Silliman v. City of Memphis

• Citation: 449 S.W.3d 440
• Decision Date: 02 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. W2013–02858–COA–R3–CV.,W2013–02858–COA–R3–CV.
• Parties: Doyle S. SILLIMAN, et al. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

449 S.W.3d 440

Doyle S. SILLIMAN, et al.

v.CITY OF MEMPHIS.

No. W2013–02858–COA–R3–CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Assigned on Briefs May 30, 2014.

July 2, 2014.

Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court Nov. 12, 2014.

Allan J. Wade and Brandy S. Parrish, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, The City of Memphis.

Ricky E. Wilkins and Sharon H. Loy, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Doyle S. Silliman, Larry Sawyer, Wanda Sawyer, Harry E. Smith, III, Kathleen J. Smith, Robert E. Teutsch, Marilyn Williams, Frank G. Witherspoon, Martha C. Witherspoon.

OPINION

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J.

In this case, we are called upon to review the trial court's decision to set aside a consent order regarding an annexation on the basis of the subsequent passage of legislation allegedly affecting the agreed-upon annexation. Because we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–122 does not apply to prohibit the annexation ordinance at issue, we reverse the trial court's judgment and reinstate the consent order.

Background

At some point prior to June 2006, the Defendant/Appellant City of Memphis (“the City”) enacted Ordinance No. 4513 (“the Ordinance”), thereby annexing into the City the property described in the Ordinance, commonly known as the Southwind Annexation Area. Plaintiffs/Appellees Doyle S. Silliman, Marilyn Williams, Harry E. Smith, III, Kathleen J. Smith, Larry Sawyer, Wanda Sawyer, Robert E. Teutsch, Roslyn M. Teutsch, Frank G. Witherspoon, and Martha C. Witherspoon (collectively, “Appellees”), on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated property owners, filed three separate quo warranto¹ actions challenging the legality and reasonableness of the annexation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–103. The lawsuits were later consolidated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–103(d).²

On June 8, 2006, Appellees and the City entered into a consent order, captioned “Amended Consent Final Judgment,” which allowed the annexation of the Southwind Annexation Area to move forward. The consent order stated that “[w]ithin the time frame established [herein], the validity of Ordinance No. 4513 is sustained. To determine the effective dates of the annexation, the parties divided the area contained in the Southwind Annexation Area into five subsections and provided the effective annexation dates for each area. Specifically at issue in this case were the areas known as “B1 and B2.” The consent order indicates that the annexation would occur on December 31, 2013. In addition, the consent order specifically includes terms that the parties could not appeal the consent order, and that the order was a final judgment disposing of all matters in dispute.

Several years passed. On May 16, 2013, the Tennessee General Assembly passed new legislation, which appeared to establish an annexation moratorium preventing municipalities from extending their corporate limits by means of annexation by ordinance from April 15, 2013 through May 15, 2014. See generally Tenn.Code Ann. § 6–51–122 (including certain exceptions not pled in this case). Thereafter, on December 19, 2013, less than two weeks from when the annexation was to become effective, the Appellees filed a motion captioned “Combined Petition and Memorandum in Support of Injunctive Relief and Relief from Amended Consent Final Judgment.” In their motion, which concerned only the areas known as B1 and B2, the Appellees asked the trial court to set aside the consent order allowing the annexation of these areas, which annexation was to occur on December 31, 2013. As the ground for their petition, Appellees relied upon Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the General Assembly's intervening enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–122 prevented the City from annexing any property by ordinance until after May 15, 2014. The Appellees also asked that the trial court enter an injunction preventing the City from annexing the subject property until May 16, 2014. The City filed a response denying that the Appellees were entitled to relief.

On December 23, 2013, the trial court granted the Appellees' motion to set aside the consent judgment, as well as their request for an injunction preventing the City from annexing the subject property until the expiration of the statutory moratorium. On the same day, the City filed a motion for a stay pending appeal, which was denied by the trial court. The City subsequently filed its notice of appeal to this Court.^{3 4}

Issues Presented

The City raises several issues for review, which are taken, and slightly altered, from its brief:

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellees relief from the Amended Consent Final Judgment entered June 8, 2006 pursuant to Rule 60.02 ?

2. Whether the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–122 preclude implementation of the City's Annexation Ordinance No. 4513 on December 31, 2013 as provided in the June 8, 2006 Amended Consent Final Judgment?

3. Whether the Tennessee Constitution's prohibition against retroactive laws precludes Tennessee Code Annotated section 6–51–122 from impairing the vested rights of the City created by the June 8, 2006 Amended Consent Final Judgment?

4. Whether Appellees are entitled to a modification of the Amended Consent Final Judgment based on the subsequent enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6–51–122 ?

5. Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees' request for injunctive relief?

In the posture of appellee, the Appellees also raise an issue as to the mootness of this appeal. As we perceive it, however, there are three issues in this case:

1. Whether the mootness doctrine demands dismissal of this appeal?

2. Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the final consent order?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the final consent order?

Analysis

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We begin with the Appellees' assertion that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal because the controversy has been rendered moot. Specifically, the Appellees argue that because the trial court's injunction only prevents the City from attempting to annex the Southwind Annexation Area until May 16, 2014, a date which had passed at the time this case was submitted to the Court on briefs, there is no remaining impediment to the annexation of the subject property. Because the City is no longer enjoined from taking steps to annex the Southwind Annexation Area by ordinance, the Appellees argue that this Court can offer no relief to the City to which they are not already entitled.

Our Supreme Court recently discussed the intertwining issues of justiciability and mootness:

This Court must first consider questions pertaining to justiciability before proceeding to the merits of any remaining claims. See UT Med. Grp., Inc. v. Vogt, 235 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tenn.2007) (noting that justiciability is a threshold inquiry). The role of our courts is limited to deciding issues that qualify as justiciable, meaning issues that place some real interest in dispute, Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 838 (Tenn.2008), and are not merely “theoretical or abstract,” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 203 (Tenn.2009). A justiciable issue is one that gives rise to “a genuine, existing controversy requiring the adjudication of presently existing rights.” Vogt, 235 S.W.3d at 119.

* * *

To be justiciable, an issue must be cognizable not only at the inception of the litigation but also throughout its pendency. Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 203–04. An issue becomes moot if an event occurring after the commencement of the case extinguishes the legal controversy attached to the issue, Lufkin v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 336 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tenn.2011), or otherwise prevents the prevailing party from receiving meaningful relief in the event of a favorable judgment, see Knott v. Stewart Cnty., 185 Tenn. 623, 207 S.W.2d 337, 338 (1948) ; Cnty. of Shelby v. McWherter, 936 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996). This Court has recognized a limited number of exceptional circumstances that make it appropriate to address the merits of an issue notwithstanding its ostensible mootness: (1) when the issue is of great public importance or affects the administration of justice; (2) when the challenged conduct is capable of repetition and evades judicial review; (3) when the primary dispute is moot but collateral consequences persist; and (4) when a litigant has voluntarily ceased the challenged conduct. Lufkin, 336 S.W.3d at 226 n. 5 (citing Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC, 301 S.W.3d at 204 ).

City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn.2013). Thus, the Appellees argue that the City's appeal is moot because this Court can offer the City no “meaningful relief in the event of a favorable judgment.” Id. (citing Knott, 207 S.W.2d at 338 ).

The City, in contrast, argues that this case is not moot, as the City would receive “meaningful relief in the event of a favorable judgment.” Id. (citing Knott, 207 S.W.2d at 338 ). Specifically, the City argues that if this Court were to determine either that the trial court did not have the power to alter the terms of the consent judgment, or that the trial court abused its discretion in enjoining the City from proceeding to annex the Southwind Annexation Area, the prior consent judgment, in which the annexation was to take place on December 31, 2013, would be reinstated. Because the consent judgment contains no requirement that the City take any affirmative action to effectuate the annexation, the City asserts that “vacating the trial court's recent order [enjoining the annexation] will automatically implement the December 31, 2013 annexation...