Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n
| Decision Date | 27 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:10CV01047 JFB |
| Parties | L.T. SIMES, II, PLAINTIFF v. ARKANSAS JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMMISSION, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint, Filing No. 43. This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, Arkansas State Circuit Court Judge L.T. Simes, alleges the defendants violated his First Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. He also asserts a supplemental state law claim for defamation. Judge Simes seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees. See Filing No. 40, Amended Complaint. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a).
Judge Simes, the plaintiff, is an African-American Arkansas state court judge. He was 60 years old at the time this lawsuit was filed and is the first African-American judge elected in his county. He assumed the bench in 1997 and the voters reelected him in 2000, 2004 and 2010.
The Arkansas Discipline & Disability Commission (hereinafter "Commission"), created by Amendment 66 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, has nine Commissioners: three are judges appointed by Supreme Court of Arkansas; three are licensed attorneys in good standing, one is appointed by state attorney general, one is appointed by the president of the Arkansas senate, one is appointed by the speaker of the house for Arkansas; and three are appointed by the governor. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-10-402(a)(1)-(3). Judge Simes sues the Commission as an entity.
Defendant David Stewart is the executive director of the Commission. Defendant John Everett is an attorney Commissioner and is vice chair of the Commission. Defendants William Story and Chris E. Williams are judges and members of the Commission. H. William Allen is also an attorney Commissioner. Defendant Reginald Duane Hamman is a public member of the Commission. All of the Commissioners are sued in both their individual and official capacities.
This action involves two recent disciplinary complaints against Judge Simes.1 The facts are set out in the Arkansas Supreme court's opinions on those complaints and need not be fully repeated here. See Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Simes, 354 S.W.3d 72, 73 (Ark. 2009) and Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Simes, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. 193, 2011 WL 1681672 (2011) ("the Weavercase"). Briefly, in 2009, following a disciplinary hearing, the Commission recommended to the Arkansas Supreme Court that it should permanently remove Judge Simes from the bench. Simes, 354 S.W.3d at 73 ("the Chandler case"). The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, declined to follow the Commission's recommendation of permanent removal from the bench and instead elected to suspend Judge Simes for the remainder of his existing term rather than to remove him from the bench permanently. Id. at 85; Amended Complaint, Filing No. 40, ¶ 31. The Commission later addressed an additional judicial complaint against Judge Simes. See Simes, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. 193, 2011 WL 1681672; Filing No. 40, ¶¶ 43-52. After a disciplinary hearing in that case, the Commission again recommended to the Arkansas Supreme Court that it should permanently remove Judge Simes from the bench. Filing No. 40, ¶ 52. Upon review, the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted some of the Commission's findings, modified others, and rejected some of its findings. Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the Commission's recommendation of removal and instead ordered that Judge Simes be reprimanded. Id., 2011 Ark. 193, 2011 WL 1681672 at *25.
Judge Simes filed his original federal court complaint in this matter while the Weaver case was pending with the Commission. Filing No. 1. He sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the Commission from going forward with a scheduled hearing in the matter. Filing No. 2. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and opposed the temporary restraining order. Filing Nos. 16-18. This court denied the motion for temporary restraining order and later denied the motion to dismiss. Filing No. 21. The action was stayed while the state judicial discipline process moved forward,under the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Filing No. 26.
After the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its ruling in the Weaver case, this court lifted the stay on these proceedings and allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Filing No. 39. The amended complaint, Filing No. 40, omitted several defendants, and the remaining defendants move to dismiss.
In his amended complaint, Judge Simes alleges that he has had to operate in a racially hostile environment since the beginning of his judicial career. In his first claim, he alleges he was targeted for removal by the Commission and subjected to bad faith, defective, and biased proceedings before the Commission. Id. at ¶ 69, p. 21. He also alleges that he was treated differently than white judges in the Commission's investigations and prosecutions of complaints. Id. He alleges that the Commission has removed two black judges and tried to remove Judge Simes twice, but that no white judge has ever been removed. He alleges that in 2008 he was informed that his picture was posted on an appliance in the Commission's office and he states that he found a cartoon of a stick figure whose head was decapitated by a buzz-saw in the record in one of the proceedings. Id. at 16. He alleges that the Commission's investigation of his complaints was markedly different from those of white judges in Arkansas. Id. at 17-18. He outlines several examples of differential treatment in the complaint. See id. He further alleges that the sanctions imposed upon him were more severe than those levied on similarly situated white judges. Id. at 19. Also, he alleges he was denied due process in connection with the complaints. Id. at 21.
Judge Simes's second claim is directed at defendant executive director David Stewart. Id. at 22. He alleges that director Stewart made false and defamatory statements against him and violated the rules and regulations of the Commission by publicly announcing that Simes had been accused of ordering a newspaper reporter not to write a story, of improperly pressuring the mayor, and of attempting to prevent people from talking to the Commission. In the First Amended Complaint, he asserts his second claim under state law, but in his brief he states the claim is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendants move to dismiss: (1) all claims for money damages against the Commission and the Commissioners in their official capacities based on the Eleventh Amendment; (2) all claims against the Commissioners in their individual capacities; and (3) all claims against executive director Stewart on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Defendants also argue that there is no justiciable case or controversy with respect to Claim 1 and that Judge Simes fails to state a claim for relief with respect to Claim 2. Defendants further argue the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. In their brief, the defendants allude to absolute judicial immunity.
Under the Federal Rules, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The rules require a "'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3. (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.8(a)(2)). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief necessitates that the complaint contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The factual allegations of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). "On the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)," the allegations in the complaint must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. In other words, the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 547
Twombly is based on the principles that (1) the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and (2) only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task" that requires the court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663-64. Accordingly, under Twombly, a court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. Although legalconclusions "can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume...
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