Silo v. Ridge

• Decision Date: 12 March 1999
• Citation: 728 A.2d 394
• Parties: Jerome SILO, Pennsylvania State Prisoner on his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated who were, are, and/or will be [subjected to] the Prison Medical Services Act, the Act of May 16, 1996, Act No. 1996-40, 61 P.S. 1011, et seq. and Act 53 of 1996, ___ and [subjected to] the new DC-ADM 820, co-pay for Medical Services Policy, which has been put in place due to the said legislation and which becomes effective as of May 18, 1998, and Jerome Silo, as next friend of PA state prisoners affected by the Prison Medical Services Act and by the DC ADM 820 Policy Abandoned by the Legal Fraternity, Petitioner, v. Tom RIDGE, Governor of Pennsylvania; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Martin F. Horn, Secretary of Pa. Department of Corrections; and James Price, individually, and in his official capacity of Supt. of SCI at Pittsburgh, Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

728 A.2d 394

Jerome SILO, Pennsylvania State Prisoner on his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated who were, are, and/or will be [subjected to] the Prison Medical Services Act, the Act of May 16, 1996, Act No. 1996-40, , et seq. and Act , ___ and [subjected to] the new DC-ADM 820, co-pay for Medical Services Policy, which has been put in place due to the said legislation and which becomes effective as of May 18, 1998, and Jerome Silo, as next friend of PA state prisoners affected by the Prison Medical Services Act and by the DC ADM 820 Policy Abandoned by the Legal Fraternity, Petitioner, v. Tom RIDGE, Governor of Pennsylvania; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Martin F. Horn, Secretary of Pa. Department of Corrections; and James Price, individually, and in his official capacity of Supt. of SCI at Pittsburgh, Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs January 15, 1999.

Decided March 12, 1999.

Jerome Silo, petitioner, pro se.

Mark E. Guzzi, Camp Hill, for respondents.

Before PELLEGRINI, J., LEADBETTER, J., and JIULIANTE, Senior Judge. JIULIANTE, Senior Judge.

Before the Court are preliminary objections filed on behalf of Respondents Tom Ridge, Governor, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), Martin F. Horn, Secretary of DOC, James Price, individually, and in his capacity of Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, to a petition for review on behalf of Jerome Silo, a state inmate, and those similarly situated (collectively, Silo), seeking a declaratory judgment holding that the Prison Medical Services Act (Act)¹ and DOC's Policy Bulletin DC-ADM 820: Co-Payment for Medical Services (Policy Bulletin)² are unconstitutional and invalid.³ For the reasons set for the below, we grant Respondents' preliminary objections and dismiss Silo's petition for declaratory relief.

I.

The Act established a co-pay program for inmate medical services in the DOC prison system that requires inmates to cover a portion of the actual costs of certain medical services provided. The Act also required that DOC develop regulations to implement the inmate co-pay program. Section 3(b) of the Act, 61 P.S. § 1013(b), requires that the regulations must provide for consistent medical services guidelines by specifying the medical services which are subject to fees, the fee amounts, payment procedures, medical procedures which are not subject to fees and fees applicable to medical emergencies, chronic care and preexisting conditions.

DOC promulgated regulations to implement the inmate co-pay program established by the Act. Those regulations became final and effective upon their publication in the May 30, 1998 issue of the Pennsylvania Bulletin and are now codified at 37 Pa.Code § 93.12. Pursuant to 45 Pa.C.S. § 905(1) and (2), final publication of the regulations in the Pennsylvania Bulletin creates a rebuttable presumption that the regulations were duly promulgated and have been approved as to legality.

In short, the regulations provide that DOC will charge inmates a $2.00 fee for the provision of a limited number of medical services, and two-thirds of the total cost of medical services provided to another inmate as a result of the inmate's assaultive conduct.⁴ However, the Act and regulations prohibit denying inmates access to any of the listed medical services because of inability to pay the required fee. DOC has prepared an inmate handbook explaining the Act and the regulations, including an explanation of the program regulations.

Silo, in his declaratory judgment action, asserts that the Act and Policy Bulletin are invalid based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§ 501-754, the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 10, the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder contained in U.S. Const. Art. I., § 9, cl. 3, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA), the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MHMRA),⁵ the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA)⁶ and the "soon to be enacted" Patient's Bill of Rights.⁷

On June 18, 1998, Respondents filed preliminary objections to Silo's declaratory judgment action seeking dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that 1) Silo's complaint fails to conform with the requirements of Pa. R.C.P. No. 1704, which requires that a class action complaint include the designation "Class Action" in the caption; 2) that Silo's declaratory judgment complaint is legally insufficient because he has failed to allege sufficient facts to state an actual controversy; and 3) Silo's declaratory judgment complaint is legally insufficient because it fails to state a cause of action under any of Silo's specific challenges to the Act and DC-ADM 820. "Initially we note that when ruling on preliminary objections, this Court considers as true all well-pleaded facts which are material and relevant." Giffin v. Chronister, 151 Pa. Cmwlth. 286, 616 A.2d 1070, 1072 (1992). "Specifically, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is deemed to admit all well-pleaded facts and all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom." Id. "In determining whether to sustain a demurrer the court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from the facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion." Id.

II.

This Court will first address Respondent's contentions that Silo should be denied declaratory relief because he has failed to allege sufficient facts to state an actual controversy and, alternatively, even assuming arguendo that a sufficient controversy has been alleged, that Silo has nevertheless failed to state a cause of action under the law with regard to any of his specific claims. Initially, we note that requests for declaratory relief are governed by the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541.⁸

"Declaratory relief is not available unless an actual controversy exists, is imminent or inevitable." Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Hafer, 142 Pa.Cmwlth. 502, 597 A.2d 754, 756 (1991). "A declaratory judgment is not appropriate to determine rights in anticipation of events which may never occur but is appropriate where there is imminent and inevitable litigation." Id. Without an actual imminent or inevitable controversy, a party lacks standing to maintain a declaratory action. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated in William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (1975), "[t]he core concept, of course, is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not `aggrieved' thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge."

In the case at bar, Silo seeks a declaration that the Act and Policy Bulletin are unconstitutional and are otherwise invalid based on various provisions of the United States Constitution, the ADA and several laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. However, a review of the petition for review in this case establishes that the relief sought is based on nothing more than mere conjecture and speculation. Silo has not alleged that he has or will imminently be adversely affected by the Act or policy. Absent such allegations, Silo lacks proper standing to bring an action under the DJA. Boyle v. Department of Transportation, 151 Pa. Cmwlth. 430, 617 A.2d 70 (1992).

Silo's complaint is devoid of any allegations that he has actually sought medical care and was denied such care or was provided with inadequate care as a result of the Act or Policy Bulletin. Moreover, Silo does not allege that his prison account has been wrongfully debited for a medical service or that he was deprived of an opportunity to challenge an assessment that is alleged to be improper. By filing this complaint, Silo has engaged in nothing more than an intellectual exercise without having been adversely affected by the Act and Policy Bulletin that are the subject of his attack; Silo's lack of standing becomes clear through a review of each of his claims.

In order to establish that the Act and Policy Bulletin violate the Eighth Amendment, Silo must establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)

; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Silo does not claim that he sought treatment for a serious medical need. Nor does he claim that the named officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Rather, Silo speculates that prisoners will forego medical treatment to avoid paying a medical service fee or will be denied medical care if inmates refuse to sign an authorization form to debit their accounts. Silo offers no facts that support his speculative assertions.

Even assuming that Silo's speculation regarding his Eighth Amendment challenge provides him with sufficient standing, the claim still must fail. Requiring inmates to pay a minimal fee for their medical care does not amount to deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3rd Cir.1997). The Eighth Amendment "does not guarantee prisoners the right to be entirely free from the cost considerations that figure in the medical care decisions made by most nonprisoners in our society." Id. at 175.

In order to establish that the Act and Policy Bulletin violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, Silo must establish that he has been deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Silo does not allege that he has actually been deprived of life, liberty or property. Nor does he allege that he was denied the opportunity to challenge any deprivation....