Silver v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HILL
• Citation: Silver v. State, 147 Ga. 162, 93 S.E. 145 (Ga. 1917)
• Decision Date: 11 July 1917
• Docket Number: (No. 528.)
• Parties: SILVER. v. STATE.

93 S.E. 145

(147 Ga. 162)

SILVER.

v.STATE.

(No. 528.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 11, 1917.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Brunswick; D. W. Krauss, Judge.

Manuel Silver was convicted of a misdemeanor, his motion for a new trial was overruled, and he brings error. Affirmed.

J. T. Colson, of Brunswick, for plaintiff in error.

Alfred H. Crovatt and B. Whitfield, both of Brunswick, for the State.

HILL, J. Manuel Silver, a nonresident and a citizen of the Republic of Portugal, was arraigned in the city court of Brunswick under an accusation charging him with a misdemeanor, in that "he did take or catch oysters, fish, shrimp, prawn, turtle, terrapin, and other crustaceans from the salt waters of said state of Georgia, for the purpose of selling the same." Before entering his plea of not guilty, the defendant filed a demurrer to the accusation, on various grounds; which demurrer was overruled, and the defendant excepted pendente lite. The case was then tried (after a plea of not guilty had been filed) by the presiding judge, acting as court and jury, under an agreed statement of facts, which, in so far as material, will be stated herein. The court rendered a judgment finding the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to serve six months in the chain gang, the sentence to be discharged upon the payment of a fine of $100 and costs. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and the defendant excepted.

1. We will first consider the grounds of the demurrer. Without stopping to discuss the first and second grounds, which allege that the accusation charges no crime against the laws of the state, or the violation of any valid law, it is sufficient to say that these grounds are without merit. The third ground attacks as illegal and void the ninth section of the act on which the accusation is predicated (Acts 1915, Extraordinary Session, p. 71 et seq.), which provides that, "if any person not a citizen of this state shall take or catch any oysters, fish, shrimp, prawn, turtle, terrapin, or other crustaceans from the salt waters of this state, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of selling, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, " on the ground that it seeks to make penal the "mere purpose" of a person, rather than the overt act of taking andcatching shrimp, prawn, etc., when there is no inhibition or prohibition against catching or selling shrimp or prawn, etc. We do not think the section of the act under review is open to the criticism. The purpose of the act, as gathered from the caption and the act itself, is "the protection and propagation of fish, shrimp, prawn, " etc., and "providing how the same may be taken and caught from the salt waters of this state." It does not, as contended, seek to make penal the "purpose" of a person who takes and catches the crustaceans enumerated in the act, but to protect them from certain persons who take and catch for the "purpose" of selling, etc. And the "purpose" may be gathered from the act of taking and selling.

2. Section 9 of the act of 1915 is not void as being in violation of article 1, § 4, par. 1, of the state Constitution, which provides that "laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, " for the reason that the rights of persons in this state, other than citizens of this state, are fixed by sections 2170 and 2173 of the Civil Code of 1910, which provide, respectively, that "such citizens of the other states of this Union as are recognized as citizens of the United States by the Constitution thereof shall be entitled, while residents of this state, to all the rights of citizens thereof; except the elective franchise and the right to hold office, and to perform such civil functions as are confined by law to the citizens of this state, " and "aliens, the subjects of governments at peace with the United States and this state, so long as their governments remain at peace, shall be entitled to all the rights of citizens of other states resident in this state." The present is not a local or special law for which provision has been made by a general law. The act is territorially general in its operation, and applies wherever there are shrimp, prawn, etc., in the salt waters of the state. "A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general law." Gray v. McLendon, 134 Ga. 225, 67 S. E. 859 (3).

3. Section 9 of the act is not in violation of article 3, § 7, par. 17, of the Constitution of the state, which provides that:

"No law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made."

The act of 1915 is not amendatory, and does not purport to be, of sections 2170 and 2173 of the Civil Code. It is an original act, covering the full subject-matter with which it deals, and is not unconstitutional for any reason suggested.

4. Section 9 of the act of 1915 referred to is not in violation of article 3, § 7, par. 8 of the Constitution of the state, which provides that:

"No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in title thereof."

The subject-matter of the act was the protection and propagation of shrimp, prawn, etc., and there is nothing in the section of the act attacked which contravenes the constitutional provision quoted. The court did not err in overruling each and every ground of the demurrer.

5. There are a number of grounds of the motion for a new trial, but they all revolve around two or three controlling questions, and they will, accordingly, he grouped together and discussed. It is insisted that there was no evidence that the defendant took and caught shrimp and prawn from the salt water of this state for the purpose of selling the same; but that, on the contrary, the evidence clearly disclosed that, where shrimp and prawn were caught and taken by the defendant, they were the property of one J. B. Abrams, and that they were not caught and taken for the purpose of sale, but for the purpose of delivery to Abrams, he being a citizen of Georgia. Prom the agreed statement of fact it appears that:

"The taking and catching of said shrimp and prawn was done by said defendant, and the disposition of said catch was done by the said defendant under the following previous arrangement, namely: J. B. Abrams has been approximately for 30 years a citizen of said state, county, and city, and continuously resident therein, and owns and operates in said state, county, and city an oyster and prawn and shrimp canning and packing plant; that in the operation thereof he owns and uses approximately 20 gasoline boats; that each boat carries a crew of 3 to 4 men; that the said boats leave the said plant of the said Abrams early in the morning of each day and go into the Atlantic Ocean along the Georgia coast, and within the jurisdiction limits of said state and county, and by the use of trawling nets take and catch shrimp and prawn from said waters; that the defendant was one of the crew of one of said boats; that said men and boats return daily to the premises and plant of the said Abrams, and then deliver the shrimp and prawn so caught to the said Abrams, to be canned and packed by him at said plant and then disposed of as the said Abrams may see fit; that the entire catch is delivered to the said Abrams exclusively, and to no other person or plant. The method of compensation or dealing between said fishermen, including this defendant and the...