Sigmon v. Stirling
| Decision Date | 30 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 8:13-cv-01399-RBH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Brad Keith Sigmon, Petitioner, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Willie D. Davis, Warden of Kirkland Correctional Institution, Respondents. |
Petitioner Brad Keith Sigmon, a state prisoner sentenced to death and represented by counsel, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter is before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin, who recommends granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment and denying and dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition with prejudice.1 The Court adopts the R & R for the reasons herein.
On April 27, 2001, Petitioner entered the home of David and Gladys Larke and beat them to death with a baseball bat. Petitioner had been in a volatile relationship with the Larkes' daughter, Rebecca Barbare ("Rebecca"). Sometime before the murders, Rebecca had ended her relationship with Petitioner and was staying at her parents' home.
According to Petitioner's statement to law enforcement, his intentions were to go into the Larkes' home and tie them up, then kidnap Rebecca so he could talk to her. [App. 1473].3 Instead, Petitioner beat the Larkes to death with each sustaining up to nine blows to the skull. [App. 1627, 1640]. After killing the Larkes, Petitioner waited in their home for Rebecca to return home from taking her children to school. [App. 1474].
When Rebecca returned to her parents' home after taking her children to school on the morning of April 27th, Petitioner took Rebecca in a car and tried to flee. Id. Rebecca eventually escaped after being shot. Id. Petitioner then fled to Tennessee where he was captured in a campground approximately 10 days later. Petitioner confessed to both Tennessee and South Carolina law enforcement officers.
Petitioner was indicted in November 2001 on two counts of first degree murder and one count of first degree burglary. Petitioner was represented by John Abdalla, Esq. ("Abdalla") and Frank Eppes, Jr., Esq. ("Eppes") at trial. On July 19, 2002, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all three charges. [App. 1705].
Following a sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death after finding three statutory aggravating factors: 1) two or more persons were murdered by the Petitioner by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct; 2) the murder was committed while in the commission of a burglary; and 3) the murder was committed while in the commission of physical torture. [App. 2384]. On July 21, 2002, the circuit court sentenced Petitioner to thirty years for the burglary charge and death for the two murder charges. [App. 2385].
On December 19, 2005, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed Petitioner's murder convictions and death sentence. [App. 2429-33]. Remittitur was issued on January 13, 2006. [ECF No. 34]. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on June 26, 2006. [ECF No. 34-3].
On October 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court. The court appointed William H. Ehlies, II, Esq. ("Ehlies") and Teresa L. Norris ("Norris") to represent Petitioner in his post-conviction matter. Petitioner's PCR counsel filed an amended PCR application on June 4, 2008. [App. 2478-81]. An evidentiary hearing was held on August 4, 2008, before the Honorable J.C. Nicholson, Jr. [App. 2718-2812]. In an order filed July 20, 2009, Judge Nicholson denied and dismissed Petitioner's PCR application. [App. 2846-93].
Petitioner appealed the denial of his PCR application to the South Carolina Supreme Court raising six grounds for relief. [ECF No. 34-5 at 2-4]. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari as to three issues and requested additional briefing. [ECF No. 34-8]. On March 20, 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Petitioner's PCR application in a published opinion. [ECF No. 34-12]. Remittitur was issued on May 13, 2013.
Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on November 18, 2013. [ECF No. 59-3].
On May 10, 2013, Petitioner commenced the instant § 2254 action by filing a motion to stay his execution and a motion to appoint counsel. See [ECF No. 1]. On May 23, 2013, the Court stayed Petitioner's execution and appointed Norris and Ehlies as Petitioner's counsel. [ECF Nos. 17; 19]. Petitioner filed his petition on August 21, 2013, raising six grounds for relief. [ECF No. 42]. The Court then extended Petitioner's stay of execution during the pendency of this case. [ECF No43].
On January 17, 2014, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court appointed Jeffrey P. Bloom, Esq. to investigate whether Petitioner may have additional claims not previously presented that may nevertheless be asserted under Martinez. [ECF No. 81]. On April 17, 2014, Mr. Bloom reported to the Court that he had discovered five additional potential claims that had not been previously asserted. [ECF No. 106].
On July 23, 2014, the Court granted Petitioner's motion to amend his habeas petition and to substitute counsel. [ECF No. 123]. Petitioner filed an amended petition on August 8, 2014, raising the six grounds raised in the original petition and the five new grounds discovered by Mr. Bloom.4 [ECF No. 131]. Petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus asserts the following grounds for relief:
I. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Sigmon's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, by failing to object to the state's improper cross-examination of a defense sentencing expert on adaptability to confinement and failing to object to the state's closing arguments concerning the day to day details of prison life.
II. The Supreme Court of South Carolina violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States by exercising its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner on Ground I by granting relief to other death-sentenced inmates while denying certiorari and relief to Sigmon when he presented the same issue with nearly identical facts and is therefore similarly situated.
III. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in derogation of Sigmon's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for failing to object to the solicitor'simproper closing arguments wherein the solicitor gave his personal opinions that death was the appropriate punishment and made improper "send a message" arguments.
IV. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to request a charge on the statutory mitigating circumstance of age or mentality, when evidence presented at trial established that Sigmon was extremely intoxicated at the time of the murders, having consumed large quantities of beer and crack cocaine beforehand.
V. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in derogation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for failing to object to the trial court's instructions that a non-statutory mitigating circumstance was one the defendant "claims" lessens his culpability since this improperly impugned the legitimacy of non-statutory mitigating evidence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
VI. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in derogation of Sigmon's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, by requesting and obtaining the statutory "mitigating" circumstance of "provocation by the victim" based on the testimony of three defense witnesses who were called to testify about their bad relationships with Sigmon's ex-girlfriend, and thereby blame her for her parents' murders, since this patently offensive strategy was very likely to inflame the jury.
VII. Sigmon was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel per the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by the failure of trial counsel to interview and call as witnesses additional family members and community witnesses, and by inadequately interviewing those family members that they did call as witnesses, and/or by failing to call the county detention center psychiatrist as a witness, and/or by failing to introduce an available video exhibit, such that substantial mitigating evidence was not presented and Sigmon was prejudiced thereby at the capital sentencing phase of his trial.
VIII. Sigmon was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel per the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments, and per S.C. Code §16-3-26(b)(1), in that the "second chair" attorney - who was not qualified under state law to serve as lead counsel - nonetheless served and acted as "lead counsel," contrary to the order of the court appointing counsel, and without objection from actual lead counsel, such that the trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and the petitioner was prejudiced thereby at the capital sentencing phase of his trial.
IX. Sigmon was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel per the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments in that trial counsel failed to object to thepetitioner being made to wear a stun-belt in court which was visible to jurors during the proceedings, and the petitioner was prejudiced thereby at the capital sentencing phase of his trial.
X. Sigmon was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel per the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments, and per S.C. Code §16-3-28, in that trial counsel was unaware that the second defense attorney could also have presented a closing argument at sentencing after the petitioner,...
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