Simmons v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | CR–12–1393. |
| Citation | 179 So.3d 244 |
| Parties | Charles Marquis SIMMONS v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Fred F. Bell, Sr., Montgomery; and Theron Stokes, Montgomery, for appellant.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Charles Marquis Simmons, a school teacher, was convicted in the Lowndes County District Court for the Class A misdemeanor of having sexual contact with a student less than 19 years old, a violation of § 13A–6–82, Ala.Code 1975. This charge was brought pursuant to a complaint filed by the victim's mother. Simmons appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo, and he was again convicted in the circuit court. Simmons was sentenced to 1 year in the county jail; the sentence was split, and he was ordered to serve 30 days in the county jail, followed by 1 year of probation. Simmons was ordered to pay a $500 fine, court costs, and a $50 crime victims compensation fund assessment.
On appeal, Simmons argues, as he did before the commencement of his trial in the circuit court, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial and to enter a judgment of conviction against him, because, he argues, the original charging instrument was not filed in the circuit court. He correctly asserts that the charging instrument in the circuit court was an information filed, and later amended, by the district attorney after Simmons filed his notice of appeal for a trial de novo.1
Rule 2.1, Ala. R.Crim. P., states that "[a]ll criminal proceedings shall be commenced either by indictment or complaint." In this case, the district court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the misdemeanor offense charged against Simmons.2 Thus, a complaint was the proper charging instrument.3 Rule 30.5, Ala. R.Crim. P., states that following a conviction in the district court, "[w]hen an appeal is taken to the circuit court for a trial de novo, the trial shall be prosecuted as provided in Rule 2.2(d)." Rule 2.2(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., states that an appeal from the district court to the circuit court "shall be prosecuted in the circuit court on the original charging instrument." Rule 30.4(a), Ala. R.Crim. P., required that the complaint executed by the victim's mother be transferred to the circuit court.
"Within fourteen (14) days after the appeal to the circuit court for trial de novo is perfected as provided by Rule 30.3(b), the clerk of the ... district court shall transmit to the clerk of the circuit court such records of the proceedings as are in the ... district court clerk's possession, including the original charging instrument. "
(Emphasis added.) This was not done.
" ‘[A]n accusation [i.e., a charging instrument,] made in the manner prescribed by law is a prerequisite to the court's power to exercise its jurisdiction. ’ " Anderson v. State, 796 So.2d 1151, 1157–1158 (Ala.Crim.App.2000) (quoting State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Ala.1989) (emphasis added)). Thus, presentment of the charging instrument, i.e., the complaint, to the circuit court was necessary to engage the jurisdiction of the "circuit court in the case of a de novo appeal." Stoll v. State, 724 So.2d 90, 92 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (), citing Young v. City of Hokes Bluff, 611 So.2d 401, 411–413 (Ala.Crim.App.) (Bowen, J., concurring in result), aff'd, 611 So.2d 414 (Ala.1992) ; Sanders v. City of Birmingham, 669 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). See also Rule 2.2(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended effective August 1, 1997.
We are not to be understood as requiring anything contrary to Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala.2006), which holds that defects in an indictment have no affect on the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction. We are asserting that the filing of the proper charging instrument was required for the jurisdiction belonging to the circuit court to attach. See generally, State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Ala.1989) .
Moreover, an information is not a substitute for a complaint or indictment. An information is used by the prosecution to allow a willing defendant to enter a guilty plea following the filing of a complaint, but before the grand jury returns an indictment. Specifically, the legislature in § 15–15–20.1, Ala.Code 1975, authorized the use of an information as the charging instrument for noncapital felony offenses that were commenced by a complaint and where the defendant has also given notice that he or she seeks to enter a guilty plea before an indictment is returned. See § 15–15–21, Ala.Code 1975, and Rule 2.2(e), Ala. R.Crim. P.
In the absence of a proper charging instrument, the circuit court could not exercise its jurisdiction over Simmons's appeal. Accordingly, Simmons's conviction and sentence rendered and imposed by the circuit court are void and due to be set aside. This cause is remanded for the circuit to proceed consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
I respectfully dissent from this Court's decision declaring Simmons's conviction void because the decision is in conflict with Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala.2006), and Stegall v. State, 628 So.2d 1006 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).
The majority opinion states:
"Simmons argues ... that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial and to enter a judgment of conviction against him, because ... the original charging instrument was not filed in the circuit court. "4
179 So.3d at 245 (emphasis added). The majority opinion concludes that "[i]n the absence of a proper charging instrument, the trial court could not exercise its jurisdiction over Simmons's appeal." 179 So.3d at 246. The failure to file a proper charging instrument in the circuit court, however, did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over Simmons's case.
This Court in Stegall addressed the failure to properly file a "solicitor's complaint" in the circuit court on an appeal from a district-court conviction for a trial de novo. In Stegall, Stegall argued that "because the ‘solicitor's complaint’ was not filed until 22 days after [Stegall] filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try his case and that the case therefore should have been dismissed." 628 So.2d at 1007. This Court held that "[t]he filing of a solicitor's complaint is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo." Id. at 1008. In other words, the circuit court's jurisdiction over an appeal from district court for a trial de novo is not determined by whether a charging instrument is filed.
Our holding in Stegall, although decided approximately 13 years before Seymour, is consistent with Seymour. In Seymour, the Alabama Supreme Court explained:
"Jurisdiction is ‘[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree.’ Black's Law Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide certain types of cases. Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 303, 57 So. 754, 755 (1911) )). That power is derived from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630–31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (). In deciding whether Seymour's claim properly challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask only whether the trial court had the constitutional and statutory authority to try the offense with which Seymour was charged and as to which he has filed his petition for certiorari review."
Thus, to determine whether the Lowndes Circuit Court had jurisdiction over Simmons's case, our only inquiry is "whether the [circuit] court had the constitutional and statutory authority to try the offense with which [Simmons] was charged." Seymour, supra.
As the majority opinion explains, Simmons, a school teacher, was charged with having sexual contact with a student under the age of 19 years, see § 13A–6–82, Ala.Code 1975, a Class A misdemeanor. Simmons was convicted, as charged, in the Lowndes District Court, and he appealed that conviction to the Lowndes Circuit Court.
Circuit courts have "exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony prosecutions and of misdemeanor or ordinance violations which are lesser included offenses within a felony charge or which arise from the same incident as a felony charge." § 12–11–30(2), Ala.Code 1975. Because Simmons was charged with a misdemeanor offense that did not arise from the same incident as a felony, the Lowndes Circuit Court did not have original jurisdiction over the offense. Although the circuit court did not have original jurisdiction over Simmons's case, the circuit court had the statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction over Simmons's appeal of his district-court conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo. See § 12–11–30(3), Ala.Code 1975 ( ...
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State v. Simmons (Ex parte State)
...judgment to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case. Simmons v. State, 179 So.3d 244 (Ala.Crim.App.2013). The State petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We reverse and r......
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Simmons v. State, CR–12–1393.
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