Simi Investment Co. v. Harris County Texas

Decision Date21 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-20686,99-20686
Citation236 F.3d 240
Parties(5th Cir. 2000) SIMI INVESTMENT COMPANY INC, Plaintiff - Appellee v. HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS, Defendant - Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and REYNALDO G. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

KING, Chief Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Harris County, Texas appeals the district court's judgment against the County, arguing that the district court erred in holding that the County had unconstitutionally interfered with the property rights of Plaintiff-Appellee Simi Investment Company, Inc. The district court found that the County had unlawfully prevented Simi from gaining access to the city street adjacent to its property in contravention of Texas law. Specifically, the district court held that the County had abused its governmental power and violated Simi's substantive due process rights by inventing and claiming ownership of a nonexistent five-foot by 3000-foot county park, which blocked Simi's lawful access to the street. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, including the grant of attorneys' fees; however, we VACATE and REMAND to determine the amount of those attorneys' fees in a manner consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This dispute centers around the real property (the "Simi Property") owned by Simi Investment Company, Inc. ("Simi") which is located in downtown Houston in close proximity to the Houston Astrodome stadium.1 More specifically, the Simi Property is situated adjacent to Fannin Street at the intersection of Interstate Loop 610 ("Loop 610") and Fannin Street. Simi sought from the City of Houston ("City") access to Fannin Street from the Simi Property, but was denied access by the City because Harris County (the "County") claimed an interest in an intervening five-foot sliver of land that runs alongside this property, separating it from Fannin Street.

This land dispute finds its origin in the early 1960s when the construction of the Astrodome led to increased development in the area surrounding what is now the Simi Property. Two of the major investors in the area were Roy Hofheinz and R.E. Smith. Hofheinz was a former Harris County judge and had been the chair of the County's governing board, the County Commissioners Court. Hofheinz was also President of the Houston Sports Association (the "HSA"), which leased the Astrodome from the County. Hofheinz-Smith owned property north of the Simi Property site, which was also located along the eastern side of Fannin Street. As a result, Hofheinz-Smith and the HSA had control of much of the property surrounding the Astrodome.

In conjunction with building the Astrodome, the County acquired rights-of-way for streets leading to the stadium. In 1961, the County Commissioners Court requested the consent of the City of Houston (the "City") to acquire one of those rights-of-way by extending the length of Fannin Street to Loop 610. The City Council approved the location and alignment of the proposed street, and the land was purchased from the Trustees of the Hermann Hospital Estate and conveyed to the County for this purpose. The Hermann Hospital Estate right-of-way consisted of a 20.67 acre tract of land that was approximately 220 feet wide and 4100 feet in length, running north-south alongside the Astrodome site. This north-south right-of-way was bounded on the west by the Astrodome and surrounding grounds, and on the east by several privately owned properties (including the Hofheinz-Smith property and what is now the Simi Property).

The deed granting the land to the County provided that the property was being purchased with the intention of extending Fannin Street "with such extension to run in a North-South direction along the Eastern side of the Property described above with the remaining Western portion of said Property to be used for street purposes or included in a park and stadium site lying along the West side of said Property." Pursuant to this deed, the County Commissioners Court issued an order on December 11, 1961, stating that "Harris County is to move back the existing fences to the new right of way line."2 Subsequently, Fannin Street was constructed as described in the deed on the eastern side of the conveyed property, and fences were erected directly abutting the Simi Property.

The original maps accompanying the County's acquisition of the right-of-way and describing the location and alignment of Fannin Street could not be found, and, thus are not a part of the record. The first site-specific document in the record is dated October 16, 1961, and was created when engineers for the County prepared a plat of the area depicting the land to be conveyed to the County for the right-of-way. The plat showed the granted land directly abutting the Simi property line. This plat, however, was not a survey and did not include the exact location of Fannin Street within the right-of-way.

At some time after 1961, this plat was altered to include the placement of Fannin Street and also, most relevant for this case, a strip of land set off from the eastern side of Fannin Street lying in between the street and the adjoining private properties. This five-foot by 3000-foot strip of land3 is the county "park" now at issue.

As drawn in the revised plat, the Fannin Street right-of-way runs north-south, directly abutting the Hofheinz-Smith property. However, once past the southern boundary of the Hofheinz-Smith property line, the right-of-way is shown to make a ninety-degree turn west for five feet, and then it continues south to the 610 Loop. The result is the creation of a five-foot strip of land that separates all of the property south of the Hofheinz-Smith property from Fannin Street, but leaves the Hofheinz-Smith property directly abutting the Fannin Street right-of-way. No description or reason is apparent for this offset, nor why the offset begins just south of the Hofheinz-Smith property.4 This plat also includes the words "location questionable" drawn to indicate the uncertain location of Fannin Street. There is no revised date on the altered plat. The County contends that this plat depicts the correct location of all relevant boundaries, with Fannin Street running north-south within the original right-of-way and a thin county park on the east side also running parallel to Fannin Street.

From this uncertain beginning, the County's "park" has withstood several legal and administrative challenges to its existence and control. First, in 1964, Texaco, Inc. requested access to Fannin Street from property it owned on the corner of Fannin and the 610 Loop. This request was submitted to the County Commissioner and was then forwarded to the County Engineer. For an unknown reason, the County Engineer sought approval from Hofheinz, as President of the HSA. Hofheinz stated that the HSA was unalterably opposed to the access because the strip of land east of Fannin was included in the original HSA lease of land for the Astrodome site and, therefore, was under HSA's control. This assertion was factually erroneous because HSA was never granted control of the land. However, Hofheinz's objection led the County to deny Texaco access to Fannin Street.

Similarly, in 1969, property owners sought a mandatory injunction against the County, requesting that the fence abutting their properties be removed to grant access to Fannin Street. A take-nothing judgment was affirmed by a Texas court of appeals, which denied the property owners access across the County's land. See Lovett v. County of Harris, 462 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e). The court found that the erection of the fence was not an unconstitutional taking under Texas law because the intervening strip of land separating the property owners from Fannin Street had not been dedicated for street purposes. See id.5

Most recently, in 1984, Sterling B. McCall, Jr., the owner of McCall Toyota, requested that he be allowed to keep a driveway that had been built on his property which provided the property with ingress and egress onto Fannin Street. This request was denied by the County Commissioners Court, and McCall was required to fence in the driveway to block access to Fannin Street.

The area designated as a park has also been subject to encumbrances that over its history have helped define its status and ownership. In 1974, Entex, a gas company, constructed a gas line running north-south along the east side of Fannin Street. This gas line was buried inside the land now claimed as a park. The district court found that "[n]o Commissioner's Court Order or other document can be found to show the County authorized an easement in the 'park' to Entex." In 1978, the City of Houston approved a plan and constructed an eight-inch water line that crossed the park. Again, the district court found no Commissioners Court order authorizing the easement across the park for the water line. Finally, in 1993, the Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County ("METRO") approved construction of a sidewalk on the park property, running alongside the Simi Property. No approval was sought from the County for an easement.

Control of Fannin Street, itself, was ceded from the County to the City of Houston in 1974. In that year, the County removed Fannin Street from its road logs.

From 1981 to 1984, Simi began acquiring property along Fannin Street.6 In 1994, Simi submitted to the City a request for driveway access from its property to Fannin Street. Richard Scott, the Technical Director/City Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Engineering for the City, responded that the City "would be in a position to process [the] application, and likely approve it," but for the fact that the County has claimed an interest in...

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