Simmons' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 25 June 1963
• Citation: 217 Cal.App.2d 580,31 Cal.Rptr. 861
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Alice P. SIMMONS, Deceased. Calvin Otis TOWNSEND, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Caroline Skidmore BINGMAN, Administratrix with Will Annexed, Respondent. Civ. 26894.

Page 861

31 Cal.Rptr. 861

217 Cal.App.2d 580

In re ESTATE of Alice P. SIMMONS, Deceased.

Calvin Otis TOWNSEND, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Caroline Skidmore BINGMAN, Administratrix with Will Annexed, Respondent.

Civ. 26894.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

June 25, 1963.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing July 25, 1963.

Hearing Denied Aug. 20, 1963.

Freda B. Walbrecht and Bernard G. Hiss, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Hitchcock & Coulter by L. G. Hitchcock, Santa Rosa, for respondent.

FOX, Presiding Justice.

Calvin Otis Townsend, claiming to be an assignee of heirs of Alice P. Simmons, deceased, brought a petition for distribution of a portion of the estate of decedent, viz., a one-half undivided interest in a parcel of real property in the city of Downey, California. ^* Petitioner alleged that the parcel was not included in the inventory and appraisement filed in the original probate proceedings, in which an Order Settling Final Account and For Final Distribution was made. He also alleged that the property was not included in any devises or bequests of the last will and testament of decedent and therefore passed on her death to her heirs at law.

Petitioner further alleged that the sole heirs at law of the decedent assigned and conveyed, for a valuable consideration, all of their right, title and interest in and to the property, by a quit-claim deed to petitioner and his then wife. He attached a copy of the alleged quit-claim deed to the petition. His final allegation with respect to his claim of interest in the property was that he wife conveyed to him by a quitclaim deed her interest in said property. He also attached that alleged quit-claim deed to the petition.

Petitioner claims that, without notice to him, Caroline Bingman, a grand-niece of one of decedent's heirs, filed a petition to reopen the estate, that letters of administration were issued to her by the court, and that the property was inventoried and appraised at $500.

The petition prays that the court make an order requiring the administratrix to deliver the property to the petitioner.

The administratrix filed an opposition to the petition, stating that the estate had been reopened for the very reason that the real property in question had not been inventoried or disposed of in the original proceeding. After obtaining an inventory and appraisement from the court, she gave notice of sale of the property, in conformance with section 780 of the Probate Code. The property was sold for the sum of $750 cash, which was the highest and only offer made for the property. The administratrix petitioned the court for an order confirming the sale and directing execution by her of a conveyance to the purchasers. She alleged that the sale was fairly and regularly made and was in the best interest of the estate.

The administratrix opposed petitioner's request for distribution on the further ground that the assignment claimed by him was obtained by the exercise of undue influence on the assignors. She also moved that the court inquire into the consideration for the alleged assignment.

Petitioner filed objections to the confirmation of the sale of the property, alleging that the administratrix and her attorney knew that the offer of $750 was 'not a fair or adequate offer for the estate's interest in said land, and such a sale was made solely for the purpose of circumventing objector's interest in said land, as grantee of the heirs at law * * *' He asserted that the sale was 'simply a dummy sale for the purpose of defrauding objector [petitioner] and a fraudulent scheme to permit Charlotte Cawest [sister of administratrix] and Caroline Bingman [administratrix] to obtian control of said land by defeating the claim of objector.' He asserted that confirmation of the sale would be confirmation of 'the perpetration of a fraud.'

After a hearing on the petition for distribution, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and adjudged petitioner to have no interest as an heir, assignee, or otherwise in and to the property in question or any other asset belonging to the estate. The petition of the administratrix for confirmation of the sale of the property, however, was also denied, on a finding that the sum of $750 was not sufficient consideration for the property.

A decree was entered, denying distribution and denying confirmation of the sale. It is from this decree that petitioner appeals.

Petitioner's principal arguments on appeal attack the correctness of the trial court's determinations concerning the alleged transfer from decedent's heirs to petitioner. He argues, inter alia, that there is 'not one iota' of evidence of fraud, duress, or undue influence and that there was adequate consideration for the alleged transfers. In arguing the question of consideration, however, petitioner ignores the import of section 1020.1 of the Probate Code, pursuant to which the trial court made its determination and which is set out in the margin. ¹ As was stated in Estate of McPherson, 94 Cal.App.2d 906, 908, 212 P.2d 41, 42: 'This section [section 1020.1] requires the Probate Court to inquire into the consideration for assignments * * * and into the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof. If the court finds the consideration grossly unreasonable, or that the assignment was procured by duress, fraud, or undue influence, it may refuse to make distribution under the assignment, except upon such terms as it deems just and equitable.' The McPherson opinion also states (94 Cal.App.2d page 909, 212 P.2d page 43): 'Application of the Probate Code section involved [section 1020.1] must be left in great measure to the sound discretion of the probate judge. And appeals from orders made pursuant to the section are governed by the general rules on appeal in this state.' The court quotes from Estate of Isenberg, 63 Cal.App.2d 214, at apge 216, 146 P.2d 424, at page 425: "It is the general rule that on appeal an appellate court will (a) view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent (b) not weigh the evidence (c) indulge all intendments which favor sustaining the finding of the trier of fact, and (d) not disturb the finding of the trier of fact is there is substantial evidence in the record in support thereof. * * * [T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact." (Estate of McPherson, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 909-910, 212 P.2d 43.)

Petitioner argues, however, that section 1020.1 of the Probate Code does not apply in the instant case. He asserts that the code section was enacted for the control of 'heir hunters' in pending estates, particularly those who obtain from an heir an agreement to pay a 'finder's fee' or to execute an assignment of large eprcentages of their interest in an estate in return for the hunter's establishing and recovering the heir's interests. While it may be true that the original motivation behind the enactment of the section was prevention of a disproportionate share of an inheritance being paid to heir hunters and permitting the court to set such assignments aside if they were found to be inequitable, nevertheless it would seem from the cases that this is not the sole purpose of the section. The section provides, inter alia, that the court may, even on its own motion, inquire into the consideration of an assignment, transfer, agreement or request for instruction, and into the amount of fees charged, and into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument. Estate of McPherson, supra, for example, involves no heir hunters. The question there concerned the circumstances surrounding the alleged assignment by an aging mother to a daughter. In that case, the mother was 82 years of age, could neither read nor write, and had no recollection of signing the instrument. In 21 Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators § 776, page 182, it is stated: 'Although this section [section 1020.1] has been construed to give the probate court some control over heir-hunter assignments, it does not mention heir hunters, but refers in general terms to any assignee or transferee and to any person other than an heir, devisee, or legatee who claims the right to distribution pursuant to agreement with or instructions by such beneficiary. It therefore enlarges the powers of the probate court with respect to all such assignments or agreements * * *' And in Estate of Auslender, 53 Cal.2d 615, 630, 2 Cal.Rptr. 769, 777, 349 P.2d 537, 545 the court said: 'Under section 1020.1 of the Probate Code the court may refuse to make distribution pursuant to an assignment, except on terms it deems just and reasonable, where it finds the consideration unreasonable or where the assignment was obtained by fraud, duress or undue influence. * * *'

It would appear, therefore, that petitioner's argument that the use of the words 'paid for' (in reference to consideration) in section 1020.1 prohibits its application in the instant case is refuted by the cases. We must, therefore, affirm the trial court's conclusion that petitioner has no interest in the subject property if there is substantial evidence to sustain the finding that the purported assignment by the heirs to petitioner and his then wife was made without consideration. And, if such evidence can be found, petitioner's argument that the transfer to him was not obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence--the other ground for a court's property refusing to make distribution under an assignment (Estate of McPherson, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d at page 908, 212 P.2d at page 42)--need not be discussed since the court's decree...