Simmons v. Pritzker
| Decision Date | 12 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22 CV 0123 |
| Parties | Christine Simmons, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jay Robert Pritzker, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiffs Christine Simmons and Hsinyi Liu filed suit on behalf of themselves, their children, and all others similarly situated. They allege that the state of Illinois, the City of Chicago School District 299, and Ottawa Township High School #140, among others, violated students' rights by failing to comply with the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and Illinois law. They also allege violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint.
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At this stage, I accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, disregarding legal conclusions or “threadbare recitals” supported by only “conclusory statements.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In cases where a party alleges fraud, as plaintiffs do here with their RICO claims, the complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Intent can be alleged generally, though. Id. “Fraud is a serious matter” and Rule 9 “represents a policy decision to protect potential fraud defendants from litigation based on nothing but...speculation.” United States v Molina Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 17 F.4th 732, 740 (7th Cir. 2021). The rule is designed to discourage a “sue first, ask questions later” approach. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2011). Particularity requires alleging the “who, what, when, where, and how” of an alleged fraud-“the first paragraph of any newspaper story.” Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 441-42 (quoting United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2009)); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).
On March 13, 2020, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker issued an executive order instructing all public and private schools serving pre-kindergarten through 12th grade students to close through March 30, 2020. [1] ¶ 56; Exec. Order 2020-05 § 1. The order suspended a state law that requires school districts to receive approval before implementing virtual learning, and to hold a public hearing and communicate to teachers, students, and staff thirty days before moving to virtual learning. [1] ¶¶ 57-58; Exec. Order 2020-05 § 3.
Plaintiffs B.W. and T.S. are both children with disabilities whose schools shut down in March 2020. [1] ¶¶ 17-28. B.W., who was 15 in March 2020, has Down Syndrome and cognitive delays. [1] ¶¶ 17-18. He was a student in the Chicago Public Schools during the 2019-2020, 2020-2021, and 2021-2022 school years. [1] ¶ 22. His mother is plaintiff Hsinyi Liu. [1] ¶ 19. B.W.s' 2019-2020 Individualized Education Plan included instruction in non-academic independent functioning, occupational therapy, vision services, and speech pathology. [1] ¶ 86. Those services could be provided by a special education teacher or a paraprofessional. [1] ¶ 86. From March 16, 2020, through April 2020, B.W. received at-home instruction. [1] ¶ 87. From April 2020 to June 2020, he mostly received at-home instruction. [1] ¶ 87. But every other week, for half a day, he attended school in person. [1] ¶ 87.
T.S., who was 16 in March 2020, has a general learning disability and cognitive impairment. [1] ¶¶ 23-24. He was a student in the Ottawa Public School District during the relevant school years. [1] ¶ 28. His mother is plaintiff Christine Simmons. [1] ¶ 25. T.S.'s IEP requires him to have extended time on tests, be allowed to take those tests in alternate settings, and receive accommodations for classroom assessments. [1] ¶ 97. His IEP also requires a health class about personal hygiene, nutrition, and other life skills. [1] ¶ 98. From March 16, 2020, through August 2020, his instruction was entirely virtual. [1] ¶¶ 99, 101. From fall 2020 to the end of the 2020-2021 school year, he received half-a-day of in-person instruction daily. [1] ¶ 101.
The school-shutdown order lasted until the end of the 2019-2020 school year. See Exec. Orders 2020-05, 2020-06, 2020-33, 2020-39. On June 4, 2020, the governor issued an order allowing schools to “transition to limited in-person instruction” after the end of the school year, as long as they complied with certain public-health measures. [1] ¶ 63; Exec. Order 2020-40.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants committed multiple violations of the IDEA. They say defendants changed plaintiffs' educational placements without offering prior notice and reconvening IEP meetings. [1] ¶¶ 88, 100, 135-41, 154-57. They say defendants didn't comply with the IDEA's “stay-put provision,” which requires schools to keep children with disabilities in their current educational placements while administrative or judicial due-process proceedings are pending. [1] ¶¶ 142-53. And they say defendants failed to reimburse them for the out-of-pocket expenses they spent on their children to make up for the schools' failures. [1] ¶ 161.
Plaintiffs say defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by denying them equal access to educational services and programs compared to their nondisabled peers. [1] ¶¶ 175-76, 189. Plaintiffs also claim defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection rights by taking actions that disparately impacted students with disabilities, [1] ¶ 196, and violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights by ending in-person instruction, [1] ¶ 203. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants violated Illinois law governing special education and a free appropriate public education. [1] ¶¶ 208-11 (). Finally, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated RICO by committing mail and wire fraud in their applications for IDEA funding. [1] ¶¶ 213-16, 219-84.
Plaintiffs ask for injunctive and retrospective relief. They ask that I certify the purported class, [1] at 47, and enjoin defendants “and other similarly situated [local educational agencies]” from violating the IDEA, including unilaterally changing plaintiffs' educational placement for more than ten cumulative days in the event of any school closures. [1] ¶ 120(1)-(4), (6). They ask that I enjoin defendants from violating the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law. [1] ¶ 120(6). They also ask that I appoint a special monitor to figure out how much purported class members regressed as a result of the changes in their educational placements, to reconvene IEP meetings, and to make recommendations to me about compensatory education or pendency payments for purported class members. [1] ¶ 120(5). But they also specify what that compensatory education should be: an additional year of education, or more, for each year that plaintiffs received remote or hybrid education. [1] at 49. Finally, they ask that I appoint a special monitor to ensure that defendants don't violate RICO. [1] ¶ 120(7).
The Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through all stages of the litigation.” N.J. by Jacob v. Sonnabend, 37 F.4th 412, 421 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotations omitted). When a court “can no longer affect the rights of litigants in the case,” the case becomes moot and the court lacks jurisdiction. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of establishing mootness. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Schs., 885 F.3d 1038, 1051 (7th Cir. 2018).
The state defendants say plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief is moot because the state shutdown order was issued more than two years ago, is no longer in effect, and no similar order has been issued since. [29] at 4-7. Plaintiffs respond that although schools have since reopened, the state retains the ability to impose another shutdown. [43] at 13, 16. For that reason, they say, their requested injunctive relief (ordering schools to provide prior written notice of any changes in educational placement, keep children in their then-current educational placements during the pendency of administrative hearings, hold IEP meetings before changing educational placements, and ensure that disabled and abled students are treated equally, see [1] ¶¶ 135-61) isn't moot. [43] at 16-17.
It is true that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice doesn't automatically render a case moot. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 885 F.3d at 1051. But “[w]hen the defendants are public officials...we place greater stock in their acts of self-correction [of the allegedly illegal conduct], so long as they appear genuine.” Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2020) (...
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