Silva v. James Ursini Co., 81-512-A

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 81-512-A,81-512-A
• Citation: Silva v. James Ursini Co., 475 A.2d 205 (R.I. 1984)
• Parties: Ronald SILVA v. JAMES URSINI CO. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 205

475 A.2d 205

Ronald SILVA v. JAMES URSINI CO.

No. 81-512-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 1, 1984.

Stephen M. Rappoport, Steven Jay Hirsch, East Providence, for plaintiff.

Michael T. Wallor, Hanson, Curran & Parks, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying the employee's claim under the Workers' Compensation Act.

The facts are not in dispute. The employer is a Connecticut corporation doing business exclusively in Connecticut. In July 1978 Ronald Zimmerman, business agent for the Sprinkler Fitters Union of Connecticut, contacted Edward Kiley, business agent for the Providence Sprinkler Fitters Union Local No. 715. Zimmerman informed Kiley that the employer, the James V. Ursini Company, was in need of sprinkler fitters for various jobs. Zimmerman requested that Kiley send members of local No. 715 to the employer's place of business in Connecticut. Immediately thereafter, Kiley called the employee and asked him if he would be interested in working for the employer in Connecticut. The employee responded in the affirmative and was then told where to report to work. The following day the employee went to the employer's business office where he signed a W-2 form and thereupon proceeded to the job site. The employee continued to work for the employer in Connecticut until he was injured three months later, for which injury he received compensation benefits from the State of Connecticut.

The employee subsequently brought a petition before the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Commission, seeking supplemental benefits. The trial commissioner denied the employee's petition on the ground that Rhode Island lacked jurisdiction over the claim. The commission, in affirming the trial commissioner, specifically found that they lacked jurisdiction because the contract of hire was entered into in Connecticut.

The employee now appeals on the following grounds: (1) whether he is entitled to successive workers' compensation benefits in more than one jurisdiction; (2) whether a state, having more than a casual interest in an employee's injury, may apply its Workers' Compensation Act without violating the Full Faith and Credit Act; and (3) whether the trial commissioner erroneously restricted the introduction of certain evidence. Due to our disposition of the first two issues we need not address the employee's final contention.

I

The employee initially argues that the granting of successive workers' compensation benefits under the Rhode Island Act would not violate the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. ¹

Under the full faith and credit clause, a judgment that is valid under the laws of one state should have the same credit, validity, and effect in every court in the United States that it had in the state where rendered. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293-94, 63 S.Ct. 207, 211, 87 L.Ed. 279, 283 (1942). Although rare, there are exceptions to this doctrine. The policy of permitting successive or supplemental workers' compensation awards has been upheld, provided that the second state would have been able to apply its workers' compensation act in the first place, and further provided that credit for the first award is given, thereby precluding the possibility of a double recovery by the employee. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 627-28, 67 S.Ct. 886, 889, 91 L.Ed. 1140, 1143 (1947); see 4 Larson,The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 85.20 at 16-17 (1983). The constitutionality of successive awards was unequivocally determined in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 2663, 65 L.Ed.2d 757, 776 (1980), wherein the Court stated:

"We * * * hold that a State has no legitimate interest within the context of our federal system in preventing another State from granting a supplemental compensation award when that second State would have had the power to apply its workmen's compensation law in the first instance. The Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be construed to preclude successive workmen's compensation awards."

Thus, no constitutional impediment to the granting of a successive award exists in Rhode Island.

II

The...