Silvestris v. Tantasqua Reg. School Dist.
| Decision Date | 18 May 2006 |
| Citation | 847 N.E.2d 328,446 Mass. 756 |
| Parties | Joanne SILVESTRIS v. TANTASQUA REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (and a companion case<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, Catherine C. Ziehl, & Zoe Butler-Stark, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney General.
Sara Smolik, Robert Mantell, & Elizabeth A. Rodgers, Boston, for National Employment Lawyers Association, Massachusetts Chapter.
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, & CORDY, JJ.
Joanne Silvestris and Valerie Goncalves (collectively, plaintiffs) are teachers in the technical division of Tantasqua regional high school (Tantasqua).2 On July 14, 1999, each filed a discrimination charge against the Tantasqua regional school district (school district) with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), claiming that the school district had violated the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute, G.L. c. 151B, and the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act (MEPA), G.L. c. 149, § 105A, by "failing to pay [them] salary and benefits equal to what male employees received from work of comparable character." Eleven months later, Silvestris and Goncalves each filed a complaint against the school district in the Superior Court, alleging only that the school district's conduct in paying them less than their male colleagues constituted wage discrimination in violation of MEPA. The thrust of the plaintiffs' allegations was that, when they were hired by the superintendent of schools for the school district (superintendent), their starting salaries were set lower than the starting salaries of male teachers in the technical division because they were given less credit for their prior work experience. In its answer to each complaint, the school district asserted, as an affirmative defense, that the plaintiffs' actions were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response to a motion of the school district, agreed to by the plaintiffs, the two actions were consolidated.
The plaintiffs then amended their complaints to add claims alleging that the school district's conduct in establishing their starting salaries had violated G.L. c. 151B and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (equal rights act), G.L. c. 93, § 102. The school district again raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its answers. The parties presented their evidence to the judge in a jury-waived trial. At the close of all the evidence, the plaintiffs' claims under the equal rights act were dismissed pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974). After the judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996), he entered judgment for the school district with respect to the plaintiffs' claims under G.L. c. 151B, and stated that, after a further hearing on damages, judgment would enter for the plaintiffs on their MEPA claims. He concluded that the plaintiffs' charges had been timely filed with the MCAD, and that the school district had engaged in wage discrimination in violation of G.L. c. 149, § 105A, by failing to give the plaintiffs credit for their prior work experience in a manner that was comparable to the way in which male teachers had been given credit for prior work experience. The judge subsequently awarded damages in the amount of $60,370 to Silvestris, damages in the amount of $115,811.44 to Goncalves, and attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $42,893.08.3
The school district appealed from the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their MEPA claims, including the allowance of liquidated damages and the assessment of legal fees, and the cases were transferred from the Appeals Court on our own motion.4 The school district now contends that (1) the plaintiffs' MEPA claims were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the judge's findings that the plaintiffs were paid less than their male colleagues for prior experience were clearly erroneous; (3) the judge erred in calculating the plaintiffs' damages by awarding back pay to their dates of hire, rather than limiting back pay to the six months preceding the filing of their MCAD charges and by using the maximum salary level when calculating their back pay; and (4) the judge erred in calculating the amount of attorney's fees by failing to take into consideration the fact that the school district prevailed on two of the plaintiffs' three claims, and by failing to deduct allegedly vague, duplicative, and unreasonable fees. For the reasons that follow, we now vacate the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their wage discrimination claims and direct the entry of judgment for the school district on those claims.
1. Statutory framework. General Laws c. 149, § 105A, states, in pertinent part:
The purpose of this statute is "to remedy pay inequities between male and female employees in comparable positions." Jancey v. School Comm. of Everett, 421 Mass. 482, 497, 658 N.E.2d 162 (1995), S.C., 427 Mass. 603, 695 N.E.2d 194 (1998).
2. Factual background. Teacher salaries at Tantasqua are governed by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (agreement).5 The agreement states, in relevant part: "Initial salary levels of teachers new to the [school district] shall be set by the [s]uperintendent in accordance with existing salary schedules." The superintendent assigns each new teacher a level and year designation from the salary schedule set forth in an appendix to the agreement, which is based on a matrix reflecting educational achievement and years of experience. Level I covers one through three years of experience, Level II covers four through nine years of experience, and Level III covers ten and more years of experience. A teacher would progress through the levels in increments equal to the number of years taught. For example, the designation "Level I, Year 1" would signify that a teacher was in his or her first year of teaching, whereas the designation "Level II, Year 5" would signify that a teacher was in his or her fifth year of teaching. While an entry-level teacher could expect to reach the maximum salary category of "Level III" in ten years, a new teacher who began at a higher level (due to prior experience) could expect to reach the maximum salary category sooner, depending on the level and year designation assigned by the superintendent.
In June, 1993, Silvestris applied for a newly created position at Tantasqua as an allied health teacher in the technical division. The job was designed to prepare students for careers in nursing. Silvestris had experience in this field prior to applying for the Tantasqua position. In 1972, she received an associate's degree in nursing from Springfield Technical Community College, passed the State licensing examination, and became a registered nurse. For the next six years, Silvestris worked as a nurse at Holyoke Hospital and provided instruction to student nurses.6 In 1980, she took a position with the Westover Job Corps, where she taught students in the nursing assistants program and coordinated job-related training for students already under the direction of employers. In 1986, Silvestris began a new job at Holyoke Community College as a job developer, working with business leaders to establish employment opportunities for business, computer science, and secretarial science students. Silvestris remained at Holyoke Community College for two years. During this same time period, she attended Westfield State College, from which she received a bachelor of science degree in occupational education in 1991. Silvestris also obtained a vocational teaching certificate in the field of allied health.
After interviewing for the position at Tantasqua in June, 1993, with the director of its technical division, Silvestris met with the superintendent, David Roach, to discuss her educational background, her prior work experience, and her salary. According to Silvestris, the superintendent said that she would receive credit for her teaching time at the Westover Job Corps because it involved the nursing assistants program and because the students there were generally the same age as high school students. However, she would not get credit for her time at Holyoke Community College because that was postsecondary experience. Further, according to Silvestris, the superintendent told her that the school district did not give credit for prior work experience "in the trade."
On July 19, 1993, the superintendent notified Silvestris that she would be hired for the 1993-1994 school year, that she would be placed in the "vocational certificate plus bachelor's degree" education category, and that her starting salary would be established at "Level II, Year 6."7 This meant that she was given credit for five years of experience. Silvestris accepted a contract with the school district. At the time she was hired, there were six male teachers and no female teachers in the technical...
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