Silvia v. Woodhouse

• Decision Date: 03 June 1969
• Citation: 356 Mass. 119,248 N.E.2d 260
• Parties: Manuel SILVIA v. Raymond J. WOODHOUSE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 260

248 N.E.2d 260

356 Mass. 119

Manuel SILVIA v. Raymond J. WOODHOUSE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued April 9, 1969.

Decided June 3, 1969.

Charles R. Desmarais, New Bedford, for Raymond J. Woodhouse.

William J. Fenton, Taunton, for Santos Wrestling Enterprises, Inc.

John F. O'Donoghue, Fall River, for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This is an action of tort in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendants, Santos Wrestling Enterprises, Inc. (Santos) and Raymond J. Woodhouse (Woodhouse). Count 1 of the declaration against Santos alleged that the plaintiff, while attending a wrestling match that was conducted under the supervision, control, and consent of Santos, sustained injuries because the premises in which the match was conducted were not reasonably safe and because Santos failed to warn the plaintiff of the dangers that existed. Court 2 alleged that Santos, its agents, and its servants negligently conducted the wrestling event, with the result that the plaintiff was injured. The declaration against Woodhouse contained allegations similar to those in count 1 against Santos.

At the close of the evidence each defendant moved for a directed verdict, both of which motions were denied, subject to the defendants' exceptions. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against each defendant. The sole question is whether these motions were properly denied.

The evidence may be summarized as follows. On the evening of September 26, 1962, the plaintiff attended a series of wrestling matches held in the Woodhouse Arenatorium, in Dartmouth, Massachusetts. He purchased a ticket for a reserved seat in the front row. About five minutes after the first match began, one of the wrestlers picked up his opponent, who weighed about 290 pounds, and threw him over the top rope of the ring. He tumbled to the apron and then to the floor, where he hit the plaintiff's left leg. ¹ As the wrestler tried to climb back through the ropes, his opponent punched him, causing him to fall backwards directly onto the plaintiff, whose knee was thus seriously injured. This occurred only a few seconds after the wrestler was first thrown from the ring.

There were three ropes which extended around each side of the ring. On each side there was an apron which extended about three feet beyond the ropes. Since the front row seats were about three feet from the outer edge of the apron, the plaintiff's seat was about six feet from the ropes. The spectators 'sat in normal upright fashion so that * * * (their) knees were somewhat closer to the ring than the edge of the seat.' 'There were no signs warning of any danger of the wrestlers falling or being thrown from the ring, nor was any warning given in any other fashion.'

The plaintiff had previously attended wrestling matches at the 'arenatorium' on four or five occasions, during which he sat in the same seat and never observed a wrestler either thrown from the ring or struck in the face and knocked out of the ring into the spectators. On cross-examination, he testified that he had seen wrestlers fall onto the apron, and that about five or six times he had seen the fall between the ropes, onto the apron, and then onto the floor. But these wrestlers, he believed, had voluntarily left the ring to 'get away from the bout, and to rest.'

Woodhouse testified that he owned and operated the arena and that it was under his control. He did the promotional work for the matches and was in charge of setting up the seats. The wrestlers and referee for each match were supplied by Santos, and the receipts were divided equally between Santos and Woodhouse. During the time Woodhouse had conducted wrestling matches in the arena, he had observed wrestlers being ejected from the ring on many occasions. He had also seen wrestlers, while attempting to climb back in the ring, knocked backward when struck in the face or apparently kicked by their opponents. Woodhouse had only watched about a dozen bouts.

The president of Santos testified that he was the matchmaker who arranged the 'line-up' for the bouts. Of the fifty per cent of the receipts which Santos received, it kept ten per cent, and the other forty was divided among the wrestlers and referees. No wrestler was told who was to win or lose, and the only instruction given was in regard to the time limit for each bout. Sometimes the president of Santos would ask a superior wrestler to 'take it easy' with an opponent of unknown ability in order to test the latter's skill. During a match a wrestler would perform many acts of showmanship, because that is what the spectators expected. These acts included stepping out of the ring voluntarily and being thrown over the ropes. The president of Santos further testified that he had seen wrestlers thrown bodily out of the ring and into the spectators.

1. The defendant Woodhouse's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. The duty owed by Woodhouse to the plaintiff, a business invitee, is familiar law and may be stated briefly. A person maintaining a place of amusement, to which the public has been invited, is bound to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the patrons and to warn them of the dangers which he knew or ought to have known they might encounter there and of which they could not reasonably be expected to know. Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass'n, Inc., 307 Mass. 102, 104, 29 N.E.2d 716; Shaw v. Boston American League Baseball Co., 325 Mass. 419, 421--422, 90 N.E.2d 840; Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 271, 124 N.E.2d 505; Byron v. Fresh Pond Open Air Theatre, 333 Mass. 121, 123, 128 N.E.2d 785, 50 A.L.R.2d 1452. No warning need be given, however, to one who already has become apprised of the danger or when the danger would be obvious to any ordinarily...