Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. BD-42,BD-42
• Citation: Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 487 So.2d 1118, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 855 (Fla. App. 1986)
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 855 Doris SIKES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Noah Lee Sikes, Deceased, Appellant, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1118

487 So.2d 1118

11 Fla. L. Weekly 855

Doris SIKES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Noah Lee Sikes, Deceased, Appellant, v.SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

No. BD-42.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

April 9, 1986.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 1986.

William C. Gentry and C. Rufus Pennington, III, of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Gentry, Jacksonville, and Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, for appellant.

E. Dale Joyner and J.W. Prichard, Jr., of Taylor, Moseley & Joyner, Jacksonville, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant, Doris Sikes, as personal representative of the Estate of her deceased husband, Noah Lee Sikes, seeks reversal of a final judgment after jury verdict in her negligence action against Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company(Seaboard), appellee.Appellant relies primarily upon trial errors for reversal, contending: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse a juror for cause; (2)the court erred in admitting certain Department of Transportation trucking permit guidelines into evidence, and in instructing the jury that the guidelines had the force of law; and (3)the court erred in denying appellant's motion to strike certain expert testimony presented by Seaboard.Appellant also contends that the trial court should have granted appellant's motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.We find reversible error in the trial court's refusal to excuse the juror for cause.Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.

The facts concerning this fatal truck-train collision are stated in this court's opinion in Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 429 So.2d 1216(Fla. 1st DCA1983), pet. for rev. den., 440 So.2d 353(Fla.1983).In that decision, this court reversed for a new trial after a defense verdict.

We first consider the claim of error arising during the voir dire examination of venireman Smith, and the colloquy between appellant's counsel, Mr. Gentry, Seaboard's counsel, Mr. Joyner, and the court regarding venireman Smith's qualifications to serve after she admitted during questioning that she knew one of the attorneys associated with Seaboard's attorney's law firm.

From the voir dire examination, we note that the juror, Mrs. Smith, identified Jay Knight as one of the railroad's lawyers, and stated that he was her son's best friend; that Knight was her son's best man at his wedding; and that she saw Knight "[t]echnically every day when he's not working."When asked by plaintiff's counsel if the acquaintance "might cause her to have reservations,"she answered: "I can't say."Counsel's request for another juror was denied.

The questioning resumed, with the juror stating that she would "try to be--not partial," and "I don't think I would."However, when appellant's counsel asked whether the fact that she knew Knight might make her "give a little bit more weight to what they[Seaboard's counsel] say as opposed to what I say ...,"she answered: "Probably."

At that point, the trial judge intervened with the question whether she could be fair to both sides despite the fact that her son was a friend of Seaboard's law firm, to which she replied: "I'll try to be fair."Despite this answer, to the very next question, posed by appellant's counsel--"[D]o you think that that would be an extra weight in any way on the side of the railroad?"--Mrs. Smith responded: "Yes, I suppose it would."Notwithstanding this answer, appellant's challenge for cause was again denied by the court.Finally, after exercising his remaining peremptory challenges, appellant's counsel renewed his request for removal of Mrs. Smith, which was again denied.

Challenge of jurors for cause is governed by Rule 1.431,Florida Rules of Civil Procedure:

(c) Challenge for Cause.

(1) On motion of any partythe court shall examine any prospective juror on oath to determine whether he is related to any party or to the attorney of any party within the third degree or is related to any person alleged to have been wronged or injured by the commission of the wrong for the trial of which the juror is called or has any interest in the action or has formed or expressed any opinion or is sensible of any bias or prejudice concerning it or is an employee or has been an employee of any party within 30 days before the trial.A party objecting to the juror may introduce any other competent evidence to support the objection.If it appears that the juror does not stand indifferent to the action or any of the foregoing grounds of objection exists or that he is otherwise incompetent, another shall be called in his place.(emphasis supplied)

As seen from the underlined portions of the rule above quoted, one of the grounds for objection to a juror is if the juror "is sensible of any bias or prejudice" concerning the case before the court.The rule further provides: "If it appears that ... any of the foregoing grounds of objection exists ...," the juror shall be removed, and "another shall be called in his place."Rule 1.431(c)(1),Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

Early case law counsels removal of a juror because of a friendly relationship with one of the attorney's in the case.In Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 121 So. 793(1929), the Supreme Court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to remove a juror because of his friendly relations with plaintiff's attorney.The juror had admitted that if there was any doubt in his mind he would give the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt in the case, and that it would embarrass him to render a verdict against the plaintiffs.Afterwards, however, upon questions by plaintiffs' counsel and the trial judge, the juror indicated that he would be able to go into the jury room and " 'render a fair and impartial verdict according to the evidence and the evidence alone.' "Id.121 So. at 796.Commenting upon the juror's answer to the later questions put to him by plaintiffs' counsel, the court said (121 So. at 796):

Notwithstanding his answer to the latter questions, we are not surprised that defendants' counsel think that the trial in which that juror participated was tainted by the suspicion, if indeed not by the fact of his unfairness, by reason of his bias for the plaintiff, which existed because of his friendly relations with their counsel.

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If there is a doubt as to the juror's sense of fairness or his mental integrity, he should be excused.It is a ground of challenge for cause.

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[W]hen a question of the juror's fitness to serve on the score of his freedom from prejudice is presented, the question is determined within the discretion of the judge [citation omitted], his discretion may be abused, and, if it is, it is subject to review.

Finally, the court in Johnson v. Reynolds concluded with these words (121 So. at 796):

Mr. Thompson, in his excellent work on Trials, says that refinements and distinctions between "bias" and "prejudice" can serve no useful purpose in the administration of justice.If the proposed juror is affected by either state of mind, it cannot be said that he is fair-minded and impartial, and, if accepted as a juror, that he would be of that standard of impartiality which is necessary to prevent an impairment of the right to jury trial.It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias or prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence.By what sort of principle is it to be determined that the last statement of the man is better and more worthy of belief than the former?We think that the juror should have been excused upon the challenge by the defendant for cause and denying the challenge was reversible error.

We note that Johnson v. Reynolds has recently been cited by the Florida Supreme Court with apparent approval in Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553(Fla.1985), for the proposition that if there is a doubt as to the juror's sense of fairness or his mental integrity, he should be excused.Id. at 556.

The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and manifest error must appear before such rulings will be reversed.Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7(Fla.1959);Plair v. State, 453 So.2d 917(Fla. 1st DCA1984).We conclude, however, that this is one of those "close cases" alluded to in Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So.2d 533(Fla. 4th DCA1985), which should have been resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to her impartiality.

The trial judge's denial of the challenge for cause on the strength of the juror's testimony that she would "try to be fair" was error.In arriving at this conclusion, it is unnecessary for this...