Simmons v. Board of Ed. of Marlette Community Schools
| Decision Date | 10 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 25460 |
| Citation | 73 Mich.App. 1,250 N.W.2d 777 |
| Parties | Sharon SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MARLETTE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, and Marlette Community Schools, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg by Robert M. Thrun, Lansing, for defendants-appellants.
Foster, Swift & Collins by Clifford D. Weiler, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before ALLEN, P.J., and D. E. HOLBROOK Jr., and PAPP, * JJ.
Does Article II, § 3 of the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act (M.C.L.A. § 38.83; M.S.A. § 15.1983) require a board of education, when terminating a probationary teacher's services, to set forth within the required definite written statement, specific and detailed areas in which the teacher's services were unsatisfactory? This question of first impression 1 and of considerable importance to school authorities comes to us on the following facts.
Plaintiff was a first-year probationary teacher hired by defendants for the school year 1973--74. At least once in February and again in March 1974, defendant's principal visited plaintiff's classroom and evaluated plaintiff's teaching performance. At a public meeting April 3, 1974, defendant board of education adopted the following resolution:
'Motion by James Boine, seconded by William Stempel that the board terminate Sharon Simmons' services as a teacher effective June 10, 1974, because her services were unsatisfactory especially in areas of classroom control and organization.'
Plaintiff was then notified by the superintendent of the board's action by a letter dated April 5, 1974, reading as follows: 2
Plaintiff admits to having received the letter and has not denied that it was received more than 60 days before the close of the school year. Plaintiff made no demand on defendants for a clarification of the reasons given in the notice 3 but, in July 1974, filed a three-count complaint in circuit court. Count II of the complaint alleges that the notice given in the letter April 5, 1974, was not sufficiently definite as required by Article II, § 3 of the Teacher Tenure Act; M.C.L.A. § 38.83; M.S.A. § 15.1983. Count II also alleged that the notice was further defective in that the letter was not expressly authorized by the defendant board and the board did not specifically direct the superintendent to notify plaintiff of the board's action. Plaintiff the moved for partial summary judgment on Count II of the complaint. Upon conclusion of oral arguments, the trial court issued an oral opinion from the bench stating that the reasons for termination of plaintiff's employment as given in the notice of April 5, 1974 were, as a matter of law, not sufficiently definite as required by Article II, § 3 of the Teacher Tenure Act. An order incorporating the oral opinion was entered June 26, 1975, and an amended order to the same effect was entered August 18, 1975. It is from the August 18, 1975 order that defendants appeal. 4
Article II, § 3 of the teacher tenure statute reads:
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants argue that a simple timely notification in writing that the teacher's work is unsatisfactory is all that the statute requires. Clearly, defendants say, if the Legislature intended the word 'definite' to require specific reasons for unsatisfactory work to be included within the written notice, the Legislature would have so stated. Plaintiff argues that the teacher tenure statute must be construed strictly against the board of education and in favor of protecting teachers' rights. Weckerly v. Mona Shores Board of Education, 388 Mich. 731, 734, 202 N.W.2d 777 (1972). Without specificity of reasons, says plaintiff, 'the public school teachers of Michigan are right back where they started prior to the tenure act and the numerous judicial interpretations guaranteeing teachers security and protections'. For the reasons set forth below we hold in favor of defendants.
Article II, § 3 is hardly a model of legislative draftsmanship. Yet, when it is read literally it appears to state, albeit in an awkward way, that there must be a written statement which definitely states whether the teacher's work was satisfactory. It does not appear to go further and require a detailing or listing of reasons why the work was unsatisfactory. Where one section of a statute is ambiguously worded, legislative intent may be found by clear and express language found in other sections. Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 469 (1850). In interpreting a statute we must read the entire act as a whole, and the meaning to be given to one section should be arrived at after due consideration of other sections, so as to produce a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Joslin v. Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Co., 359 Mich. 420, 102 N.W.2d 584 (1960). Applying this rule of construction to the instant case, we note that Article II of the tenure statute deals with the discharge of probationary teachers while Article IV deals with the discharge of tenured teachers. Sections 1 and 2 of Article IV require specific reasons to be included in the notice when discharge of a tenured teacher is contemplated. 5 If the Legislature had intended to require this same detailing of charges against a probationary teacher it easily could have done so. The fact that the Legislature chose not to do so indicates to us that the Legislature did not intend that a notice to probationary teachers should include detail of why and in what manner the teacher's work was unsatisfactory.
While no case has squarely addressed this issue, a number of cases have discussed other duties of the employer school board where a probationary teacher is not retained. The landmark case--actually a trinity of cases 6--is Munro v. Elk Rapids Schools. There, plaintiff had been employed as a probationary teacher for two school years. In November and January of the second year, plaintiff was evaluated as to teaching ability and rated satisfactory. Nevertheless, in February plaintiff received a letter stating:
'I regret to inform you that on February 12, 1968, the Elk Rapids School Board directed me to notify you that you would not be offered a contract for the 1968--69 school year.'
At the Court of Appeals level, defendant admitted that plaintiff's work was satisfactory but claimed that a 'satisfactory' rating does not automatically guarantee continued employment. In a brief opinion the Court of Appeals adopted defendant's interpretation. The case then went to the Supreme Court which, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed. The dissenting opinion written by Justice (now Chief Justice) T. G. Kavanagh stated that the case was controlled by the spirit, if not the letter, of Wilson v. Flint Board of Education 7--a case where the plaintiff teacher was not furnished written notification as to whether her work was satisfactory and where the court held that the absence of such mandated written notice precluded the defendant board from discontinuing her employment. The dissenting opinion in Munro v. Elk Rapids Schools, 383 Mich. 661, 178 N.W.2d 450 (1970), then went on to review the history of the tenure statute and concluded that it was necessary for the school board to follow the letter the law, Viz.--the requirement that written notice be given the teacher that his work was unsatisfactory Footnote five of the dissenting opinion explicitly states:
One year later Munro was reargued before the Supreme Court which, in a per curiam opinion, adopted the Kavanagh dissent stating:
'For the reasons set forth in the minority opinion heretofore filed herein and reported at 383 Mich. 661, beginning at 688, 178 N.W.2d 450, which is hereby adopted as the opinion of this Court, we hold that under the statute, Unless a probationary teacher is notified in writing that his work is unsatisfactory, upon completion of his probationary period he is entitled to employment with tenure status with all of its specified rights and privileges.' 385 Mich. 618, 619--620, 189 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Emphasis supplied.)
The salient point for us is that both Munro and Wilson involved cases where no written notice was given at all and where the issue involved was not whether a detailed statement of the reasons for the unsatisfactory work were mandated by statute but whether a school board could under certain circumstances discharge a probationary teacher even if the teacher's work was good. To us Munro indicates that a simple, timely written notification that the teacher's work is unsatisfactory is compliance with the statute. The next relevant case was Weckerly v. Mona Shores Board of Education, 388 Mich. 731, 202 N.W.2d 777 (1972). In that case the narrow issue was at what point in time the prescribed written statement of unsatisfactory work must be provided. Nevertheless the Court referred to its Munro and Wilson decisions stating:
'We have held that if no written statement is provided, the...
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