Siladi v. McNamara

Citation325 A.2d 277,164 Conn. 510
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date21 March 1973
PartiesErnest SILADI v. Thomas F. McNAMARA et al.

Richard A. Silver, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, were John W. Roberts, Greenwich, and Stephen M. Seelig, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).

G. Sarsfield Ford, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Marguerite D. Weeks, for appellee (named defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court rendered following the acceptance of a jury verdict for the named defendant and the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Of the assignments of error, two claims have been preserved for appeal. One is that the court erred in excluding testimony of a witness offered as an expert by the plaintiff. The second is that the charge to the jury was inadequate.

The case arises from an automobile accident on the Merritt Parkway in 1966. The plaintiff was driving his vehicle in an easterly direction in the left of the two eastbound lanes when a car driven by the defendant Esternoris Prieto and owned by the defendant Betzy Prieto which had been traveling somewhat erratically in a westerly direction, weaved across the median divider and collided with the plaintiff's car. This collision forced both vehicles into the right-hand lane of eastbound traffic, in which the named defendant was driving. Seconds after the collision between the Prieto and Siladi cars, the named defendant's automobile struck the rear of the Siladi vehicle.

The plaintiff subsequently instituted this action seeking compensation for his injuries. Neither the defendant Esternoris Prieto nor the defendant Betzy Prieto entered an appearance. The jury returned a verdict against the defaulting defendants in the amount of $40,000 but found the issues in favor of the named defendant. The court accepted the verdict and refused to set it aside.

We first consider the claim that the trial court erred in ruling that a witness offered by the plaintiff was not qualified to testify as an expert witness. 1 The witness, David Kessler, according to the offer of proof, would have testified that the named defendant 'had sufficient time to stop his vehicle so as not to strike the rear of Mr. Siladi's car.' He would have based his opinion on 'the cause, time, distance, speed, skid marks, and other matters relating to the physical evidence of the automobile collision.'

After an extended examination of the witness' qualifications, the court excluded the witness' proffered testimony. The court found that the witness was an administrator of a program designed to further highway safety in New Jersey and that he supervised and participated in accident analyses, but also that he 'made no claim to expertise with regard to the particular matter of composition of road surfaces,' that he did not know what an accident test was, and that he was primarily an administrator rather than an investigator The court then excluded the offered testimony, stating that although the witness might qualify as an expert in some field, it was 'not convinced he qualifies as an expert in this particular field.'

'The determination of the qualification of an expert is largely a matter for the discretion of the trial court.' Coffin v. Laskau, 89 Conn. 325, 329, 94 A. 370, 372; Oborski v. New Haven Gas Co., 151 Conn. 274, 280, 197 A.2d 73. The trial court's decision is not to be disturbed on appeal 'unless that discretion has been abused, or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.' 31 Am.Jur.2d 531, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 31; see Dunn v. Finley, 151 Conn. 618, 621, 201 A.2d 190; Oborski v. New Haven Gas Co., supra; Rogoff v. Southern New England Contractors Supply Co., 129 Conn. 687, 691, 31 A.2d 29.

In the case before us, the trial court properly applied the law and acted well within the scope of its discretion. Generally, expert testimony may be admitted if the witness has a special skill or knowledge, beyond the ken of the average juror, that, as properly applied, would be helpful to the determination of an ultimate issue. See, e.g., 31 Am.Jur.2d 523, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 26. The special skill or knowledge, however, must be directly applicable to the matter specifically in issue. '(An expert's) fitness, then, is a fitness to answer on that point. He may be fitted to answer about countless other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views in the matter in hand.' 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 555, p. 634. See Dunn v. Finley, supra, for an analogous set of circumstances. The trial court in the present case concluded that the expertise of the witness did not extend to the matters sought to be proven. We clearly do not have before us exceptional circumstances constituting an abuse of discretion. See Model Code of Evidence rule 401 comment c, pp. 201-2.

The plaintiff relies on Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co., 126 Conn. 221, 10 A.2d 600, and Rogoff v. Southern New England Contractors Supply Co., supra. The reliance is misplaced. The Wray case involved a misapplication of law, and Rogoff merely suggested in dicta that an abuse of discretion is more likely to occur in the exclusion of expert testimony than in its admission. 2 here there was no such abuse.

The plaintiff's second preserved assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to include certain of his requests to charge in its charge to the jury. The attacked portion of the charge concerns concurrent negligence and proximate...

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70 cases
  • State v. Hines
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 25 d2 Maio d2 1982
    ...the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.' State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275, 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515, 325 A.2d 277 [1973]. It is well established that individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall ......
  • State v. Moye
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 9 d2 Outubro d2 1979
    ...the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.' State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275, 348 A.2d 645, 649; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515, 325 A.2d 277. It is well established that individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge. S......
  • State v. Piskorski
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 19 d2 Junho d2 1979
    ...presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.' State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275, 348 A.2d 645; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515, 325 A.2d 277. It is well established that individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charg......
  • State v. Gabriel
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 d2 Março d2 1984
    ...the case to the jury so that no injustice will result." State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275, 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515, 325 A.2d 277 [1973]. It is well established that individual instructions are not to be judged in an artificial isolation from the overa......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Survey of 1993 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 68, January 1993
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