Simmons v. Porter
Decision Date | 07 January 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 102,662.,102,662. |
Citation | 245 P.3d 1091 |
Parties | Adam SIMMONS, Appellant, v. Richard W. PORTER and Sarah M. Porter, d/b/a Porter Farms, Appellees. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The defense of assumption of risk under Kansas law is analyzed and applied.
2. A party opposing summary judgment must produce something of evidentiary value in its arguments. The fact that a party has an explanation of the uncontroverted facts does not necessarily make them controverted.
3. The assumption of risk doctrine still exists in Kansas concerning certain employer-employee relationships.
4. Within its very restricted periphery of application, the common-law defense of assumption of risk has not been altered by the adoption of comparative fault, K.S.A. 60-258a, and continues to constitute an absolute bar to recovery.
5. Under the doctrine of assumed risk, one who voluntarily exposes one's self to known or appreciated danger due to the negligence of another may not recover for the injury sustained thereby.
6. The assumption of the usual risks of employment is not ordinarily a jury question. It is a matter of law. It is only if the risk is or may be unusual that a jury question can arise, and even in such cases, if the risk though unusual is obvious, such as an ordinarily prudent person could appreciate and understand, the worker who persists in the employment assumes the risk.
Jeffrey W. Jones, of Hamilton, Laughlin, Barker, Johnson & Watson, of Topeka, for appellant.
Craig C. Blumreich, of Larson & Blumreich, Chartered, of Topeka, for appellees.
Before LEBEN, P.J., PIERRON and BUSER, JJ.
Adam Simmons appeals a summary judgment ruling in favor of Richard W. Porter and Sarah M. Porter, d/b/a Porter Farms (Porter Farms) after he was tragically injured in a gasoline fire. Simmons argues the district court improperly applied the assumption of risk doctrine in granting summary judgment to Porter Farms.
The parties agree on the following uncontroverted facts:
Simmons sustained personal injury on February 11, 2004, while performing work in the course and scope of his employment with Porter Farms. Simmons had been hired by Porter Farms to work as a mechanic on farm trucks and machinery. When Simmons applied for the job, he advised Porter Farms he was an auto mechanic with several years of experience. Simmons claimed he had a lifetime of experience as an auto mechanic.
At the time he was injured, Simmons was in the process of removing the fuel tank from a 1978 Ford F-250 pickup truck. The truck had a gas leak in the fuel tank and Simmons was going to remove the fuel tank to determine where it leaked and if the fuel tank could be repaired or would need to be replaced.
Simmons commenced his work on the fuel tank without first draining or removing the fuel from the tank; the level being "less than a half a tank." In his deposition, Simmons explained he left 5 or less gallons of fuel in the tank in order to keep the gas fumes down and in turn keep the ignition possibilities down. Simmons used a 4-ton floor jack to raise the truck so he could work underneathit. Simmons rolled under the vehicle on his back on a floor creeper. He hung a shop light from the frame rail of the truck for illumination.
Simmons found that the fuel tank was secured by a plumbing strap wrapped around the tank and connected to the frame by one bolt on the front side and by bailing wire wrapped around the tank and the frame on the back side. Simmons was aware of how the fuel tank was attached even before he put the jack under the truck to raise it. Although the fuel tank was not secured with factory straps or replacement part straps, Simmons continued to work on the truck anyway. He began removing the fuel tank by using a pneumatic wrench to loosen the bolt securing the plumbing strap to the frame. The fuel tank suddenly shifted, fell, and dropped off of the jack. Simmons was covered in gasoline. As Simmons quickly pushed out from under the truck on the floor creeper, his foot caught on the shop light causing it to fall, break, and ignite the gasoline, setting him on fire.
Simmons was fully aware of the fuel tank configuration on the truck and knew there was a potential risk of fire in removing a fuel tank. Simmons acknowledged that the condition of the fuel tank was open and obvious to him and he understood the risks in removing the tank.
Simmons had removed fuel tanks from other Porter Farm vehicles. However, each of the prior tanks had been properly secured with factory straps or replacement straps. Nearly all of Simmons' time at Porter Farms was spent in the shop working on farm trucks and machinery. There were three mechanics who worked at Porter Farms during the time Simmons worked there. However, Simmons said there was no one at Porter Farms at this time who knew more about fixing cars and trucks than he. Porter Farms did not have a vehicle lift, a fuel siphon pump, or a car jack.
Simmons was severely burned and permanently injured in the fire. Simmons sued Porter Farms, arguing Porter Farms owed him a legal duty of care and skill to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. He alleged the breach of this duty was the natural, probable, and proximate cause of his injuries.
In managing the case, the district court permitted Porter Farms to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of Porter Farms' affirmative defense of assumption of risk. In granting summary judgment to Porter Farms, the district court concluded as follows:
On appeal, Simmons first argues the district court erroneously found all of the facts in Porter Farms' motion for summary judgment to be uncontroverted and failed to give proper consideration to the facts stated in his response. He cites no Supreme Court Rules or case law supporting his argument, which consumes a little over one page of his appellate brief.
The court in City of Arkansas City v. Bruton, 284 Kan. 815, 166 P.3d 992 (2007), addressed a similar type of argument. The Bruton court held the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the parties violated Supreme Court Rule 141 (2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 203.) and that the sheer number of filings of statements of facts indicated there remained unresolved material facts. 284 Kan. at 837, 166 P.3d 992. In arriving at this conclusion, the Bruton court engaged in the following analysis:
The district court below engaged in the same separation of the wheat from the chaff in adopting its statement of uncontroverted facts. At the beginning of the summary judgment hearing, the district court stated, "I will advise you that I have read everything you submitted and the...
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Simmons v. Porter
...exposes himself or herself to that danger. The Court of Appeals affirmed based on existing precedent. Simmons v. Porter, 45 Kan.App.2d 177, 182–83, 245 P.3d 1091 (2011). Simmons argues we should abandon this court-made doctrine in favor of our state's statutory comparative fault system in w......
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Herrman v. Williams
...she hadn't cited to any actual evidence; instead, she simply explained her own beliefs about those facts. See Simmons v. Porter , 45 Kan. App. 2d 177, 181–82, 245 P.3d 1091 (2011) (the fact that a party has an explanation of the uncontroverted facts does not necessarily make them controvert......