Simmons v. Pcr Technology
Decision Date | 02 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. C02-1504 MHP.,C02-1504 MHP. |
Citation | 209 F.Supp.2d 1029 |
Parties | Stephen SIMMONS, Plaintiff, v. PCR TECHNOLOGY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
RE Remand to Superior Court
Plaintiff Stephen Simmons filed a complaint in California state court against his former employer, PCR Technology, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. On March 28, 2002, defendant filed a notice of removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Now before the court is plaintiff's motion to remand. Plaintiff further moves for sanctions against defendant for improper removal. Having considered the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.
Plaintiff, a California resident, worked for defendant, a corporation incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. This action is based on alleged acts of racial discrimination that occurred during plaintiff's employment and eventual termination.
Plaintiff filed a claim in the Superior Court of Alameda County on February 7, 2002 alleging discrimination under state law. Defendant removed the action to this court on March 28, 2002 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on April 25, 2002.
An action is removable to a federal court only if it could have been brought there originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has diversity jurisdiction over any civil action between citizens of different states so long as the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. If at any time before final judgment, the court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the action shall be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, and federal jurisdiction "must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Defendant always bears the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. Id. Where the amount of damages sought by a plaintiff is unclear, defendant must prove facts supporting the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Thus, defendant must demonstrate that it is "more likely than not" that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 404.
The district court determines whether defendant has met this burden by first considering whether it is "facially apparent" from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied. See Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir.1997). If the complaint does not clearly specify damages, the court may examine facts in the complaint and evidence submitted by the parties. The jurisdictional minimum may be satisfied by claims for special and general damages, attorneys' fees and punitive damages. See Conrad Assoc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F.Supp. 1196, 1198 (N.D.Cal.1998).
The parties do not dispute diversity of citizenship. Accordingly, this motion turns on whether the requisite "amount in controversy" exists. Federal district courts have jurisdiction only where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The parties find themselves in the curious position of arguing their opponent's case. Plaintiff asserts that defendant cannot meet its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendant counters that the amount in controversy, which includes compensatory, punitive and emotional distress damages, plus injunctive relief and attorneys' fees exceeds the jurisdictional amount. The court finds that defendant has satisfied its burden.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, including medical expenses and lost wages; punitive and emotional distress damages; injunctive relief; and attorneys' fees. Lost wages at time of removal totaled $25,600. The question is whether the sum of the remaining damages, plus attorneys' fees, satisfies the jurisdictional minimum.
Plaintiff's complaint seeks compensatory damages, including lost wages, benefits, medical expenses and future wage loss. Compl., Prayer ¶ a. Defendant contends that plaintiff's wage loss alone will exceed $56,000 by trial, supporting diversity jurisdiction when coupled with statutory attorneys' fees and other relief.
Plaintiff's employment was terminated on June 1, 2001. Compl. ¶ 7. This action was removed on March 28, 2002. Thus, assuming a monthly salary of $2,560, plaintiff's wage loss from termination until removal is $25,600.1 Although the court declines to project future wage loss until a hypothetical trial date, it is nonetheless reasonable to expect these damages to exceed $25,600.
The complaint further alleges that plaintiff "suffered costs for medical expenses" and prays for "medical expenses and other special expenses for treatment and care." Compl. ¶ 28, Prayer ¶¶ a & b. In his motion, however, plaintiff denies any medical expenses. See Pl.'s Mot. at 4:12-13 (). At oral argument, plaintiff explained this contradiction, stating that he had initially claimed medical damages as a precautionary measure on the off chance that such damages would eventually emerge.
Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Jurisdictional facts are assessed on the basis of plaintiff's complaint at the time of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. "[A] plaintiff may not defeat removal by subsequently changing his damage request, because post-removal events cannot deprive a court of jurisdiction once it has attached." St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938). By choosing to overplead in his complaint, plaintiff has chosen to accept the risk that he will plead himself into federal court. The court thus assumes plaintiff will be awarded some amount of medical damages, however slight.
Plaintiff highlights a post-removal settlement letter and stipulation to damages below the jurisdictional amount. A settlement letter may provide a reasonable estimate of plaintiff's claim.2 See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) ( ). In a letter dated April 22, 2002, plaintiff contends that he sought $23,000 to settle all claims. Murray Dec., Exh. 2; see also id., Exh. 1 (letter dated April 18, 2002) ("[A]t the time the complaint was filed, the value, being the most generous, was at or less than $23,000").3 Plaintiff also stipulated that total damages at removal did not exceed $75,000. Id., Exh. 2. () .
Significantly, the settlement letter and stipulation were prepared after removal.4 The Supreme Court has long discouraged reliance on post-removal stipulations and affidavits. See St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 292, 58 S.Ct. 586 ( ). Such statements are likely to manipulate the amount in controversy to secure jurisdiction in the desired court. The court gives little credence to plaintiff's post-removal statements. These letters do not alter the determination of the amount in controversy.
Plaintiff also seeks punitive and exemplary damages. Compl., Prayer ¶ e. The amount in controversy may include punitive damages when they are recoverable as a matter of law. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir.2001); Miller v. Michigan Millers Ins. Co., 1997 WL 136242, *4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (Patel, J., presiding); Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F.Supp. 447, 450 (S.D.Cal.1995). Plaintiff's action is brought pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal.Govt.Code § 12900 et seq. Punitive damages are available under FEHA. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940. Accordingly, the court may consider punitive damages when determining the amount in controversy.
Although the complaint seeks punitive damages, the amount sought is unclear. To establish probable punitive damages, defendant may introduce evidence of jury verdicts in cases involving analogous facts. See Faulkner v. Astro-Med, Inc., 1999 WL 820198, *4 (N.D.Cal.1999); Miller, 1997 WL 136242 at *4. To this end, defendant highlights jury verdicts with substantial punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Prasad v. University of Cal. Davis Med. Ctr., JVR No. 802857 ( ); Carrol v. Interstate Brands Corp. dba Wonderbread, dba Hostess & dba Dolly Madison, et al., Cal.Super.Ct. for the County of San Francisco Case No. 995728, 1 C.E.L.M. 68 (Sept.2000) ( ); Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., JVR No. 801112 ( ). The fact that the cited cases involve distinguishable facts is not dispositive. Notwithstanding these differences, the jury verdicts in these cases amply demonstrate the potential for large punitive damage awards in employment discrimination cases. Although the facts of the instant action are far less egregious, defendant has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that...
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