Silfies v. City of Allentown
| Decision Date | 26 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1796 C.D. 2019,1796 C.D. 2019 |
| Citation | 247 A.3d 1196 (Table) |
| Parties | Stephanie SILFIES, Appellant v. CITY OF ALLENTOWN |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Stephanie Silfies (Plaintiff) appeals from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County in her personal injury action against the City of Allentown. The jury reached a defense verdict that the City was not negligent. Plaintiff seeks a new trial based upon what she contends were prejudicial errors by the trial court. We adopt the trial court's opinion and affirm its order denying Plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new trial.
The record in this case is voluminous, but the undisputed facts for purposes of considering this appeal may be summarized as follows. On the afternoon of July 20, 2015, Plaintiff took her teenaged son and his friend to Joseph Daddona Park to eat lunch. Plaintiff parked her car and, with her son and his friend, walked through Daddona Park to and across a pedestrian bridge in order to sit in the shade of a tree. Upon reaching the end of the bridge, Plaintiff encountered a descent consisting of two steps (the first step onto a single stone stair adjacent to the end of the bridge and a second step to the ground). Plaintiff stepped off the bridge with her right foot onto the single stair. Plaintiff fell and her right lower extremity—which was previously compromised by a severe injury to her right ankle which had required multiple surgeries, as well as amputation of all her toes1 —suffered a compound spiral fracture. After several months of unsuccessful treatment attempting to heal the fracture, Plaintiff's right leg was amputated below the knee.
Plaintiff filed a complaint consisting of a single count of negligence against the City in July 2017. Among the defenses raised in the City's amended answer and new matter was whether recovery was prohibited by what is known as the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (RULWA).2 RULWA was enacted "to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability." Section 1 of RULWA, 68 P.S. § 477-1. At the conclusion of the pleadings, the City filed for summary judgment asserting immunity under RULWA and Plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment to the effect that RULWA was inapplicable. The trial court denied both motions and permitted testimony concerning the factors relevant to the applicability of RULWA and the ultimate issue of whether RULWA applied.
A jury trial was held from June 10 to June 14, 2019. Prior to trial, Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence and argument that she was obligated to use and/or negligent for not using another path. By order dated February 1, 2019, the trial court denied this motion. Also prior to trial, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff's conviction of a summary offense of retail theft was admissible as evidence of crimen falsi.
After the parties had rested, the City moved for a nonsuit and directed verdict on the basis of RULWA, which motion the trial court denied. The trial court conducted a charging conference with counsel for the parties, during which the trial court determined as a matter of law that RULWA did not apply and that the City was not immune from suit.3 The trial court instructed the jury to disregard all testimony on RULWA (Notes of Testimony June 14, 2019; Reproduced Record "R.R." at 1870a), and, with the agreement of the parties, gave instructions on the applicable law using the points for charge jointly offered by the parties regarding the issues of negligence, factual cause, comparative negligence, and the duty of a landowner to a public invitee and the duty owed to Plaintiff.
During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the trial court:
If Recreational law does not apply then what law apply's [sic] to the bridge concerning maintenance [sic], safety[,] and signage? And how does it apply to people with disabilities?
(Court Ex. 1; R.R. at 2095a.) The trial court conferred with counsel outside the jury's presence. The trial court denied Plaintiff's request to instruct the jury on signage requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).4 The trial court responded to the jury's question by stating that the only legal standard applicable to the circumstances of the case was negligence and that RULWA was inapplicable. Noting that some jurors shook their head "yes" to the potential rereading of the jury charges and others shook their head "no," the trial court asked the jury to go back and talk about it, offering to reread the entire charge if the jury wished him to do so. Shortly thereafter, without requesting the rereading of the charge or further instruction, the jury returned with a defense verdict by a vote of 11 to 1, finding that the City was not negligent. The trial court denied Plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new trial and, upon appeal to this Court and the filing of a statement under Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure by Plaintiff, issued an opinion under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, Plaintiff raises the following issues, which we have paraphrased for the sake of conciseness:
We have carefully reviewed the trial court's opinion under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), which we believe ably addresses these issues. Therefore, we adopt the trial court's opinion (appended hereto) and affirm the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new trial.
AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2021, the December 5, 2019 opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County appended hereto is ADOPTED and the order of that court denying Appellant Stephanie Silfies’ post-trial motion for a new trial is AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF COMMON FLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION
Plaintiff Stephanie Silfies ("Silfies") suffered injuries when she fell at approximately 6:00 p.m. on July 20, 2015, while crossing a pedestrian bridge located within the Defendant City of Allentown's Joseph S. Daddona Lake & Terrace Park ("Daddona Park"). A jury trial was held from June 10, through June 14, 2019, that resulted in a verdict in favor of the Defendant City of Allentown (the "City").1
Daddona Park consists of eleven acres of land which were gifted to the City in 1932. It includes greenspace, a manmade lake, an amphitheater, a portion of Cedar Creek and a pedestrian bridge over Cedar Creek as one of several ways to access a picnic area. The lake was constructed in 1934/1935. The bridge was affixed to the property as early as 1938. Silfies fell while crossing the bridge. In essence, Silfies claimed the City was negligent in failing to properly maintain the bridge. She raises seven errors in her post-trial motions, each of which will be addressed seriatim.
Prior to trial, Silfies filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the City filed a motion for summary judgment on the applicability of the Recreational Use of Land and Water Act (the "RULWA"), 68 P.S. §§ 477-1 - 477-8. The RULWA was adopted "to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability." 68 P.S. § 477-1. It provides, subject to certain conditions, that:
... an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
68 P.S. § 477-3. It specifically includes "picnicking" as a "recreational purpose" for which the protected land may be used. 68 P.S. § 477-2 (3). And it defines "land" as follows:
... land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
The City contended it was immune from liability under the RULWA; Silfies contended the RULA did not apply to this case. The court denied both motions by order of February 4, 2019. In reaching that decision, the court reviewed various cases to discern the relevant factors relied upon to determine the applicability of the RULWA and concluded it was not clear on the then-developed record that either party was entitled to summary judgment on that...
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