Simmons v. Ricci

• Decision Date: 13 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-0250 (RMB)
• Parties: FREDERICK SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE R. RICCI et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

FREDERICK SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. MICHELLE R. RICCI et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 10-0250 (RMB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: September 13, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Bumb, District Judge:

Petitioner Frederick Simmons ("Petitioner") filed the instant petition ("Petition") seeking a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); he is challenging his judgment of conviction rendered by the Superior Court of New Jersey. See Docket Entry No. 1. Petitioner duly paid his filing fee. See Docket Entry dated Jan. 22, 2010. The Court informed Petitioner of his rights, pursuant to Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000), see Docket Entry No. 3; Petitioner did not respond to the Court's Mason notice, hence indicating that Petitioner wished for the Court to rule on his Petition as submitted. The Court directed Respondents to file an answer to the Petition, and allowed Petitioner an opportunity to traverse. See Docket Entry No. 4. Upon the Court's finding that Respondents' initial answer failed to comply with the Court's order directing responsive pleading, see Docket Entries Nos. 7 and 8 (replicating Respondent's original answer and the Court's order detailing its shortcomings), and upon the Court's reorder of answer, see Docket Entry No. 8, Respondents complied. See Docket Entries Nos. 11-20.Petitioner did not traverse as to either Respondents' initial answer or their re-answer. See generally, Docket.

For the reasons expressed below, the Court will dismiss the Petition and will decline to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c), 2254(a), (b), (c).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 2254(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code gives the court jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition challenging a state conviction or sentence only where the inmate's custody violates federal law:

[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

"In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1997). "Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982). "If a state prisoner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable. It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner preserved his claim before the state courts." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 n.19 (1982). "[E]rrors of state law cannot be repackaged as federal errors simply by citing the Due Process Clause." Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 1997). Moreover, "it is well established that a state court's misapplication of its own law does not generally raise aconstitutional claim." Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Smith v. Zimmerman, 768 F.2d 69, 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1985).

A district court must give deference to determinations of state courts. See Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 919 (2001); Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996). Federal courts "must presume that the factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts are correct, a presumption that can only be overcome on the basis of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Stevens v. Delaware Correctional Center, 295 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Where a federal claim was "adjudicated on the merits" ¹ in state court proceedings, § 2254 does not permit habeas relief unless adjudication of the claim

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision is "'contrary to' a Supreme Court holding if the state court 'contradicts the governing law [as it is interpreted or] set forth in [the Supreme Court's, rather than in any state court's or any circuit court's] cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materiallyindistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

In other words, under the "'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. Whether a state court's application of federal law is "unreasonable" must be judged objectively, which means that an application may be incorrect, but still not unreasonable. Id. at 409-10.

A court begins the analysis by determining the relevant clearly established law. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). Clearly established law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A court must look for "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 72 (2003).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, detailed the underlying events as follows:

The events that led to the indictment and convictions occurred at the Firehouse Tavern in Wildwood on May 10, 1996, at about 2:00 a. m. Michael James, the part-owner and bartender, was getting ready to close when two black men, whom he did not know, walked into the bar at about 2:10 a.m. and one of them asked for a case of beer. James had a "gut feeling" that he was about to be robbed, but dropped his guard when one of the men, [Petitioner], was recognized and greeted by Robert Connors, the only customer left in the bar. However, the man nearestto James, later identified as Poteat, pulled put a club from under his jacket and hit him in the head, knocking him to the ground.

James got up and started to fight for his life, he grabbed Poteat and punched him in the mouth while yelling for help. Poteat threatened to shoot James if he didn't keep the noise down. During this time, James could not see what was going on between [Petitioner] and Connors. James and Poteat continued grappling and rolled out through the door onto the sidewalk. James kept yelling for help while continually being clubbed by Poteat.

[Petitioner] then came out the front door and kicked James in the throat. When a customer returned in has car to the tavern after having dropped off another patron, Poteat and [Petitioner] ran off in different directions. The returning patron and James then drove . . . towards the police station . . . .

Once at the police station, James and the patron told the police of the robbery and informed their that [another] patron [i.e., Connors,] was still in the tavern. An ambulance was called and patrol cars were dispatched to the tavern where police found Connors lying dead, face down on the bathroom floor in a puddle of blood and hot water from pipes where the sink had been broken off the wall. Two of the three cash registers in the bar were open and emptied, only change remained.

Around 6:30 or 7:00 that morning, some two hours after the arrest of Poteat, Kevin McLaughlin, a Wildwood police detective, was directed to look for [Petitioner]. McLaughlin went to the Quality Restaurant where [Petitioner] was employed, but the owner said [Petitioner] was not there. Other officers checked Commissioner's Court, [Petitioner] residence, to no avail. McLaughlin returned to the Quality Restaurant and was again told [Petitioner] was not [there], but would be in later to work the lunch shift. McLaughlin went back a third time between 10:30 a.m. and 11.00 a.m , and was once again told [Petitioner] was still not there, however, as he was about to leave the door opened and [Petitioner] said, "are you guys looking for me?" McLaughlin told him that they wanted to talk to him at police headquarters. [Petitioner] replied, "let's go" and did not ask why. Nor did [Petitioner] complain of physical injuries, or show any sign of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

At police headquarters, after McLaughlin administered Miranda warnings to [Petitioner,] who acknowledged his rights and waived them, [Petitioner initially] told McLaughlin that he was at the Firehouse Tavern, but had no involvement in any crime. He then changed his story and made an inculpatory statement which was held admissible after a hearing. A tape and transcript of [Petitioner's] confession were presented to the jury. In it, [Petitioner] said that about 1:20 a.m. Poteat approached him as he was standing by the Sportsmen'sBar on New Jersey Avenue and Garfield Avenue. Poteat wanted him to take a walk to see if they could make some money, which [Petitioner] understood to mean swindle someone or make a drug buy. As they walked to the Firehouse Tavern, Poteat told him there should be some "good money" there because it was a busy place. [Petitioner] did not know if they were going to ["]get money["] from someone there or from the bar itself.

They looked inside the bar from the Park Boulevard side and saw two heads. They walked in and [Petitioner] recognized the patron and greeted him. [Petitioner] asked the patron for a cigarette and he gave him one. [P

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