Silmon v. Rahhal
| Decision Date | 29 September 1936 |
| Docket Number | 25260. |
| Parties | SILMON et al. v. RAHHAL. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 24, 1936.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Under the provisions of section 9 of the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908, as amended by Act of Congress of April 12 1926, 44 Stat. 239, no conveyance of any full-blood Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes of any interest received by inheritance or devise in the allotment of a deceased Indian allottee shall be valid unless approved by the county court of the county in which the said allottee resided at the time of his death; and the order of the court approving such conveyance has the force and effect of a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction.
2. Where the order of a county court approving a full-blood Indian conveyance of land is attacked in a judicial proceeding, and by an agreed statement of facts filed in the cause it is shown that such county court was without jurisdiction to issue such order, said agreed statement of facts is a judicial admission and is binding upon the parties and upon the court, and the order should be declared invalid.
Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Eugene Rice, Judge.
Action by Ed M. Rahhal against Jefferson Silmon and others to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants have appealed.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and rendered in part.
Arnote & Arnote, of McAlester, for plaintiffs in error.
Wilkinson & Hudson, of McAlester, for defendant in error.
This case involves the legality of an order of the county court approving a full-blood Indian conveyance of inherited lands which deed was one subject to county court approval under section 9 of the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat 315, as amended by the Act of Congress of April 12, 1926, § 1, 44 Stat. 239. The section as amended is in part as follows: "Provided, That hereafter no conveyance by any full-blood Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes of any interest in lands restricted by section 1 of this Act acquired by inheritance or devise from an allottee of such lands shall be valid unless approved by the county court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of the deceased allottee or testator: * * * And provided further That all orders of the county court approving such conveyances of such land shall be in open court and shall be conclusive as to the jurisdiction of such court to approve such deed."
The case was submitted to the district court on an agreed statement of facts wherein it is shown that a full-blood Choctaw resident of Pittsburg county died in 1929 possessed of his allotment, and leaving as his sole heir his father, also a full-blood Choctaw. The father sold a portion of the allotment, and the deed was approved by the county court of Pittsburg county. He later sold the remaining portion, and the deed was approved by the county court of Pottawatomie county.
The latter deed is now attacked as void for lack of jurisdiction of the county court of Pottowatomie county to approve the same. The grantee therein, or his assigns, relies upon the proviso in the foregoing section of the act which is as follows: "And provided further; That all orders of the County Court approving such conveyances of such land shall be in open court and shall be conclusive as to the jurisdiction of such court to approve such deed." It is the grantee's contention that under this proviso when a deed is approved by a county court, although that court is not the one having jurisdiction of the settlement of the deceased allottee's estate, the order approving can under no circumstances be attacked for want of jurisdiction.
If we are to sustain the grantee's contention, it becomes apparent that the first proviso will be rendered meaningless. Such construction should be avoided if possible, and that interpretation be accorded the act which will allow the whole to stand, unless the provisions be found in hopeless conflict. Finerty v. First National Bank, 92 Okl. 102, 218 P. 859, 32 A.L.R. 1326. In the face of seeming conflict the courts will, where possible, harmonize the provisions of an act by placing upon the words therein employed that meaning tending more to harmony and to the expression of the real intent of the lawmaking body. Sackett v. Rose, 55 Okl. 398, 154 P. 1177, L.R.A.1916D, 820.
In the instant case the entire Act of Congress of April 12, 1926 (44 Stat. 239), must be examined as a whole in order to determine the intent of Congress and, if it become necessary to that purpose, words used therein may be modified or altered with reference to their generally accepted meaning, or others may be supplied in arriving at that intent. Oklahoma Coal Co. v. Atkinson, 121 Okl. 59, 247 P. 366. In construing the act, we should also look to the history of the times when the same was enacted, especially as applied to the subject of the legislation. Usually that history tends strongly to disclose the reason for the legislation and the conditions sought to be remedied thereby, and therefore the intention of the legislative body. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Gist, 79 Okl. 8, 190 P. 878.
By the wording of section 9 of the act of 1908, it is apparent that Congress attempted to place the power of approval in the county court as a court of probate; only probate courts had jurisdiction of the settlement of estates. However, the result is well known. The state and federal courts have interpreted that section as conferring upon the county court powers purely ministerial. Its act of approval was not judicial and remained at all times subject to collateral impeachment. Groom v. Dyer, 72 Okl. 99, 179 P. 12; Haddock v. Shelton, 142 Okl. 202, 286 P. 329; Barnett v. Kunkel, 259 F. 394, 170 C.C.A. 370. Thus its determination of the jurisdictional fact of residence of the deceased allottee was left without the force or effect of a judicial determination. As a result, titles to full-blood Indian inherited lands were thrown into an unsettled, and more or less chaotic, condition. It was this condition that Congress attempted to remedy by the amendment of April 12, 1926.
By this latter act, Congress clearly manifested its intention that such deeds thereafter executed should still be invalid unless approved by the county court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of the deceased allottee. That court is the one of the county in which the allottee resided at the time of his death. Section 1069, O.S.1931. But by the second proviso Congress has attempted to stabilize the orders of approval thereafter made and to designate the force and effect to be accorded them. Instead of permitting such order to remain merely the act of a ministerial officer, Congress has clearly manifested an intent that henceforth the act of approval shall be on a par with that of a court of general jurisdiction, and therefore not subject to impeachment except for extrinsic fraud or want of jurisdiction appearing upon the judgment roll. In such case jurisdiction is conclusively...
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