Signor v. Safeco Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 0:19-cv-61937-WPD |
| Parties | GINA SIGNOR, Plaintiff v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [DE 10] (the "Motion"), filed on August 15, 2019. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, Plaintiff's Response [DE 35], Defendants' Reply [DE 39], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Gina Signor ("Signor" or "Plaintiff") filed this putative class action against Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois ("Safeco" or "Defendant") in Florida state court on June 25, 2019. See Am Compl. [DE 1-1] ("AC"). The Complaint alleges four counts; a claim for declaratory relief under Florida Statute § 86.021; a claim for breach of contract for Defendant's use of the CCC ONE Market Value system ("CCC System"); a claim for breach of contract for Defendant's failure to pay dealer fees; and a claim for Defendant's taking of the salvage value of Plaintiff's total loss vehicle. Defendant removed this case on August 1, 2019, and the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand on December 11, 2019. See [DE 27].
Plaintiff pursues this action on behalf of herself and a putative class of Florida Safeco personal automobile policy holders. AC 17. Plaintiff's breach of contract and declaratory relief claims arise out of Safeco's alleged failure to properly settle total loss claims. AC 1.
Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief, Count I, alleges Plaintiff and other class members are uncertain of their rights under the Policy and Florida law and wish to obtain a declaration of their rights thereunder. AC 22.
In Count II, Plaintiff lays out a breach of contract claim based on Defendant's use of the CCC System. See AC 22-25. According to Plaintiff, Defendant's use of the CCC System does not satisfy Plaintiff's insurance policy with Defendant (the "Policy") on its face or as amended to conform with Florida law. AC 9-12. In particular, Plaintiff alleges 1) Defendant's use of the CCC system fails to comply with the options for settling a total loss claim on the basis of actual cash value and 2) Defendant has failed to maintain proper documentation of the deductions and adjustments made to the amount offered by Defendant to settle Plaintiff's total loss claim. AC 11-12.
In addition, Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim Count III, based on Defendant's refusal to pay "dealer fees" which Plaintiff alleges are included in the definition of "actual cash value" as provided for by the Policy and Florida law. AC 12. Finally, Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim Count IV, for Safeco's allegedly impermissible taking of the salvage value of insureds' total loss vehicles. Plaintiff alleges that Safeco took the salvage value of insureds' total loss vehicles, even though such a condition or deduction is not provided for in the Policy. AC 13.
Defendant moves to dismiss all four counts.
To adequately plead a claim for relief, Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted only if the plaintiff is unable to articulate "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When determining whether a claim has facial plausibility, "a court must view a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true." Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2007).
However, the court need not take allegations as true if they are merely "threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "Mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, and a plaintiff cannot rely on naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013). "[I]f allegations are indeed more conclusory than factual, then the court does not have to assume their truth." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). In sum, "[t]he plausibility standard 'calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the defendant's liability." Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
According to Defendant, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief. Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief due to the lack of a realistic threat of future harm In addition, Defendant argues that the statutory provisions regarding which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment do not provide a private right of action.
"Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies.'" See A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2019). A key component of the requirement is a plaintiff's standing to bring his or her claims. Id. The doctrine of standing encompasses three requirements, 1) an injuiy-in-fact, 2) which is fairly traceable to defendant's conduct, and 3) redressable by the court. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). The federal Declaratory Judgment Act also limits relief to actual cases or controversies. See A&M Gerber, 925 F.3d at 1210.1 "In order to demonstrate that there is a case or controversy that satisfies Article Ill's standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief—as opposed seeking damages for past harm the plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears that there is a 'substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.'" See A&M Gerber, 925 F.3d at 1210 11 (quoting Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999)).
In A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO General Insurance Company, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who stated only a claim for declaratory relief did not have standing where Plaintiff failed to allege a risk of future injury. See Id. at 1215. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit found that the potential future possibility that the insured may still be insured by the defendant "under the same or a similar policy being interpreted the same way, thereby having this issue present itself again...is too contingent to constitute a "substantial likelihood" of future injury." See Id. However, in A&M Gerber, the Court made clear that plaintiffs would have standing where they "alleged that the insurer 'paid [them] less on the claim than [they] contend[ed] they [were] owed,'" Id. at 1214. In summary the Court stated, "[i]n the absence of a claim for money damages or substantial likelihood that [the insured] will suffer a future injury—both of which [plaintiff] was careful to avoid alleging here—[plaintiff] has no standing to pursue this case." Id. at 1216.
Here, Plaintiff clearly brings a claim for money damages in addition to a claim for declaratory relief under the insurance Policy. See AC 25, ¶ 42; AC 26 ¶ 46; AC 26 ¶ 50; AC 27. As such, Plaintiff has standing under relevant Eleventh Circuit precedent to bring a declaratory judgment claim to adjudicate her rights under the insurance Policy.
The Court notes that Defendant cites a previous order from this Court in the case Lopez v. Progressive, in which this Court dismissed a similar claim for declaratory relief. That Order relied on a version of A&M Gerber which has subsequently been vacated and superseded on rehearing. See A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.), withdrawn from bound volume, opinion vacated and superseded on reh'g, 925 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2019). This Court finds Plaintiff Signor has standing to bring a claim for declaratoryrelief under the analysis articulated in the Eleventh Circuit's May 30, 2019 superseding opinion in A&M Gerber. See 925 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2019).
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a statutory claim for declaratory relief because Florida's Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act ("UITPA") does not provide a private cause of action for violations of Florida Statute § 626.9743. In response, Plaintiff asserts that her claim for a declaratory judgment as to her rights under the Policy as amended to comply with § 626.9743 may be brought under both the Florida declaratory relief act and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
The federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. In the context of claims for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence dictates that the case or controversy must be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests; and that it be real and substantial and admit of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a...
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