Simmons v. Simmons

• Citation: 57 App. DC 216,19 F.2d 690
• Decision Date: 02 May 1927
• Docket Number: No. 4518.,4518.
• Parties: SIMMONS v. SIMMONS.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

57 App. DC 216, 19 F.2d 690 (1927)

SIMMONS v. SIMMONS.

No. 4518.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted April 6, 1927.

Decided May 2, 1927.

T. L. Jeffords and E. C. Dutton, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

Appellee, Irene Simmons, hereafter referred to as the plaintiff, brought a suit for absolute divorce in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against her alleged husband, Herbert Simmons, and a corespondent. Defendant husband answered the bill, and also filed a cross-bill, praying for an annulment of the marriage between himself and the plaintiff, on the ground that, when the marriage took place plaintiff had a husband living, from whom she had not been legally divorced.

The case was heard on the cross-bill and answer thereto, and from the evidence it appeared that on March 7, 1918, plaintiff procured a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion from her then husband, Henry E. Davis, in the circuit court of Alexandria, Va., and on April 10 following married the defendant.

The court below found from the evidence that the plaintiff and defendant were living together in the District of Columbia as husband and wife under the name of Simmons, although at the time it was known to defendant that the plaintiff was a married woman. It was while they were so living together that plaintiff filed her bill for divorce in the Virginia court, and procured the decree above mentioned. The court also found as a fact, and it is fully supported by the record, that the Virginia decree was procured by fraud, "both as to the required residence in Virginia of the plaintiff, and as to the alleged desertion of her husband." Indeed, it strongly appears that defendant furnished plaintiff with the money to carry on her suit in Virginia.

On this state of facts the learned trial justice below in his opinion concluded as follows: "To allow him, under these circumstances, to take advantage of the void decree of divorce obtained by Irene Davis in order to avoid the consequences of his marriage to her, occurring about a month after the decree of divorce was entered, would be to lend the aid of the process and authority of this court to conduct that is violative of plain principles of equity and strike a blow at the integrity of the marriage relation."

In a case of this sort, neither the principles of equity nor the integrity of the marriage relation are controlling. We are here considering a case involving a marriage which is void ab initio. Section 1283, D. C. Code, provides in part as follows: "The following marriages are prohibited in the District of Columbia and shall be absolutely void ab initio, without being so decreed, and their nullity may be shown in any collateral proceedings, namely: * * *

"Third. The marriage of any persons either of whom has been previously married and whose previous marriage has not been terminated by death or a decree of divorce."

Section 1284 provides that:

"Any of such marriages may also be declared to have been null and void by judicial decree."

In proceedings to annul a void marriage, especially where it is so declared by statute, the rule of pari delicto and the equitable principle of "clean hands" are inapplicable, since in such cases the state becomes a third party. While it is a settled principle of law that, where parties are in pari delicto, the court will refuse to extend them aid, and will leave them without remedy against each other, it is equally true that, where the state is an interested party, the contributing guilt of the parties to the suit will not operate as a bar to the granting of relief. "The rule of par delictum will not be applied, however, to prevent relief in a suit to annul and set aside a void marriage. This is a matter in which the state is an interested party. Under the facts as found by the court, the marriage should be set aside as void, but the parties are entitled to no other or further relief." Szlauzis v. Szlauzis, 255 Ill. 314, 99 N. E. 640, L. R. A. 1916C, 741, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 454.

In Lynch v. Lynch, 34 R. I. 261, 83 A. 83, it appeared that at the time of the marriage the wife, as here, had a husband living, from whom she had not been lawfully divorced. The court of original jurisdiction refused a divorce on the ground that the parties were in pari delicto, but the appellate tribunal, reversing the decree, said: "Her legal status, however, is something in which the state as well as the parties is interested. If, as a matter of fact, she was already married when she undertook to enter into the married state with the respondent such second marriage was a nullity, and the court should so declare."

The interest of the state extends beyond the private grievances of the parties directly involved. It sponsors the welfare of society and the sanctity of the marriage relation. It refuses to countenance the continued perpetration of crime between such parties in violation of law and good morals. "In this class of cases it is not the private grievance of the complainant alone which is considered, and which controls the nature and extent of the remedy, if any, which may be granted. The state is often called a `third party' to every suit for divorce or nullity of marriage. But not only the state is concerned, but the interests of innocent unborn children may be involved. If a decree of nullity is denied when nullity has been absolutely established by the proofs, the legality of the marriage is not established. * * * The fact that the marriage was null remains." Freda v. Bergman, 77 N. J. Eq. 46, 76 A. 460.

The equitable rule, that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands," has no application, where its enforcement would result in sustaining an act declared by statute to be void, or against public policy. In such cases, the interest of society intervenes, and the state is regarded as a third party. In the case of Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120, 1 Ann. Cas. 612, the parties were prohibited from marrying in West Virginia because of relationship by blood. They went into Pennsylvania and were married. After they had lived together for 18 years, the husband brought a suit to annul the marriage, and the trial court dismissed his bill, on the ground "that a court of equity ought not to entertain a litigant who vaunted his own iniquity, and made that his sole grounds for the decree asked from it." The appellate court, reversing this decree, said: "If the parties could continue the marriage relationship without violating the criminal laws of the state, then the court might be justified in refusing to entertain the plaintiff's bill. But, when the law forbids the continuance of their marriage relation, notwithstanding its inception may have been a misdemeanor, it is the...