Silberstein v. I.R.S., 93-2629

• Citation: 16 F.3d 858
• Decision Date: 14 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2629,93-2629
• Parties: -1166, 94-1 USTC P 50,081 Michael J. SILBERSTEIN; Laraine Silberstein, Appellants, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; United States of America, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 858

16 F.3d 858

73 A.F.T.R.2d 94-1166, 94-1 USTC P 50,081

Michael J. SILBERSTEIN; Laraine Silberstein, Appellants, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; United States of America, Appellees.

No. 93-2629.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 11, 1994.

Decided Feb. 14, 1994.

Counsel who represented the appellant was Edgar E. Lim of St. Louis, MO.

Counsel who represented the appellee was Gary R. Allen of the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, WELLFORD, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion by ruling on a motion for summary judgement filed forty-one days rather than forty-five days prior to the date scheduled for trial. We disagree and affirm.

Michael J. Silberstein and Laraine Silberstein sought a tax refund. The district court originally set the matter for trial on March 1, 1993. The court issued a subsequent scheduling order establishing a pretrial conference on March 5, 1993, in preparation for trial "on the three week docket commencing March 1, 1993."

The Silbersteins had been served with a request for admissions to which they had failed to respond for some five months after the thirty-day deadline established by Fed.R.Civ.P. 36. They attempted to respond out of time on January 11, 1993. However, the district court, on January 15, overruled the motion for leave to respond and, instead, sustained the government's motion to deem the request admitted. Four days later, on January 19, 1993, the government filed its motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment motion was granted on March 3, 1993.

Appellants filed a "Motion to Set Aside" which the district court properly construed as a timely Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The motion was overruled and the Silbersteins' appeal.

Appellants do not take issue with the rulings of the district court on the merits of the dispute. Instead, they invoke a purported procedural violation of Local Rule 7(H).

Rule 7(H), adopted by the district court under the authority granted by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2071(a) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, provides that: "motions for summary judgment or to dismiss may not be filed later than forty-five (45) days prior to the trial date." Such local rules, as appellants correctly contend, are binding on the parties. See, e.g., Braxton v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 728 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir.1984).

Our problems with appellants' contentions are twofold. First, the trial court has ample authority to amend the trial date as it did in this case. A March 5 pretrial conference signals that the trial will not commence before that date. Thus, the summary judgment motion was timely. Second, the district court has considerable leeway in the application of its local rules. See Morgan Distributing Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 996 (8th Cir.1989). Indeed, "[i]t is...