Simmons v. Cnty. of Suffolk

Decision Date30 September 2015
Docket Number14-CV-3884(JS)(ARL)
PartiesGLYNICE SIMMONS, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of DAINELL ERIK SIMMONS, Plaintiff, v. THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-10 individually and officially as members of the Suffolk County Police Department, and MARYHAVEN CENTER OF HOPE FOR MENTALLY CHALLENGED INDIVIDUALS and EMPLOYEES JOHN DOE 1-10, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff:

Anthony Michael Mahoney, Esq.

855 Grand Concourse

Bronx, NY

Moshe C. Bobker, Esq.

Linda Cronin, Esq.

Cronon & Byczek, LLP

1983 Marcuse Ave., Suite C120

New Hyde Park, NY 11042

For Moving

Defendant:

Anna I. Hock, Esq.

Robert Frank Elliot, Esq.

Bartlett, McDonough & Monaghan, LLP

170 Old County Road

Mineola, NY 11501

For Non-Moving

Defendants:

Arlene S. Zwilling, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney's Office

H. Lee Dennison Building, 5th Floor

100 Veterans Memorial Highway

P.O. Box 6100

Hauppauge, NY 11711-0099

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Glynice Simmons ("Plaintiff" or "Simmons"), individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Dainell Erik Simmons ("Dainell"), deceased, commenced this action on June 23, 2014, against defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Police Officers John Doe 1-10 individually and officially as members of the Suffolk County Police Department ("collectively the "County Defendants"), and Maryhaven Center of Hope for Mentally Challenged Individuals, and Employees John Doe 1-10 (collectively "Maryhaven"). Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges, inter alia, violations of Dainell's civil rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See generally Sec. Am. Compl., Docket Entry 23.) Specifically, Plaintiffs bring claims against Maryhaven for, inter alia, negligence for the false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, negligence, negligent training, hiring, retention and supervision, personal injury, assault, battery, failure to render medical aid, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, invasion of privacy, racial profiling, intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and violations of Plaintiff's free speech, as well as claims pursuant 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1986. (Sec. Am. Compl., Docket Entry 23 ¶ 1.)

Presently before the Court is Maryhaven's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (Docket Entry 24). For the following reasons, Maryhaven's motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND1

This action arises from the death of Dainell, a twenty-nine year old African-American male with Autism. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 19, 22.) Dainell resided at a group home, operated by Maryhaven, an independent and private, not-for-profit Corporation affiliated with Catholic Health Services of Long Island, which serves the developmentally disabled community through a network of both habilitation and residential services. (Def.'s Br., Docket Entry 24-4, at 3.)

On July 24, 2013, Dainell exhibited uncooperative behavior. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) On past occasions when Dainell exhibited such behavior, the staff had been instructed to contact Dainell's mother so she could speak to her son. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) That night rather than contacting his mother, a Maryhaven employee called 911 and requested policeassistance. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 113.) Plaintiff believes that inaccurate statements were made during the call regarding Dainell and his behavior. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) By the time the Suffolk County Police Department responded to the call, Dainell had calmed down and was sitting on the couch. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 114) Yet, when police officers arrived, Maryhaven staff pointed Dainell out and identified him to the officers without trying to diffuse the situation or advising the officers that Dainell was now calm. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114-15.) As a result, officers handcuffed, tasered, pepper sprayed, and used excessive force on Dainell, leading to his death. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff alleges that Maryhaven had an obligation to diffuse the situation and to advise the officers that Dainell had calmed down. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 115.) Plaintiff claims that Maryhaven not only was negligent in its duty to care for Dainell, but also in its training of its staff. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109-18.) Plaintiff further asserts that Maryhaven acted in concert with the County Defendants in depriving Dainell of his constitutional rights, resulting in his death. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-55, 62-68.)

Maryhaven argues for dismissal of the action because: (1) Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims cannot be maintained because Maryhaven is neither a state actor nor engaged inconduct under state law (Def.'s Br. at 5-11); (2) Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that the parties made or attempted to enforce a contract, therefore rendering the statute inapplicable (Def.'s Br. at 11-12); (3) Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim cannot be maintained because Plaintiffs fail to allege a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which is a prerequisite for a § 1986 claim (Def.'s Br. at 12-14); and (4) Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to the state law claims (Def.'s Br. at 14-15).

DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of Defendants' motion, the Court will discuss the applicable legal standard.

I. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court applies a "plausibility standard," which is guided by "[t]wo working principles." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009). First, although the Court must accept all allegations as true, this "tenet" is "inapplicable to legal conclusions;" thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Second, only complaints that state a "plausible claim for relief" can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Determining whether a complaint does so is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.; Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is confined to "the allegations contained within the four corners of [the] complaint." Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F. 3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1998). However, this limitation has been interpreted broadly to include any document attached to the complaint, any statements or documents incorporated in the complaint by reference, any document on which the complaint heavily relies, and anything of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991).

II. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims2

Plaintiff does not allege that Maryhaven is a government actor; rather, maintains that Maryhaven engaged in joint activity with the County Defendants, thus making them a state actor for the purposes of their § 1983 claim. (Pl.'s Br., Docket Entry 28, at 6-9.) Maryhaven argues that calling 911 and pointing out Dainell to the responding officers cannot support a § 1983 claim because the challenged conduct was not a state action. (Def.'s Br. at 5-11.)

In pertinent part, § 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of . . . [state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or a] suit [in] equity . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A violation is proven when "a person or persons acting under color of state law deprived a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [C]onstitution or laws of the United States." McDarby v. Dinkins, 907 F.2d 1334, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Plainly, a § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of her rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Annis v. Cnty. of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998).

The Supreme Court has recognized that a party acts under color of state law when he exercises power "'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941)); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988). For purposes of a § 1983 action, a defendant necessarily "acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State." Id. at 50, 108 S. Ct. 2255; see also Christian v. Belcher, 888 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[B]efore a defendant may be held liable under Section 1983, that defendant must first possess power by virtue of state law, then misuse that power in a way that violates federal constitutional rights." (emphasis in original)).

"'Private actors are not liable under section 1983 unless the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right can be fairly attributable to the State.'" Russell v. Aid to Developmentally Disabled, Inc., No. 12-CV-0389, 2013 WL 633573, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (quoting Omnipoint Commc'ns Inc. v. Comi, 233 F. Supp. 2d 388, 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (in turn, quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482(1982...

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