Silva v. Rite Aid Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 September 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-2135
• Citation: 416 F.Supp.3d 394
• Parties: Kaley Diann SILVA and Lindsey Avenetti, Plaintiffs v. RITE AID CORPORATION, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

416 F.Supp.3d 394

Kaley Diann SILVA and Lindsey Avenetti, Plaintiffs

v.RITE AID CORPORATION, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-2135

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 19, 2019

Matthew E. Moloshok, Pro Hac Vice, Stephen L. Dreyfuss, Pro Hac Vice, Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal LLP, Newark, NJ, Rick Klingbeil, Rick Klingbeil, PC, Portland, OR, Devin J. Chwastyk, Rachel R. Hadrick, McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, Harrisburg, PA, Kevin D. Gamarnik, Pro Hac Vice, Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis LLP, Costa Mesa, CA, Matthew R. Wojcik, Bullivant Houser Bailey, PC, Seattle, WA, Robert A. Curtis, Pro Hac Vice, Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis LLP, Santa Barbara, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Arthur P. Fritzinger, F.B. Coller, Paul K. Leary, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Cozen O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, Holly D. Brauchli, Matthew R. Wojcik, Willhelm Dingler, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Seattle, WA, Megan S. Cook, Bullivant Houser Bailey, PC, Portland, OR, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge Plaintiffs Kaley Diann Silva ("Silva") and Lindsey Avenetti ("Avenetti") commenced this action against defendant Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite Aid"). Plaintiffs allege several Pennsylvania common-law and statutory claims against Rite Aid, claiming that certain Rite Aid product labeling was misleading. (Doc. 38). Rite Aid moves to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 50).

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Rite Aid is a nationwide drug store chain and a retailer of nutritional supplements. (Doc. 38 ¶¶ 8, 10). Rite Aid sells its own nutritional supplements in brick-and-mortar stores and online through its website. (See id. ¶¶ 3, 10). These nutritional supplements are packaged using two product labels. The principal display panel label is located on the front of the bottle and contains basic information about the product, including the name of the nutritional supplement, the delivery mechanism (e.g. , capsule, tablet), and the quantity of pills. (See id. ¶¶ 35-37, 47-48; see, e.g., id. at 22, Figure 5a). The supplement facts label, located on the back of the bottle, provides a more detailed description of the product's ingredients and serving size. (See, e.g., id. at 22, Figure 5a). In Rite Aid's stores, these bottles are placed next to and above a pricing label. (Id. ¶ 49). The pricing label conveys the price, the nature of the supplement, and the number of pills per bottle. (Id. ¶ 49; see, e.g., id. at 23, Figure 5c). On Rite Aid's website, consumers can view the principal display panel and supplement facts labels before purchasing by clicking on small image icons. (See id. ¶ 71; see, e.g., id. at 24, Figure 5b).

Plaintiffs are Oregon residents and consumers of Rite Aid supplements. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7). Silva purchased two bottles of nutritional supplements at a Rite Aid store in Oregon. (Id. ¶ 93). Silva does not allege that she read the supplement facts labels before purchasing the bottles. (See id. ¶¶ 99, 104). Avenetti purchased two bottles of nutritional supplements through Rite Aid's online store. (Id. ¶¶ 108-09). Avenetti similarly does not claim to have read the supplement facts labels by clicking on its image before completing the online transactions. (See id. ¶¶ 113, 114). Plaintiffs allege that the principal display panel labels for the purchased products failed to accurately specify the quantity of supplement per serving and the size of each serving. (Id. ¶¶ 51-54).

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a complaint on February 2, 2018. Plaintiffs are now proceeding on their second amended complaint, alleging claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-1 et seq. Rite Aid moves to dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standards

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Such jurisdictional challenges take one of two forms: (1) parties may levy a "factual" attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the court's jurisdictional reach; or (2) they may assert a "facial" challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's allegations but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court's jurisdiction. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) ). In either instance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

B. Failure to State a Claim

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ). The court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ).

To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). First, "the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’ " Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32 ; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Then, once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts "that allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Discussion

Reduced to its essentia , plaintiffs' position is that Rite Aid's principal display panel labels are misleading. Plaintiffs claim that a reasonable consumer would understand the principal display panel labels alone as promising a full serving of nutritional supplement in each capsule or tablet. Rite Aid contends that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief and that plaintiffs have failed to state any claim for which relief can be granted. We begin with the question of standing.

A. Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likel[ihood] that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). A plaintiff successfully pleads an injury in fact by alleging "that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ " Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ); see also Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of establishing that they are " ‘likely to suffer future injury’ from the defendant's conduct." In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., Sales Practices & Liab. Litig., 903 F.3d 278, 292 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting McNair v. Synapse Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) ). In class actions, at least one named plaintiff must satisfy this future injury requirement. McNair, 672 F.3d at 223 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs' second amended complaint is devoid of any allegation of future injury. (See Doc. 38). Recognizing this deficiency, plaintiffs seek leave to amend "to plead additional facts that will support their standing to seek injunctive relief, including but not limited to facts showing that Plaintiffs still plan to purchase Rite Aid products in the future." (Doc. 59 at 28, 32). But intent to purchase Rite Aid nutritional supplements in the future does not alone establish an actual or imminent future injury. And any suggestion that plaintiffs may be harmed by a future purchase of Rite Aid nutritional supplements is far too speculative to justify injunctive relief. See McNair, 672 F.3d at 224-25.

The law...