Silvestro v. Berryhill, 4:16-cv-1150-LSC

• Decision Date: 01 September 2017
• Docket Number: 4:16-cv-1150-LSC
• Parties: DEBORAH SILVESTRO, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

DEBORAH SILVESTRO, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

4:16-cv-1150-LSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

September 1, 2017

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Deborah Silvestro, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Ms. Silvestro timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Ms. Silvestro was fifty-four years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") decision, and she has an eleventh grade education. (Tr. at 35-37.) Her past work experiences include employment as a sock folder, restaurant manager, and fast-food cook. (Id.) Ms. Silvestro claims that she became disabled on May 31, 2013, due to osteoarthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, hypothyroidism, thoracic outlet syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome ("IBS"), obesity, and diabetes. (Tr. at 15.)

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to the next step.

The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of the plaintiff's medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of impairments that is not classified as "severe" and does not satisfy the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Thedecision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that "substantial medical evidence in the record" adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not disabled).

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") before proceeding to the fourth step. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff's impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Silvestro meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB was insured through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 15.) He further determined that Ms. Silvestro has not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of her disability. (Id.) According to the ALJ, Plaintiff's osteoarthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, hypothyroidism, history of thoracic outlet syndrome, IBS, obesity, and diabetes are considered "severe" based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal the severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 18.) The ALJ did not find Ms. Silvestro's allegations to be totally credible, and he determined that she has the following RFC: light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except that she is limited to unskilled work withno climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; no work at unprotected heights or with hazardous machinery; no more than concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold; reasonable access to restroom facilities at the usual and customary breaks (reasonably defined as on the premises); and no more than frequent contact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. (Tr. at 19.)

According to the ALJ, Ms. Silvestro is unable to perform any of her past relevant work, she is "closely approaching advanced age," and she has a "high school education," as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 25.) Because Plaintiff is limited in her ability to perform the full range of light work, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert ("VE") and used the Medical-Vocational Rules as a guideline for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she is capable of performing, such as "Cashier 2," parking lot attendant, and toll collector. (Id.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff "has not been under a 'disability,' as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 31, 2013, through the date of this decision." (Tr. at 26.)

II. Standard of Review

This Court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of theCommissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App'x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and 'the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for "despite th[e] deferential standard [for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Hecskler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. Discussion

Ms. Silvestro alleges that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded for three reasons. First, Plaintiff believes that the ALJ improperly evaluated her treating physician's opinion. Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not afford proper consideration to her subjective complaints of pain. Third, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ incorrectly concluded that she could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

A. Treating Physician's Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated her treating physician's opinion. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to "substantial or considerable weight unless 'good cause' is shown to the contrary." Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted). "Good cause" exists for an ALJ to not give a treatingphysician's opinion substantial weight when the: "(1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that "good cause" existed where the opinion was...