Simmons v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church

• Decision Date: 12 January 1934
• Docket Number: No. 144.,144.
• Citation: 170 A. 237
• Parties: SIMMONS et al. v. WILEY METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

170 A. 237

SIMMONS et al.

v. WILEY METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH et al.

No. 144.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 12, 1934.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A charitable institution is liable in damages for injuries received by a person on the public highway through the negligent operation of the charitable institution's automobile truck by its servant and driver; such injured person being a stranger having no beneficial relation to the institution, and not being guilty of contributory negligence.

2. Proof of the defendant's ownership of an automobile driven on the public highway raises a presumption of fact that such automobile was in the possession of the defendant, if not personally, then through its servant, the driver, and that such driver was acting within the scope of his employment; and, where these presumptions are not overcome by uncontradicted proof to the contrary, a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the driver was not the servant of the defendant or was not acting within the scope of his employment must be denied.

LLOYD, CASE, and DONGES, Justices, and KAYS and WELLS, Judges, dissenting.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Camden County.

Action by William L. Simmons and others against the Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church, a corporation, and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

T. Harry Rowland and Garfield Pancoast, both of Camden, for appellant Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church.

Riggins & Davis, of Camden, for respondents.

TRENCHARD, Justice.

This is the appeal of the Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church (hereinafter called the defendant), one of the defendants below, from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action brought to recover for injuries sustained in a collision on a public highway between the automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding and an automobile truck owned by the defendant corporation and driven, as was alleged, by its servant.

The grounds of appeal challenge only the legal propriety of the refusal of the trial judge to direct a verdict for the defendant We think that such refusal was proper.

First, it is said that a verdict should have been directed for the defendant church because it is a charitable institution, and therefore not liable for the torts of its agents or servants.

It is to be noted that contributory negligence is not urged as a reason for a directed verdict.

The question thus raised, it will be seen, is whether a charitable institution is liable in damages for injuries received by a person on a public highway through the negligent operation of the charitable institution's automobile truck by its servant and driver; such injured person being a stranger having no beneficial relation to the institution, and not being guilty of contributory negligence. We think that it is.

This precise point has never been definitely decided by any appellate court in this state. It is also apparent that in other jurisdictions there are divergent views, one the so-called Massachusetts or Pennsylvania rule, and the other the so-called New York rule. The trial judge followed the New York rule, and we think rightly, and in accordance therewith declined to direct a verdict for the defendant.

In D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. Law, 61, 127 A. 340, 341, this court decided that because the defendant in that case was a charitable institution it could not be held liable for the negligence of its servants and agents to a plaintiff who was a patient in the defendant hospital. The court there said: "In our opinion, public policy requires that a charitable institution maintaining a hospital be held not liable for Injuries resulting to patients through the negligence or carelessness of its physicians and nurses, even if the injured person were a pay patient; payment for board, medical services, and nursing in such case going to the general fund to maintain the charity."

In Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 108 N. J. Law, 453, 158 A. 832, 833, our Supreme Court held that the exemption of the hospital from liability, stated in the D'Amato Case, extends to the case of a mother, visiting her daughter (a patient at the hospital), who fell on the stairs while leaving the building. The court said: "To the extent that her need went—that need being a mother's wish to be with her sick child and to speed the latter's recovery by the inspiration of a home presence—she was a recipient of the same benevolence, a beneficiary of the same charitable foundation, as was the patient. * * * The opportunity afforded for her attendance was part of the charitable service the defendant was rendering to suffering humanity. In a very real sense the charitable impulses which served the patient served also the...