Simon v. House

• Decision Date: 04 May 1891
• Citation: 46 F. 317
• Parties: SIMON et al. v. HOUSE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

46 F. 317

SIMON et al. v. HOUSE et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

May 4, 1891

Green &amp Green, for plaintiffs.

McLeary & Fleming, for defendants.

MAXEY J.

The plaintiffs, Joseph Simon and Joseph Kohn, claiming to be the purchasers at execution sale of a tract of land containing 177 acres, and alleged to be worth the sum of $2,500, filed their bill of complaint, April 23, 1889, against Alfred House, Fly & Davidson, and H. W. Nott, praying for the cancellation of certain alleged fraudulent conveyances of said land executed by House to Fly & Davidson, and from Fly &amp Davidson to Nott. The bill also alleges that the deeds referred to operate as a cloud upon the title of plaintiffs and further prays that the cloud may be removed. A plea to the jurisdiction was interposed by the defendants, June 29 1889, in which it is, in substance, averred that the valuation placed upon the land by the plaintiffs in their bill is excessive; that the true value of the land is, and was at the time of the institution of the suit, far below $2,000, and that it does not now, nor did it then, exceed in value $1,200; that plaintiffs well knew that the matter in dispute, to-wit, the said tract of land, did not exceed in value $2,000; and that the allegation of value, as contained in the bill, is false, and was fraudulently made, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon this court. On August 1, 1889, replication was filed by the plaintiffs, and issue joined on the plea. In support of the averments of their plea touching the value of the land, the defendants took the depositions of five witnesses, four of whom estimate the value at $1,062, inclusive of improvements, and the fifth at not exceeding $1,416, with improvements included. The testimony was published and delivered to the attorney of plaintiffs, October 18, 1889, but no testimony was taken by the plaintiffs to sustain the allegations of the bill. At the November term, 1890, the cause was submitted to the court on the pleadings and proofs, and a ruling requested upon the jurisdictional question thus appearing of record. It is provided by the act of August 13, 1888, 'that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, * * * in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid;' that is, $2,000. 25 St.at Large, p. 434, Sec. 1. 'By matter in dispute,' says the supreme court, ' is meant the subject of litigation; the matter for which the suit is brought, and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined. ' Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 339. To ascertain the value of the matter in dispute, in cases where jurisdiction is sought on the ground of the amount in controversy, resort must be had to the character of the action. Thus in a suit upon a money demand, where the general issue is pleaded, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed. Lee v. Watson, supra; Schacker v. Insurance Co., 93 U.S. 241; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U.S. 565. In suits sounding in damages, the damages claimed give the jurisdiction. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 6 S.Ct. 501; Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.S. 669, 3 S.Ct. 421; Dwyer v. Bassett, 63 Tex. 276. In a case impeaching the right to an office, it is held that the amount of the salary attached to it is considered as determining the value of the matter in dispute. Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 175, 9 S.Ct. 566, citing Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 S.Ct. 570. The value of the interest or estate claimed in ejectment suits determines the jurisdiction. Crawford v. Burnham, 1 Flip. 117; Lanning v. Dolph, 4 Wash.C.C. 624; Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 242; Railway Co. v. Smith, 135 U.S. 195, 10 S.Ct. 728; Grant v. McKee, 1 Pet. 248. And it is ruled by the supreme court that 'a suit to quiet the title to parcels of real property, or to remove a cloud therefrom, by which their use and enjoyment by the owner are impaired, is brought within the cognizance of the court, under the statute, only by the value of the property affected. ' Smith v. Adams, supra; Parker v. Morrill, 106 U.S. 1, 1 S.Ct. 14. See Fuller v. Grand Rapids, 40 Mich. 395. It follows that the matter in dispute here is the tract of real estate described in the bill, and its value must therefore be looked to in order to ascertain whether the court has jurisdiction of the suit. Where the jurisdiction is dependent upon the value of the matter in dispute, it is not less necessary that the jurisdictional facts should appear than in those cases where jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship; for the one is as essentially a ground of jurisdiction as the other. 4 Wash. C.C. supra; 1 Flip., supra. And in all cases the facts on which the jurisdiction of the circuit courts depend must, in some form, appear on the face of the record. Insurance Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237, 7 S.Ct. 193; Halsted v. Buster, 119 U.S. 341, 7 S.Ct. 276; Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 4 S.Ct. 510; Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 4 S.Ct. 407; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 S.Ct. 289; Menard v. Goggan, 121 U.S. 253, 7 S.Ct. 873; Everhart v. College, 120 U.S. 223, 7 S.Ct. 555. The reason given for the rule is expressed in the following language of the supreme court:

'As the jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited, in the sense that it has no other jurisdiction than that conferred by the constitution and laws of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction, unless the contrary affirmatively appears. ' Grace v. Insurance Co., 109 U.S. 283, 3 S.Ct. 207; Bors v. Preston, supra; Railway Co. v. Swan, supra.

Where a suit is not within its jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court, enjoined by the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1875, (18 St.at Large, 472,) which is not repealed by the act of August 13, 1888, to enter an order of dismissal. That section provides--

'That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court, * * * it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought, * * * that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable * * * under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit, * * * and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just.'

Referring to the foregoing section of the act of 1875, in Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 212, the supreme court says:

'In this connection we deem it proper to say that this provision of the act of 1875 is a salutary one, and that it is the duty of the circuit courts to exercise their power under it in proper cases. ' Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 144, 5 S.Ct. 807; Little v. Giles, 118 U.S. 603, 604, 7 S.Ct. 32.

From an examination of the authorities, it will be seen that, while the effect of all the provisions of the act of 1875 taken together was to greatly enlarge the jurisdiction of the circuit court, the purpose of the fifth section was to confine the jurisdiction to cases clearly within its cognizance; and, to emphasize that purpose, provision is made for a summary dismissal, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court, at any time after the suit is brought, that it does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the court. The section of the act goes further, and relaxes the strictness of the old rule in regard to the manner in which certain jurisdictional questions were required to be raised. For example, it was formerly held that, when the pleadings properly averred the citizenship of the parties, the defendant could only dispute the allegation of citizenship in the declaration by a plea in abatement filed in the due order of pleading. Jones v. League, 18 How. 81; Wickliffe v. Owings, 17 How. 47; Sheppard v. Graves, 14 How. 505; Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. 351; De Sobry v. Nicholson, 3 Wall. 423. See Farmington v. Pillsbury, supra. Now, however, that rule does not obtain. It is said by the court in Morris v. Gilmer, which explains and limits Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588, 6 S.Ct. 521, that--

'While, under the judiciary act of 1789, an issue as to the fact of citizenship could only be made by a plea in abatement, when the pleadings properly averred the citizenship of the parties, the act of 1875 imposes upon the circuit court the duty of dismissing a suit, if it appears at any time after it is brought, and before it is finally disposed of, that it does not really and substantially involve a controversy of which it may properly take cognizance. * * * And the statute does not prescribe any particular mode in which such fact may be brought to the attention of the court. It may be done by affidavits, or the depositions taken in the cause may be used for that purpose. However done, it should be upon due notice to the parties to be affected by the dismissal.' 129 U.S. 326, 9 S.Ct. 289.

The mode of procedure in this suit is not subject to...