith

• Decision Date: 06 July 1910
• Citation: Siglin v. Smith, 168 Ala. 398, 53 So. 260 (Ala. 1910)
• Parties: SIGLIN ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

53 So. 260

168 Ala. 398

SIGLIN ET AL. v. SMITH ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 6, 1910

Appeal from Chancery Court, Cherokee County; W. W. Whiteside Chancellor.

Suit by Elizabeth Smith and others against William Siglin, as administrator, and others. Decree for complainants, and respondents appeal. Reversed and remanded.

McClellan J., dissenting.

Knox Acker, Dixon & Blackmon and Hugh H. White, for appellants.

Hugh Reid, Conner & Lumpkin, and C. Daniel, for appellees.

McCLELLAN J.

William A. Smith died August 16, 1908. Subsequently William Siglin qualified as administrator of his estate. After the first amendment, the original bill in this cause made a case for the removal of the administration of the estate from the probate into the chancery court. It was first filed by Elizabeth Smith, the mother of intestate, who was alleged to be an heir of the intestate, and later two other collateral heirs were transposed from parties defendant to parties complainant. The parties defendant were the brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews of intestate, comprising, it was alleged, with the mother, all his heirs, and Siglin, the administrator. A supplemental bill, amending the original bill, was filed, in which Alice Jordan (or Smith) and 10 children borne by her while cohabiting with intestate were made parties to the cause. The bill, after all amending invoked the court's power to declare a nullity, and to cancel, on the ground of fraud, etc., so far as the purported grantor was concerned, a certain deed purporting to have been executed by Elizabeth Smith with others after the original bill was filed to Alice Smith (Jordan) and her 10 children mentioned, conveying to them all the right, title, and interest of Elizabeth Smith in or to the estate of William A. Smith, deceased.

The contention for appellants, tending to error in the decree below, is that there was after all amendments were made a misjoinder of parties complainant, a misjoinder of parties defendant, a departure, and multifariousness. The discussion in brief for appellant deals with the general question of multifariousness, involving an application of the reasoning and authorities to support that insistence to the specific matters of objection enumerated. It is evident from the amended bill that the determining factor, as respects the heirship of Elizabeth Smith and of the sisters, brothers, nephews, and nieces of intestate, is whether Alice Smith (Jordan) is the surviving widow of intestate; and, if so, the 10 children of intestate by her are intestate's heirs, thereby, of course, excluding Elizabeth Smith and the collateral kindred from the right of inheritance under our statute of descent and distribution. That is an issue of fact with which we are not now concerned.

Justices ANDERSON, MAYFIELD, SAYRE, and EVANS hold that the bill was rendered multifarious, and subject to demurrer therefor by virtue of the amendment made by the filing of the supplemental bill; that that pleading introduced matter foreign to the original bill and brought in parties to the original bill, who were in no wise interested in the administration of the estate, and who were not proper parties to the bill as originally filed.

Speaking for the writer, in dissent from the prevailing view stated the major, general, purpose of the original bill was to administer the estate of the intestate. That purpose comprehended the ascertainment of those entitled to share in the estate, and to what proportions. The jurisdiction of equity was, of course, adapted, under familiar principles, to effect the ultimate object, and within it to control and command the personal representative in the performance of his duties in the premises. That two others alleged to be heirs, were transposed as parties to the cause did not--could not--alter the status. The bill still retained the character and general purpose indicated. While the cause so stood, one of the complainants, it is alleged in the supplemental bill (amending the original bill), was fraudulently induced to execute a conveyance whereby her entire interest in the estate sought to be administered was divested. With us the administration of an estate in equity is in a general sense one "single" cause of action. Tygh v. Dolan, 95 Ala. 269, 10 So. 837; Baker v. Mitchell, 109 Ala. 490, 493, 20 So. 40; Sims' Ch. Prac. §§ 422, 661. The administration of an estate cannot at the same time pend in part in both the chancery and probate courts. The warranted assumption of jurisdiction of the former court of an administration pending in the probate court deprives the latter court of jurisdiction, for the one cause of action cannot be split up. Author, supra. Nor is a bill by an heir seeking the...