Simmons v. Luebbers, 01-2663.

• Decision Date: 14 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-2663.,No. 01-2699.,01-2663.,01-2699.
• Parties: Willie SIMMONS, Appellant, v. Allen LUEBBERS, Appellee. Willie Simmons, Appellant, v. Al Luebbers, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

299 F.3d 929

Willie SIMMONS, Appellant, v. Allen LUEBBERS, Appellee.

Willie Simmons, Appellant, v. Al Luebbers, Appellee.

No. 01-2663.

No. 01-2699.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 11, 2002.

Filed: August 14, 2002.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied: September 24, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Burton H. Shostak, argued, St. Louis, MO (Deborah J. Westling and Grant J. Shostak, on the brief), for appellant in 01-2663.

Eric W. Butts, argued, St. Louis, MO (Phillip M. Horwitz, on the brief), for appellant in 01-2699.

Cassandra K. Dolgin, AAG, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Willie Simmons appeals from the district court's denial of his petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.¹ We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Simmons was convicted in a single trial of two counts of capital murder following the deaths of Leonora McClendon and Cheri Johnson. Following the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Simmons to death on both counts. The Missouri Supreme court then overturned the two convictions on the grounds that the murder charges should not have been tried together. See State v. Simmons, 815 S.W.2d 426 (Mo.1991) (en banc). On remand, Simmons was tried separately for both murders. He was convicted and sentenced to death after each trial.

Simmons filed two separate motions for post-conviction relief with the trial court. After both sides presented evidence and Simmons underwent a psychiatric examination by a court appointed examiner, the trial court denied both motions. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Simmons's motions for post-conviction relief and affirmed both convictions and sentences. See State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 729 (Mo.1997) (en banc) (Johnson murder) (hereinafter "Simmons I"); State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752 (Mo.1997) (en banc) (McClendon murder) (hereinafter "Simmons II").

On February 22, 1999, Simmons filed two habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied both petitions and granted a certificate of appealability on twelve of the twenty-eight issues presented in the petitions.² These appeals followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Our consideration of Simmons's appeals is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & Supp.1998), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. "Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) `was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or (2) `involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)(O'Connor, J., concurring)). "Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495). In addition, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provides that relief may not be granted to a person in state custody unless the underlying state proceeding "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Sexton v. Kemna, 278 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also Johnston v. Luebbers, 288 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.2002).

A.

Simmons argued to the Missouri Supreme Court that his trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective because they failed to adequately investigate and present to the trial court evidence of his lack of mental capacity during the guilt phase of the McClendon trial. Simmons now argues that the Missouri Supreme Court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because Simmons's mental health raised questions as to whether he was competent to stand trial, and because Simmons's trial attorneys failed to uncover additional available evidence that would have cast doubt on his ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him. In our view, the Missouri Supreme Court did not err in its analysis of this issue.

As noted by the Missouri Supreme Court, the proper analysis for evaluating an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Simmons must demonstrate both that his attorneys' performance was deficient, and that his attorneys' deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Bryson v. United States, 268 F.3d 560, 561 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 Steinkuehler v. Meschner, 176 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir.1999)). To establish the first prong of the Strickland test, Simmons must show that his attorneys' representation fell below the "`range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). Trial counsel has a "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. However, there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and that counsel's challenged actions were part of a sound trial strategy. Id. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Further, to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, Simmons must establish "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.

Prior to the McClendon trial, Simmons's trial attorneys acquired reports from four mental health professionals. The first was prepared by Dr. Daniel, who performed a psychiatric evaluation of Simmons in 1990. Dr. Daniel found that Simmons did not show evidence of memory or other cognitive problems, and determined that Simmons did not have a diagnosable psychiatric disorder.

Dr. Fleming also performed a psychological evaluation of Simmons in 1990. Dr. Fleming noted that Simmons was unwilling to participate in the examination. Simmons apparently refused to respond to any questions that he felt to be intrusive, and exhibited mistrust of psychologists. This made it impossible to complete the evaluation. Nevertheless, Dr. Fleming concluded that Simmons had a low borderline intelligence. Dr. Fleming also noted that Simmons had gaps in his memory, evidenced in part by his denial that he ran away to Chicago during his childhood and was assaulted at a bus station. According to Dr. Fleming, Simmons understood the charges against him, and the possible penalties that he faced. He also understood the basic court process. However, Dr. Fleming opined that Simmons was not able to understand his arrest, trial, and the role of his attorneys because of his paranoia and mistrust of attorneys. Dr. Fleming believed that Simmons's delusions made him unable to understand the seriousness of his sentence, and that his paranoia prevented him from disclosing important information that might be of value to his attorneys. Dr. Fleming concluded that Simmons was incompetent to stand trial because of his mental status, and that his paranoia and mental illness made him unable to assist his attorneys or to rationally understand the issues.

Dr. Parwatikar and Dr. Peterson were appointed to examine Simmons before Simmons's separate trials for the murders of Johnson and McClendon. Dr. Parwatikar's report was based on the reports and data procured by other psychologists because, as the examination was about to begin, Simmons refused to be interviewed and demanded to be returned to his cell. Dr. Parwatikar concluded that Simmons was competent to proceed to trial. Dr. Peterson's report focused on mitigation issues because Simmons refused to participate in the examination. Dr. Peterson did not address Simmons's competency to stand trial.

Simmons contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to conduct an additional pretrial investigation into his competency to stand trial. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that because Simmons's trial attorneys already possessed four mental health reports on Simmons, and because Simmons refused to cooperate with at least three of the psychiatrists that his attorneys had obtained to examine him, his attorneys' failure to conduct an additional investigation into his competency status was not unreasonable. See Simmons II, 955 S.W.2d at 773. This was a reasonable application of the Strickland standard. Simmons's 1994 trial attorneys conducted an adequate investigation of Simmons's mental health status. Dr. Daniels successfully evaluated Simmons, and Drs. Fleming, Peterson, and Parwatikar tried, but were unable to do so because Simmons refused to cooperate. Further, Simmons's attorneys testified that throughout their extensive interactions with Simmons, they had...