Silver Buckle Mines, Inc. v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13-476C,13-476C
• Parties: SILVER BUCKLE MINES, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

SILVER BUCKLE MINES, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 13-476C

United States Court of Federal Claims

August 7, 2014

RCFC 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; Bureau of Land Management; 30 U.S.C. § 28f; unpatented mining claim maintenance fee; statutory interpretation; plain meaning; not ambiguous; no absurd result; IOAA, 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b); voluntary payment as affirmative defense

Frank R. Siderius, Siderius Lonergan & Martin LLP, Seattle, Washington, for plaintiff.

James Sweet, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, with whom were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Bryant Snee, Acting Director, and Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, all of Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

WOLSKI, Judge.

The matter before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Silver Buckle Mines, Inc. (Silver Buckle) is an Idaho corporation and holder of seventy-two active, unpatented lode mining claims in Idaho. Since 1993, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM or Bureau) has levied an annual maintenance fee on such unpatented mining claims under the authority of 30U.S.C. § 28f. Congress amended section 28f in 2011, apparently eliminating the maintenance fee on claims located before August 10, 1993, but BLM continued to exact the fee in 2012. All of plaintiff's claims were located prior to August 10, 1993, and an annual maintenance fee was paid for each to BLM in 2012 for the 2013 assessment year. Plaintiff seeks the return of these fees, alleging that they were illegally exacted.

A. Claim Maintenance and Section 28f

Before 1993, BLM required a minimum level of "assessment work" to be done on a claim annually in order for the claimant to remain eligible to hold the claim. Compl. at IV;¹ see 30 U.S.C. § 28. The purpose of the assessment work was putatively to "insure the holder's good faith and to require diligent development" of resources. Compl. at IV; see also Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350, 353 (1884) ("The purpose [of section 28] was . . . to require every person who asserted an exclusive right to his discovery or claim, to expend something of labor or value on it as evidence of his good faith, and to show that he was not acting on the principle of the dog in the manger.").

In 1993, the assessment work requirement was modified by requiring the filing of an annual maintenance fee in lieu of performing work on the claim. Compl. at V; see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (1993 Act), Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 10101, 107 Stat. 312, 405 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 28f) ("Such claim maintenance fee shall be in lieu of the assessment work requirement . . . .").² Section 28f was subsequently amended numerous times, though the substance of the provision remained essentially the same.

Most relevant to this action, in 2011, Congress changed the language and provided for differing treatment of unpatented placer claims, as opposed to unpatented lode mining claims, mill sites, and tunnel sites (collectively, "unpatented nonplacer claims"). Compl. at VI; see Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (2012 Act), Pub. L. No. 112-74 § 430, 125 Stat. 786, 1047 (2011) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 28f). After the amendment, section 28f(a)(1) --- whichgoverned only unpatented nonplacer claims --- apparently required a maintenance fee for those claims located on or after August 10, 1993, but not before that date. See 125 Stat. at 1047 (requiring fees only for claims "located . . . on or after August 10, 1993." (emphasis added)). The result is thus that the most natural reading of the amended statute indicated that the maintenance fee had been eliminated for unpatented nonplacer claims located before August 10, 1993.³

The Bureau modified its regulations following the passage of the 2011 amendment to comply with certain provisions of the amendment --- for example, increased fees on unpatented placer claims --- but the new regulations did not reflect the date-of-location limitation for unpatented nonplacer claim maintenance fees found on the face of the amended law. Compl. at VIII (citing Interim Final Rule on the Administration of Mining Claims and Sites, 77 Fed. Reg. 44155, 44155-58 (issued July 27, 2012) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3830) (interim final rule)). Consequently, BLM continued to demand maintenance fees for the 2013 assessment year on unpatented nonplacer claims located before August 10, 1993 despite the change in wording in section 28f(a)(1). Id. at VII.

Thereafter, the law was once more amended on March 26, 2013, reinserting the word "before," so that section 28f(a)(1) again read "before, on, or after August 10, 1993." Id. at IX; see Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6 § 1403, 127 Stat. 198, 419 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 28f).

B. The Present Action

Plaintiff filed its complaint in the Court of Federal Claims on July 16, 2013, asking for "judgment against the United States . . . for refunds of maintenance fees illegally exacted" by BLM from holders of pre-1993 unpatented nonplacer claims during 2012, when section 28f allegedly did not require the payment of maintenance fees for such claims. Compl. at 8.⁴ In response, the government filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.'s Mot.) at 1.⁵

In its initial brief the government argued that plaintiff's suit should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on two independent bases: (1) that Congress intended to authorize the fee in spite of the clear language of the amendment which eliminated the fee for pre-1993 claims and sites; and (2) that plaintiff never objected to or protested the payment of the fee and is therefore unable to seek repayment. Def.'s Mot. at 4. In its reply paper, filed November 4, 2013, the government adduced an additional theory, namely, that the fee --- if not required by 30 U.S.C. § 28f --- was authorized by the Independent Offices Appropriation Act (IOAA), 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b). Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.'s Reply) at 6-7.

Because plaintiff was unable to address defendant's IOAA theory in its initial response paper, after oral argument was heard the Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the applicability of the IOAA to the fee at issue. The Court has reviewed all of the briefs and the motion is now ripe for adjudication.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) and describes its claim for refund of a purportedly illegal exaction as "founded upon an act of Congress," contending that an act of Congress has been misinterpreted by BLM to permit the imposition of maintenance fees which were collected and retained by the agency. Compl. at II. The government does not challenge the court's jurisdiction in this case.⁶ Nevertheless, subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold determination, and it is incumbent upon any court to ensure that the litigants are properly before it prior to examining the merits of the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). The parties or the court sua sponte may challenge the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804); Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); James v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 391, 394 (2009); see also RCFC 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court assumes that the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint aretrue and construes those allegations in plaintiff's favor. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995).⁷

Here, plaintiff alleges that BLM claimed the authority to collect the fees pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 28f(a)(1) and 43 C.F.R. § 3834.11. Compl., Ex. B at 2, Ex. C at 10. Whether or not those provisions actually authorized the BLM to collect the fees at issue, they were invoked by BLM to justify its exaction, and their interpretation is central to this cause of action. This is sufficient basis for this court to take cognizance of this case under the clear precedent of this court's predecessor, the Court of Claims, and the Federal Circuit. See Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 513 (1954) ("[A] claim to recover an illegal exaction made by officials of the Government, which exaction is based upon a power supposedly conferred by a statute, is a claim 'founded upon any Act of Congress.'"); see also Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

When considering a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Pixton v. B & B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Englewood Terrace Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 583, 584 (2004). The granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy." Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369,...