Silva v. City of New Bedford
| Decision Date | 10 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-11866-WGY |
| Citation | 602 F.Supp.3d 186 |
| Parties | Mary SILVA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD, Paul Fonseca, Brock Morrisette, and John Does 1-9, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Mary Silva, New Bedford, MA, Pro Se.
John J. Cloherty, III, Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants Paul Fonseca, City of New Bedford.
YOUNG, D.J.1
Beginning in March 2020, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a series of administrative orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic which tolled all civil statutes of limitations from March 17, 2020, until June 30, 2020.2 Mary Silva ("Silva") is a pro se civil rights plaintiff who seeks the benefit of these tolling orders.
Silva filed suit after police allegedly (1) set fire to her home by deploying flash grenades during a search and (2) later initiated an unlawful traffic stop. Verified Compl. ("Compl.") ¶¶ 17-32, ECF No. 1. She brought seven counts comprising constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" section 1983") and intentional torts. Id. ¶¶ 33-52. New Bedford Police Detective Paul Fonseca ("Fonseca") and the City of New Bedford ("New Bedford") (collectively, the "Defendants") moved to dismiss all counts on the grounds that the federal claims are untimely and the state claims without merit. Defs.’ City New Bedford & Paul Fonseca Mot. Dismiss ("Mot. Dismiss"), ECF No. 17. As to the federal claims, the dispute centers on an issue of first impression: whether the Supreme Judicial Court's tolling orders apply to section 1983 actions. See Defs.’ City New Bedford & Paul Fonseca Mem. Law Support Mot Dismiss ("Defs.’ Mem.") 6-9, ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Mem. Law Support Opp'n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Mem.") 4-8, ECF No. 30.
After hearing arguments on December 8, 2021, the Court took the matter under advisement. Electronic Clerk's Notes, ECF No. 36. On December 22, 2021, the Court entered an order allowing in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss. Order 1, ECF No. 37. In so ruling, the Court upheld Silva's federal claims as timely, allowing four counts -- all comprising section 1983 claims -- to survive. This Memorandum of Decision explains the Court's reasoning as to timeliness and now holds that the Supreme Judicial Court's tolling orders apply to section 1983 actions.
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 10, 2017 , while Silva was at the New Bedford Police Station, Fonseca, Massachusetts State Trooper Brock Morrisette ("Morrisette"), and SWAT team members executed a warrant to search her home for evidence on her boyfriend -- a homicide suspect. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20-21. Upon entry they deployed flash grenades, which started a fire that spread throughout the home, destroying Silva's property and displacing Silva and her son. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 26. That same evening , after leaving the station, Silva was stopped by five New Bedford police officers, who drew their guns and ordered her to exit her car. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. The officers visually searched the car, then left without explanation for the stop. Id. ¶ 30.
On October 15, 2020 ,3 Silva filed a complaint against: Fonseca, id. ¶ 6; Morrisette,4 id. ¶ 10; Michael Gomes, the former Chief of the New Bedford Police Department, id. ¶ 5; Daniel Bennet, the former Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, id. ¶ 2; the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, id. ¶¶ 3-4; the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, id. ¶ 3; and the New Bedford Police Department, id. ¶ 4. Silva also sued John Does 1-9, individuals of unknown identities comprised of SWAT team members and New Bedford police officers. Id. ¶¶ 7-9, 11-16.
Silva brought seven counts. Compl. ¶¶ 33-52. Counts one through five arise from the search of her home and counts six and seven from the subsequent traffic stop. Id.
On March 9, 2021, another session of this Court dismissed: the Eighth Amendment claims in counts one and two, Mem. & Order ("Judge Sorokin's Order") 7, 9, ECF No. 5; the Fifth Amendment claim in count six, id. 7, 9; the claims against Michael Gomes5 and Daniel Bennet in count five, id. 5, 8; and the claims against the New Bedford Police Department, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security in count five, id. 6, 8-9. The Court then added New Bedford to the docket as "the sole defendant" in count five. See id. at 6-7, 8.
The section 1983 claims which remained after the May 9 order alleged: violations of the Fourth Amendment against Fonseca, Morrisette, and John Does 1-5 (counts one and two), Compl. ¶¶ 33-39; a conspiracy to deprive civil rights in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Fonseca, Morrisette, and John Does 1-5 (count four), id. ¶¶ 43-44; municipal liability against New Bedford (count five), id. ¶¶ 45-47; and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against John Does 6-9 (count six), id. ¶¶ 48-49. The remaining tort claims alleged: trespass to chattel and conversion against Fonseca, Morrisette, and John Does 1-5 (count three), id. ¶¶ 40-42; and intentional infliction of emotional distress against John Does 6-9 (count seven), id. ¶¶ 50-52.
On March 11, 2021, the case was reassigned to this session of the Court. Electronic Not. Case Reassignment, ECF No. 10. On September 29, 2021, Fonseca and New Bedford moved to dismiss all counts. Mot. Dismiss. The parties have fully briefed this motion. See Defs.’ Mem; Pl.’s Mem.; Reply Mem. Response Pl.’s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss ( ) 1-2, ECF No. 35; Pl.’s Opp'n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ("Pl.’s Opp'n") 8, ECF No. 29. Focusing on the federal claims, Fonseca and New Bedford argued Silva's section 1983 action was (1) filed after the applicable limitations period expired and (2) not subject to the Supreme Judicial Court's tolling orders. Defs.’ Mem. 3-9.
On December 22, 2021, the Court entered an order allowing in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss. Order 1. First, the Court dismissed with prejudice: "count one in its entirety; count three in its entirety; count four insofar as it alleges a conspiracy to deny the right of access to courts pursuant to the First Amendment; and count seven in its entirety." Order 2 (citations omitted). Second, the Court dismissed without prejudice: "count four insofar as it alleges a conspiracy to deny equal protection of the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; and count six insofar as it alleges the denial of equal protection of the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. 2 (citations omitted). Third, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to: "count two in its entirety; count four insofar as it alleges a conspiracy to deny freedom from excessive force pursuant to the Fourth Amendment; count five in its entirety; and count six insofar as it alleges an unlawful seizure and the use of excessive force pursuant to the Fourth Amendment." Id. 2-3 (citations omitted).
This Memorandum of Decision explains why the four surviving counts (counts two, four, five, and six), all arising under section 1983, are timely.
This Memorandum of Decision first considers whether the complaint was timely filed on its face. Concluding it was not, it next examines whether the statute of limitations for the federal claims was tolled. This question hinges on whether the tolling orders issued by the Supreme Judicial Court apply to section 1983 actions. Section 1988 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code instructs federal courts to bridge the interstices in section 1983 using state law so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law. See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980).
Silva argues the tolling orders apply to her section 1983 claims by way of section 1988. Pl.’s Mem. 4-8. The Defendants counter that the section 1988 borrowing framework does not encompass tolling orders issued by a state's highest court. Defs.’ Mem. 6-9.
Because (1) Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent broadly authorize federal courts to borrow state tolling rules, and (2) the tolling orders are not inconsistent with the policies underlying section 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court's tolling orders apply to section 1983 actions, rendering Silva's claims timely filed.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "state a claim upon which relief can be granted ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts "draw every reasonable inference" in favor of the plaintiff. Berezin v. Regency Sav. Bank, 234 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2000). "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ().
"Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that ‘the facts establishing the defense are clear on the face of the plaintiff's pleadings.’ " Trans-Spec Truck Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2001) ) (brackets omitted). In such cases, "[w]here the dates included in the complaint show that the limitations period has been exceeded and the complaint fails to ‘sketch a factual predicate’ that would warrant the application of either a different statute of limitations period or equitable estoppel, dismissal is appropriate." Id. (quoting LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509-10 (1st Cir. 1998) ). In other words, courts ought dismiss "when the pleader's allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is...
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