Siler v. Guillotte

• Decision Date: 03 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 8584,8584
• Citation: 410 So.2d 1265
• Parties: Mark SILER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert GUILLOTTE, Allstate Insurance Company, Louisiana Department ofTransportation, and Pearson Construction Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 1265

410 So.2d 1265

Mark SILER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert GUILLOTTE, Allstate Insurance Company, Louisiana

Department ofTransportation, and Pearson

Construction Company, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8584.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Feb. 3, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1982.

Corne & Block, Louis M. Corne, and Fruge & DeJean, Kenneth W. DeJean, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.

Voorhies & Labbe, D. Mark Bienvenu, Lafayette, John W. King, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees.

Before GUIDRY, SWIFT and STOKER, JJ.

GUIDRY, Judge.

This case is one of two tort actions based upon common facts which were consolidated for trial in the interest of judicial expediency. The cases remain consolidated on appeal and we this day render a separate decision in the companion matter entitled Allen Chevalier v. Robert Guillotte, et al., 410 So.2d 1271.

Plaintiffs, Mark Siler and Allen Chevalier, filed separate tort actions against defendants, Robert Guillotte, his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (hereafter Allstate), Pearson Construction Company (hereafter Pearson), and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (hereafter DOTD), for damages resulting from an automobile-truck collision occurring at the intersectional interchanges of I-10 West and Highway 167. Guillotte and his insurer filed answer denying any responsibility for the accident and in the alternative alleging contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs. By third party demand Guillotte and his insurer sought indemnification and/or contribution from Pearson and DOTD. Guillotte's demand for indemnification and/or contribution was based on his contention that traffic control devices in the vicinity of the accident were inadequate to warn motorists of abnormal, dangerous traffic conditions existing in that section of the highway. Third party demands for indemnification and/or contribution were also filed by Pearson against DOTD and DOTD against Guillotte, his insurer, and Pearson and their insurer, American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company.

On August 25, 1980, a partial judgment of dismissal was rendered by the trial court dismissing plaintiffs' suits against Guillotte and his insurer due to a settlement reached by the aforesaid parties. However, the plaintiffs, Siler and Chevalier, reserved all rights against Pearson and DOTD and agreed to assume responsibility, if any, for any judgment rendered against Guillotte and Allstate pursuant to DOTD's third party demand. Plaintiffs' suit against Pearson was tried to a jury which concluded that Robert Guillotte was negligent and that his negligence was the sole cause of the accident. Plaintiffs' suits against DOTD were tried by the district judge who also concluded that the sole cause of the accident was Robert Guillotte's negligence. A judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against DOTD and Pearson was signed on January 21, 1980. Plaintiffs appeal.

On October 11, 1977, plaintiffs were involved in an automobile-truck collision in the Parish of Lafayette, Louisiana at the intersectional interchange of Louisiana Highway 167 and U. S. Interstate 10. Louisiana Highway 167 is a four lane separated highway running generally north and south. U. S. Interstate 10 is a four lane separated highway running generally east and west. The record reflects that defendant, Pearson, had contracted with DOTD to perform certain repairs on the I-10 overpass which crosses over Highway 167. The repair work necessitated the closing of the northbound two lanes of Highway 167 as it passes under the overpass. Northbound traffic on that roadway was re-routed from the northbound lanes of traffic to the easternmost southbound lane of Highway 167. This was accomplished by a cross over road some distance from the overpass where traffic in the northbound lanes would cross over to the easternmost southbound lane. In other words, for some distance north and south of the overpass Highway 167 accommodated two-way traffic.

On the aforesaid date, the Siler vehicle, ¹ which was traveling north on Highway 167, entered the detour section, crossed over to the southbound lane in accordance with traffic directives, and entered the easternmost lane of the two-way traffic detour. After traveling a short distance, at a point almost to the overpass, while Siler was in his proper lane of travel, an automobile driven by Robert Guillotte crossed from the opposite lane of travel into plaintiffs' lane and crashed head-on into the Siler vehicle. Both plaintiffs sustained substantial injuries as a result of the collision.

The following issues are presented on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in refusing to permit plaintiffs to present evidence regarding the non-negligence of Robert Guillotte; and, (2) Did the trial court and jury err in concluding that Robert Guillotte's negligence was the sole cause in fact of the accident.

Appellants' first specification of error is based upon a ruling by the trial court sustaining objection to evidence sought to be introduced by the plaintiffs tending to exonerate Robert Guillotte from negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident. The objection was made prior to plaintiffs calling Robert Guillotte on direct examination. The basis for the defendants' objection and the court's ruling was that plaintiffs in their pleadings alleged that the accident was caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of all defendants and had thereby judicially confessed the negligence of Robert Guillotte.

A somewhat similar issue was presented in Wall v. American Employers Insurance Company, 386 So.2d 79 (La.1980). In Wall, our Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal erred in determining, as a procedural matter, that plaintiffs were bound by their original and amended pleadings filed at the commencement of the litigation, before settlement with and release of two alleged tortfeasors, such that the judgment ultimately rendered against the unreleased tortfeasor entitled the remaining defendant to a reduction of that judgment. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court stated:

".... Here plaintiffs settled with and released two of the three defendants well before trial. Aware of the release, defendant itself raised in its supplemental answer to the petition the issue of the negligence of the released co-defendants and prayed that if judgment be for the plaintiffs, the judgment be reduced because of the release of the two co-defendants. And while plaintiffs did not amend their original petition in which they alleged the joint and concurrent negligence of all defendants, plaintiffs did introduce without objection from defendant evidence of lack of fault on the part of the two released co-defendants.

In this case as in Hall (Hall v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 278 So.2d 795 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973)) the issue of the co-defendants' fault or lack thereof was fully and completely litigated at trial. Defendant did not object to the introduction of the evidence of the released co-defendants' lack of fault; nor did it at or before trial contend that plaintiffs had judicially confessed the released co-defendants' negligence in their pleadings. Consequently defendant must be held to have consented to expansion of the pleadings by introduction of the evidence. ³ Had defendant objected, showing his lack of express or implied consent, then the trial court could have allowed plaintiffs to amend their petition. 4 An objection at that time would possibly have facilitated amendment of the petition and would have obviated this procedural problem.

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs are not bound by their allegations in the original petition, for the pleadings were amended by implied consent of the parties to charge exclusive fault on the part of the police jury. The Court of Appeal's reliance upon the allegations in plaintiffs' original petition was erroneous." (footnotes omitted).

Unlike Wall, the defendants in this case timely objected to the introduction of such evidence and plaintiffs did not seek to amend their pleadings pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. Article 1154 to alleged exclusive fault on the part of the remaining defendant.

The issue presented is close. However, we conclude that we need not categorically decide whether the trial court's ruling was in error. This is so because, even if erroneous, plaintiff suffered no prejudice as a result of this ruling. The record, in this case, reflects that the issue of Robert Guillotte's fault or lack thereof was fully and completely litigated at trial such that there is an adequate record for this court to review and make a determination on that issue.

We now address appellants' remaining specification of error. As stated, plaintiffs contend that the trial judge and the jury erred in concluding that Robert Guillotte's negligence was the sole cause in fact of plaintiffs' injuries. In this regard, plaintiffs allege that both Pearson and DOTD were negligent in failing to erect adequate warning signs and road markings advising Guillotte of the two-way traffic zone existing at the intersection of U.S. I-10 and Louisiana Highway 167, and that such negligence was the cause in fact of plaintiffs' damages.

At trial Guillotte testified that prior to the accident he had been at a local bar where he drank a few beers with three friends. Shortly thereafter, he and his friends left the bar in Guillotte's automobile. He stated that he drove via U. S. I-10 East to Breaux Bridge, Louisiana where he immediately turned around and began driving in a westerly direction on I-10 towards Lafayette. Guillotte testified that he exited I-10...