Simon v. Coop. Educ. Serv. Agency #5
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | s. 21-2139 & 22-1035 |
| Citation | 46 F.4th 602 |
| Parties | Sarah SIMON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICE AGENCY #5, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Aaron N. Halstead, Attorney, Hawks Quindel, S.C., Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 21-2139.
Ronald S. Stadler, Attorney, Kopka, Pinkus, Dolin, P.C., Waukesha, WI, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 21-2139.
Aaron N. Halstead, Aaron Bibb, Attorney, Hawks Quindel, S.C., Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 22-1035.
Ronald S. Stadler, Jonathan E. Sacks, Attorney, Kopka, Pinkus, Dolin, P.C., Waukesha, WI, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 22-1035.
Before Easterbrook, St. Eve, and Kirsch, Circuit Judges.
When Sarah Simon returned from medical leave, her employer, Cooperative Educational Service Agency #5, did not allow her to return to her previous position as a lead teacher at her school. Instead, it placed her in a backwater position with fewer responsibilities that required her to split her time between different schools. After a bench trial, the district court determined that Cooperative had violated the Family and Medical Leave Act and awarded Simon declaratory relief and attorney's fees. Cooperative appealed, contending that neither declaratory relief nor attorney's fees are appropriate under the circumstances. We disagree and therefore affirm.
Cooperative Educational Service Agency #5 is a Wisconsin-based governmental entity that services 35 public-school districts. In July 2014, it hired Sarah Simon as an Alternative Program Lead Teacher at REACH Academy, an elementary school for children with special emotional and behavioral needs. In that role, Simon taught her assigned students, managed paraprofessionals, developed integrated education plans (IEPs), and communicated with parents, school districts, social workers, and law enforcement officials.
In October 2016, a REACH Academy student kicked a steel door into Simon's head, which caused her to suffer a concussion. Simon took FMLA-qualifying leave and was cleared to return to part-time, light-duty work on October 31, and full-time work with no restrictions on November 24. But Cooperative did not allow Simon to return to her previous position at REACH Academy because its business director and others had determined that doing so would present an "unreasonable risk." Instead, it placed her in a support position with duties resembling those of a paraprofessional. Although Simon received the same salary and benefits in her new role, it involved significantly less responsibility, independence, discretion, and management than her previous Lead Teacher position. Her work involved supporting other teachers’ classrooms, required splitting time between two elementary schools, and did not include lesson planning, evaluation, reporting, direct education, communication with students’ families, input on IEPs, or assistance from paraprofessionals.
Based on this treatment, Simon sued Cooperative, alleging several FMLA violations. The district court held a bench trial on one of those claims—the FMLA interference claim based on Cooperative's failure to return Simon to an equivalent position following her leave. By trial, Simon sought only: (1) an injunction requiring Cooperative to hire her for the next available equivalent position at REACH Academy; (2) an injunction requiring Cooperative's employees to undergo additional FMLA training; and (3) a declaration that Cooperative had violated the FMLA when it failed to return Simon to an equivalent position following her leave.
After the bench trial, the district court entered a combined opinion and order in May 2021. In the opinion, the district court found that Cooperative had violated the FMLA by not returning Simon to an equivalent position following her leave. It also determined that only declaratory—rather than injunctive—relief was appropriate based on Cooperative's hiring trends, the unavailability of Simon's previous Lead Teacher role, and Simon's new job elsewhere. The court's order granted declaratory judgment and set a briefing schedule for Simon to submit a request for attorney's fees and costs. But the court did not enter a separate final judgment.
Cooperative filed its first notice of appeal based on this opinion and order. Over the next few months, the parties fully briefed the issues raised in preparation for oral argument. On December 17, 2021, the district court entered another opinion and order granting in part Simon's request for attorney's fees. On December 22, Cooperative filed a second notice of appeal based on that new opinion and order. The next day, the district court entered a standalone final judgment granting Simon both a declaratory judgment and $59,773.62 in attorney's fees.
We held oral argument on January 7, 2022, and asked about appellate jurisdiction. That same day, Cooperative filed another notice of appeal stating that it challenged the district court's judgment on both the merits and attorney's fees.
The December 22 and January 7 notices of appeal have been consolidated into one successive appeal, which the parties have now fully briefed. Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, record, and from the January 7 oral argument, we have agreed to decide the successive appeal without another oral argument because doing so would not significantly aid the decisional process. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
Before reaching the merits, we first address the messy path this appeal has taken and explain the basis for our appellate jurisdiction. See West v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. , 951 F.3d 827, 829 (7th Cir. 2020). We have jurisdiction over appeals of "final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When Cooperative first filed its appeal in May 2021, the district court had not yet entered a judgment in a separate document and had not otherwise signaled that its decision was final.
As relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) requires "every judgment" to "be set out in a separate document" to eliminate uncertainty about whether a district court's entry is final for appellate purposes. See Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis , 435 U.S. 381, 384–85, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam). If a district court fails to issue a separate judgment, "[a] party may request that judgment be set out in a separate document as required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(d). We reiterate the separate-document rule's importance because it helps keep "jurisdictional lines clear." Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Block , 984 F.3d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
We also remind district courts of Rule 58(e) ’s requirement that the entry of judgment "[o]rdinarily ... may not be delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or award fees" unless the Rule's procedures for deferring judgment until resolution of attorney's fees have been followed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). In some cases, it may be "more efficient to decide fee questions before an appeal is taken so that appeals relating to the fee award can be heard at the same time as appeals relating to the merits of the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. To choose this option, however, a district court must enter an order stating that it is doing so before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). When that procedure is not followed, judgments on the merits and on attorney's fees are separately appealable. See Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Engineers & Participating Emps. , 571 U.S. 177, 179, 187, 134 S.Ct. 773, 187 L.Ed.2d 669 (2014).
Although the district court did not follow the prescribed Rule 58(e) procedure for consolidating the merits and attorney's fee issues into one final judgment, that's effectively what it did. It entered one final judgment on December 23, 2021, resolving both the merits and attorney's fee issues. But it's clear at this stage that the district court's decision on both the merits and the attorney's fees are final and that we have appellate jurisdiction over both appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) (). We thus proceed to consider these issues.
On the merits, Cooperative contends that the district court erred by entering a declaratory judgment for two reasons. It argues first that declaratory relief is unavailable under the FMLA and, second, that Simon did not show that she was prejudiced by its FMLA violation. We review a district court's legal conclusions following a bench trial de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Murdock & Sons Const., Inc. v. Goheen Gen. Const., Inc. , 461 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2006).
The FMLA's "Enforcement" section permits an eligible employee to bring a civil action against her employer for violations "to recover the damages or equitable relief prescribed" by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). The FMLA further directs that "[a]ny employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee affected—... for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion." Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B). The parties dispute whether a declaratory judgment falls within the FMLA's authorization for "equitable relief." If the FMLA authorizes the entry of a declaratory judgment as "equitable relief," Simon may be entitled to attorney's fees. See Id. § 2617(a)(3). If not, then the declaratory judgment was authorized only by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which does not provide for fees.
Although we have not yet addressed this issue in the FMLA context, we have when interpreting a similar statute. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)...
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