Simmons v. State
| Decision Date | 02 May 1899 |
| Citation | 25 So. 881,41 Fla. 316 |
| Parties | SIMMONS v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to criminal court of record, Duval county; John L. Doggett Judge.
W. H Simmons was found guilty of robbery by putting in fear, and brings error. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Property obtained by trick or artifice, or by threats of illegal arrest, criminal prosecution, or insinuations against character, except they relate to sodomitical practices, is not taken by 'putting in fear,' within the meaning of section 2398, Rev. St.
2. Allegations in an information to the effect that Simmons Tyre, and Jones, by putting in fear one Rebecca Jackson, by then and there falsely representing and pretending to the said Rebecca Jackson that one of them, to wit, the said Jones, was then and there an officer, to wit, a constable and authorized to take her furniture, and by then and there threatening to arrest and take into custody the said Rebecca Jackson if she resisted them in the taking of said furniture, do not show a 'putting in fear,' within the meaning of section 2398, Rev. St.
W. P. Ward, for plaintiff in error.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.
On February 24, 1898, plaintiff in error was, in the criminal court of record of Duval county, found guilty, as charged, upon a trial under an information duly filed, charging 'that W. H. Simmons, H. M. Tyre, and S. S. Jones, of the county of Duval and state of Florida, on the 7th day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, in the county and state aforesaid, did then and there, by putting in fear one Rebecca Jackson, by then and there falsely representing and pretending to the said Rebecca Jackson that one of them, to wit, the said S. S. Jones, was then and there an officer, to wit, a constable, and authorized to take her furniture, and by then and there threatening to arrest and take into custody the said Rebecca Jackson if she resisted them in the taking of said furniture, did then and there feloniously rob, steal, and take from the person of the said Rebecca Jackson one stove, of the value of eighteen dollars; one bureau, of the value of twelve dollars; one washstand, of the value of eight dollars; one bedstead, of the value of four dollars; one child's crib, of the value of four dollars; one crib mattress, of the value of one dollars,--all of the value of forty-seven dollars,--the property, goods, and chattels of the said Rebecca Jackson, contrary to the form of the statute,' etc. Before the trial plaintiff in error moved to quash the information, which was denied, and after the verdict he moved in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that the information did not allege facts sufficient to charge him with the crime of which he was convicted; but this motion was also overruled, and from the sentence imposed he sued out this writ of error.
The only error assigned, which we find it necessary to consider relates to the ruling upon the motion in arrest of judgment. The information is based upon section 2398, Rev. St., reading as follows: 'Whoever by force, violence or assault, or putting in fear, feloniously robs, steals and takes from the person of another, money or other property which may be the subject of larceny (such robber not being armed with a dangerous weapon), shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding fifteen years.' The information does not charge any force, violence, or assault, but sets forth in detail the facts from which the conclusion that Rebecca Jackson was put in fear is drawn, and plaintiff in error argues that the facts alleged are not sufficient to show a 'putting in fear,' within the meaning of the statute quoted. The statute does not define what circumstances shall constitute 'putting in fear,' but this expression is evidently used in a technical sense, and we must ascertain its meaning by reference to the common-law definition of 'robbery,' from whence it is derived. Turner v. State, 1 Ohio St. 422; Clary v. State, 33 Ark. 561. At common law, robbery was 'the felonious and forcible taking of the property of another from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or by putting in fear.' 1 Whart. Cr. Law, § 846; 2 Russ. Crimes (9th Ed.) *98. The putting in fear, or intimidation, was considered the equivalent of constructive violence, and the demands of the law were met by proof of fear excited with respect to apprehended injuries to the...
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Williams v. United States
...by means of insinuations against, or threats to destroy, the character by accusations of sodomitical practices." Simmons v. State, 41 Fla. 316, 319, 25 So. 881 (1899). As in Virginia, this alternative form of robbery appears to have been abandoned in Florida, and was not discussed in any re......
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...So. 4; Bradley v. State, 20 Fla. 738; King v. State, 17 Fla. 183; Gafford v. State, 79 Fla. 581, 84 So. 602. In the case of Simmons v. State, 41 Fla. 316, 25 So. 881, the defendants were charged with robbery by one of methods only by which the statute declares the offense may be committed, ......
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...implied threat of arrest or other police action does not qualify as the force or fear required to establish a robbery. Simmons v. State, 41 Fla. 316, 25 So. 881 (1899); Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157 The state contends that the proof made out what it characterizes as the lesser ......
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