Sigmon v. Stirling

• Decision Date: 14 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-7,18-7
• Parties: Brad Keith SIGMON, Petitioner - Appellant, v. Bryan P. STIRLING, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections and Willie Davis, Warden of Kirkland Correctional Institution, Respondents - Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

956 F.3d 183

Brad Keith SIGMON, Petitioner - Appellant,

v.Bryan P. STIRLING, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections and Willie Davis, Warden of Kirkland Correctional Institution, Respondents - Appellees.

No. 18-7

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 30, 2019

Decided: April 14, 2020

Amended: April 15, 2020

ARGUED: Joshua Snow Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Melody Jane Brown, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey Phillip Bloom, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge King wrote a dissenting opinion.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Brad Keith Sigmon seeks habeas relief from his death sentence for the murders of David and Gladys Larke. Sigmon argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the Supreme Court of South Carolina violated his due process and equal protection rights by granting relief to other similarly situated inmates.

Following a state court’s denial of relief, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina determined that the state court’s denial did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. As to Sigmon’s procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court concluded Sigmon has not demonstrated cause for the default or actual prejudice.

We affirm.

I.

In 2001, Sigmon and Rebecca Barbare had been in a romantic relationship for approximately three years and lived together in a trailer near the trailer of Barbare’s parents, David and Gladys Larke. Sigmon v. State , 403 S.C. 120, 742 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2013). But early in that year, after Barbare ended their relationship and moved in with her parents, Sigmon became increasingly obsessed with Barbare. Id.

On April 26, 2001, Sigmon and an acquaintance, Eugene Strube, spent the evening drinking alcohol and smoking crack cocaine. Id. Early in the morning of April 27, Sigmon told Strube that when Barbare left to take her children to school the next morning, Sigmon would go to the Larkes’ home, "tie her parents up," and "get ahold of" Barbare. J.A. 40–41.

Later that morning, after Barbare left to take her children to school, Sigmon took a baseball bat from beneath his trailer and entered David and Gladys Larke’s home. Sigmon , 742 S.E.2d at 396. When David Larke, upon seeing Sigmon, called to Gladys Larke to bring him his gun, Sigmon struck David Larke in the back of his head with the bat several times. Id. Thereafter, Sigmon chased Gladys Larke into the living room and struck her several times in the head. Id. at 397. Sigmon then went to the kitchen, saw David Larke was still moving, and struck him again. Id. And after seeing that Gladys Larke was also still moving, Sigmon struck her several more times. Id. David and Gladys Larke died within minutes.

Sigmon retrieved David Larke’s gun and waited for Barbare to return. Id. When she arrived, Sigmon forced her into her car and drove her away. Id. But during the ride, Barbare jumped from the car, causing Sigmon to pull over, chase after her, and shoot her. Id. Barbare survived the shooting. Id.

Meanwhile, Sigmon fled but was captured in Tennessee ten days later after his mother helped authorities locate him. Id. Upon his capture, Sigmon confessed to the murders. Id.

A South Carolina grand jury indicted Sigmon, charging him with two counts of murder, first degree burglary, and other offenses, including kidnapping. The state filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. Shortly before trial, the state dismissed all charges other than the two counts of murder and the single count of burglary.

Attorneys John Abdalla and Frank Eppes represented Sigmon at his July 2002 trial. During the guilt phase, Sigmon admitted his guilt to the jury. Id . The state presented evidence that David and Gladys Larke had likely lived for three to five minutes after Sigmon’s assault, hemorrhaging and breathing blood, before dying as a result of blunt force trauma to the head

. Id. The jury found Sigmon guilty of all charges. Id.

During sentencing, Sigmon’s mitigation case focused on childhood abandonment and the development of his social mores and judgment, as well as evidence of drug use and mental illness. Sigmon also presented evidence he was adapting to prison life and was not a difficult prisoner. Mitigation witnesses included three experts—a clinical social work expert, a pharmacology expert, and an expert on prison adaptability. Sigmon also called five jail employees, five family members, and a volunteer who led a Bible class at the jail. Other witnesses testified about Barbare’s previous relationships. After presenting sentencing evidence, the prosecutor and Attorney Eppes each made a closing argument. As permitted by South Carolina law, Sigmon also made a statement to the jury. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-28.

The jury recommended a sentence of death after finding three aggravating factors: two or more persons were murdered in one course of conduct; the murder was committed in the commission of a burglary; and the murder was committed in the commission of physical torture. The trial court sentenced Sigmon to thirty years for the burglary charge and to death for the two murder charges. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the sentence on direct appeal. State v. Sigmon , 366 S.C. 552, 623 S.E.2d 648, 649–50 (2005).

Sigmon then pursued relief through an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") filed in state court. The PCR court appointed Attorneys William Ehlies and Teresa Norris to represent Sigmon.

Sigmon alleged in his PCR application that his trial counsel were ineffective in, among other things, failing to object to improper prison conditions evidence, failing to object to improper closing arguments, and making various errors related to the court’s instructions on mitigation. An evidentiary hearing was held in August 2008, and in July 2009, the PCR court denied and dismissed Sigmon’s PCR application. Sigmon sought review by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which considered three of Sigmon’s claims but ultimately affirmed the PCR court’s dismissal. See Sigmon , 742 S.E.2d 394.

Thereafter, Sigmon sought relief in federal district court, asserting six grounds for relief, all of which had been presented to the South Carolina courts. After this Circuit’s decision in Juniper v. Davis , 737 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2013), the district court appointed a new attorney—one who had not represented Sigmon before the PCR court—to review the case for claims available under Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). The attorney identified five additional grounds for relief. Sigmon amended his petition to include all eleven grounds. Federal proceedings were stayed while Sigmon pursued a second PCR action in state court, where the state court determined Sigmon’s five new claims were procedurally defaulted under South Carolina law. When federal proceedings resumed, the state moved for summary judgment on Sigmon’s eleven claims. Sigmon withdrew one defaulted claim before the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, leaving four procedurally defaulted Martinez claims.

Applying the deferential standard of review found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the magistrate judge recommended denying relief on all six of Sigmon’s preserved claims. As for the four Martinez claims, the magistrate judge considered affidavits offered by Sigmon in support of these claims and nonetheless concluded none were substantial. Sigmon objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court overruled the objections, finding no preserved claim satisfied the standard articulated in § 2254(d) and no Martinez claim was substantial. The district court therefore granted the state’s motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, this Court granted a certificate of appealability on all of Sigmon’s preserved claims and all but one of Sigmon’s Martinez claims. On appeal, Sigmon argues that the district court erred on each asserted ground for relief and seeks to have his sentence vacated or, alternatively, seeks remand for an evidentiary hearing.

II.

We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief on summary judgment de novo. Bostick v. Stevenson , 589 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2009). However, we view this appeal generally through the highly deferential lens mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Our deference under § 2254 ensures "state proceedings are the central process, not just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas proceeding." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Accordingly, we may grant habeas relief on claims adjudicated on their merits in state court only if the adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ; see also Cummings v. Polk , 475 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2007).

On the other hand, this highly deferential standard does not apply to Sigmon’s Martinez claims, which were not adjudicated on their merits in state court. Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of habeas claims "that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state...