Silverman v. Miranda

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket Number6 Civ. 13222 (ER)
Citation213 F.Supp.3d 519
Parties Leon SILVERMAN, James Crowley, Janet Sachs, Herbert Pobiner, Louis Flacks, and Paul Berkman, as Trustees of the Union Mutual Medical Fund, and Union Mutual Medical Fund, Plaintiffs, v. George MIRANDA, Robert Bellach, Anthony Cerbone, and Martin Sheer, as Trustees of the Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health and Insurance Fund, and Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health and Insurance Fund, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Robert J. Kipnees, John Albert Fialcowitz, Michael Andrew Kaplan, Lowenstein Sandler PC, Roseland, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs, Leon Silverman, James Crowley, Janet Sachs, Herbert Pobiner, Louis Flacks and Paul Berkman, as Trustees of the Union Mutual Medical Fund, and the Union Mutual Medical Fund, pro se.

Thomas Albert Thompson, Thomas A. Thompson, Law Offices, Yonkers, NY, Roland Richard Acevedo, Seiff Kretz & Abercrombie, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Ramos, District Judge

This is a decade-long dispute between two employee benefit funds concerning the right to contributions made by employers pursuant to a number of collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs"). Plaintiffs are the trustees of the Union Mutual Medical Fund ("UMMF") and the UMMF (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), and Defendants are the trustees of the Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health and Insurance Fund ("Local 210 Fund") and the Local 210 Fund (collectively, "Defendants"). After significant motion practice, various rulings by this Court, and an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on August 13, 2015, alleging that Defendants failed to remit to Plaintiffs certain employer contributions as required by the CBAs, in violation of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff UMMF is a collectively bargained group health plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") that was established to obtain and provide medical benefits to its participants and beneficiaries. Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 1. The UMMF's participants and beneficiaries primarily consist of the retired members of two unions, the Allied Trades Council and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union 210 ("Local 210 Union"), and their spouses. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant Local 210 Fund is an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA that was established to provide health insurance to its participants, who are primarily current members of the Local 210 Union and their spouses. Id. ¶ 12.

The Allied Welfare Fund ("AWF") is also a collectively bargained employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA that provides benefits to its participants, who are primarily active union members. Id. ¶ 8. Both the Local 210 Fund and the AWF are funded by contributions from employers ("Contributing Employers") made pursuant to the CBAs. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14; see Defs.' Counter-56.1 ¶ 7. On April 30, 2006, the AWF was bifurcated and a portion of its assets (Plaintiffs contend it was 80% while Defendants contend it was 70%) was transferred to the Local 210 Fund. Defs.' Counter-56.1 ¶ 9. Thereafter, most of the Contributing Employers who had previously contributed to the AWF began contributing to the Local 210 Fund. Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 10.

The various CBAs provide, in relevant part, that:

From and out of the contributions made to the Allied Welfare Fund as specified above, Eight Dollars per employee per week shall be unconditionally and irrevocably allocated and paid to the Union Mutual Medical Fund ... for the benefit of retired employees of the Employer and retired employees of all other employers similarly situated and their families ....

Id. ¶ 7; see generally Declaration of Robert J. Kipnees, Esq., dated June 15, 2010 (Doc. 125), Ex. G (excerpts of CBAs). Plaintiffs contend that pursuant to this provision, the AWF and, more recently, the Local 210 Fund were obligated to remit a portion of the money collected from the Contributing Employers to the UMMF. Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 6. Defendants deny that they were under any such obligation but admit that they paid the UMMF in accordance with the terms of the CBAs. Defs.' Counter-56.1 ¶¶ 4, 6.

In 2000, the AWF trustees filed suit against Duane Reade in the Southern District of New York, claiming that Duane Reade, as a Contributing Employer, failed to make the required contributions pursuant to its CBA. Pls.' 56.1 ¶ 18. In 2006, the AWF and Duane Reade settled their dispute for $825,000. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. The Duane Reade settlement was received by the AWF in satisfaction of Duane Reade's obligation under its CBA to pay contributions to the AWF. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiffs claim that 80% of the settlement monies were transferred to the Local 210 Fund as a consequence of the bifurcation of the AWF. Id. ¶ 22. The UMMF received no portion of those proceeds. Id.

In January 2006, the Local 210 Union began persuading Contributing Employers to amend their respective CBAs to reduce the contributions remitted to the UMMF (and, necessarily, increase the contributions retained by the AWF and Local 210 Fund). Id. ¶ 25. Whereas the CBAs then in place had provided that $8.00 per employee per week would be allocated to the UMMF, the Local 210 Union persuaded Contributing Employers that $0.10 per employee per week should be allocated to the UMMF. Id. ¶ 26. In March or April 2006, without the UMMF's consent, the CBAs were amended to reflect this reduction. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. As a result of the amendments, the monthly contributions received by the UMMF from the AWF and/or the Local 210 Fund significantly decreased, from approximately $59,000 to $74,000 per month in the first three months of 2006 to $449 in January 2007. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.

Plaintiffs sued Defendants in November 2006, seeking remittance of the employer contributions allegedly due, including a portion of the proceeds from the Duane Reade settlement. Doc. 1.2 In June 2008, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. 54. Construing Plaintiffs' allegations as claims under ERISA, the district court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,460,777.33 plus interest. Silverman v. Miranda, 918 F.Supp.2d 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Jones, J.) (" Miranda III "), vacated sub nom. Silverman v. Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund, 761 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 2014) (" Silverman ").3 The Second Circuit vacated the award, finding that Plaintiffs failed to state claims under ERISA, and remanded the action for the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, construed as alleging state law breach of contract. Silverman, 761 F.3d 277. On remand, this Court concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently alleged state law claims for breach of contract but held that the claims were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. Silverman v. Miranda, 116 F.Supp.3d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (" Miranda IV "). The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint a second time to assert violations of the LMRA, and Plaintiffs did so on August 13, 2015. Doc. 325. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are now before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Senno v. Elmsford Union Free Sch. Dist., 812 F.Supp.2d 454, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2009) ). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment is first responsible for demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, "the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Saenger v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 706 F.Supp.2d 494, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) ).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2004) ). However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rely on unsupported assertions, conjecture or surmise. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995). The non-moving party must do more than show that there is "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). When both parties move for summary judgment, "neither side is barred from asserting that there are issues of fact, sufficient to prevent the entry of judgment, as a matter of law, against it." Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir. 1993). "[T]he court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Olean, 667 F.2d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 1981). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, "the non-moving party...

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