Simmons v. United Transit Co.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 10683,10683
• Citation: 99 R.I. 460,208 A.2d 537
• Parties: Ruth SIMMONS v. UNITED TRANSIT COMPANY. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 537

208 A.2d 537

99 R.I. 460

Ruth SIMMONS v. UNITED TRANSIT COMPANY.

Ex. No. 10683.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 29, 1965.

F. Monroe Allen, Providence, for plaintiff.

McGee & Doorley, Frank J. McGee, Providence, for defendant.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger in a bus owned and operated by the defendant. The case was tried to a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $13,000. The defendant is in this court prosecuting an exception to the decision of the trial justice denying its motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is grossly excessive.

In passing upon a motion for a new trial on the issue of excessive damages, it is the duty of the trial justice in an exercise of his independent judgment to pass upon the weight and credibility of the evidence adduced as to the damages. Cioe v. Pennacchia, 88 R.I. 133, 143 A.2d 288. If in so doing he finds that the award is grossly in excess of an amount adequate to compensate for the injuries as established by the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial unless a remittitur to a proper sum is filed. Faltinali v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 55 R.I. 438, 182 A. 605.

The defendant contends, as we understand it, that the trial justice misconceived the weight of the evidence offered on the question of plaintiff's injury and the pain and suffering endured by her as a consequence thereof. Noting that plaintiff's evidence tended to establish special damages of approximately $4,500, it concludes that the award for pain and suffering was reflected in the balance of the award, or approximately $8,500. This amount, it argues, is grossly excessive in view of the nature of the injury sustained and the want of evidence establishing any extended duration of the pain and suffering. In support thereof it points out that the only injury proved by plaintiff was a fractured coccyx along with some contusions and bruises, which, in defendant's view, was not a particularly serious injury. The defendant further argues that all of the testimony as to the degree and duration of pain came from plaintiff's own description of her pain and suffering.

In Tilley v. Mather, 84 R.I. 499, 124 A.2d 872, this court, rejecting the view that some formula had been established to determine whether an award of damages for pain and suffering was grossly in excess of an amount adequate to compensate for that actually proved, went on to say at page 502 of 84 R.I., at page 874 of 124 A.2d: 'The establishment of the amount to be awarded for such damages has always been left, under proper instructions, to the discretion of the jury. * * * It has been our policy to allow the jury substantial latitude in computing the amount to be awarded as damages for pain and suffering and to reduce the jury's verdicts in this respect only when it appears that they are grossly excessive. The phrase 'grossly excessive' is not an empty one. To be grossly excessive, there must be a demonstrable disparity between the amount awarded and the pain and suffering shown to have been endured as a consequence of the injury sustained.'

The question as to the amount of damages that will serve to compensate an injured plaintiff adequately for pain and suffering endured as a consequence thereof is in the first instance for the determination of the jury. Whether such an award is adequate for that purpose is a matter upon which reasonable men may well disagree, and for that reason we subscribe to the view that the jury...