Simons v. Rhode Island Co.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1907
• Parties: SIMONS v. RHODE ISLAND CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

66 A. 202

28 R.I. 186

SIMONS

v. RHODE ISLAND CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 15, 1907.

Exceptions from Superior Court.

Action by Theresa Simone against the Rhode Island Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Overruled.

Argued before DOUGLAS, C. J" and DUBOIS, BLODGETT, JOHNSON, and PARKHURST. JJ.

Dennis H. Sheahan, for plaintiff. Henry W. Hayes, Frank T. Easton, Lefferts S. Hoffman, and Alonzo R. Williams, for defendant.

PARKHUKST, J. This is an action by a widow to recover for loss of the services of her minor daughter, caused, as she alleges, by the negligence of the defendant's servants, whereby the minor child was injured and disabled from earning the wages which she had earned prior to the accident and turned over to her mother.

It appears in evidence that on the morning of December 17, 1904, the plaintiff's minor daughter, then about 17 or 18 years old, was a passenger in a car of the defendant, proceeding easterly from Olneyville on Westminster street in Providence, and was seated about midway of the car on the left-hand side thereof talking with a friend when the car reached a point near the junction of Broadway and Westminster street, where there is a switch crossing over from the east-bound track, and so arranged as to enable a car taking the switch to turn from Westminster street into Broadway. When the car in question had approached this switch near enough to allow the motorman to turn the switch, he stopped the car and turned the switch so, as to enable his car to proceed along the straight track easterly on Westminster street, and then started his car forward. The wheels of the forward truck passed the switch in the usual manner as intended, but the wheels of the rear truck, in some way and for some reason unexplained, "split the switch," as it is called; i. e., in some unknown way the switch was so far opened that the rear wheels left the straight or main track and proceeded on the switch track towards Broadway, thereby approaching the line of the west-bound track. As soon as the motorman perceived that the rear of his car was thus slewing toward the west-bound track, he put on his brake and stopped the car, but not quickly enough to avoid a collision with a west-bound car, operated by the defendant's servants, which was proceeding at this time towards Olneyville on the west-bound track. This latter car had stopped, according to custom, on approaching the said switch or cross-over track, and its motorman, seeing the other car apparently passing the switch in safety, had thereupon started his car, intending to pass onward westerly into Olneyville, when just as he was coming alongside of the other car he saw its rear end slewing towards the track on which he was proceeding, and immediately applied his brake, but not quickly enough to avoid a collision. The forward end of the west-bound car struck the side of the east-bound car, towards its rear end, just before they stopped, doing little, if any, damage to the cars, which moved only a few inches before they stopped altogether.

The testimony shows that the collision was not a violent one, and it does not appear that any particular damage was done to either of the cars, or that any person, other than the plaintiff's daughter, was injured; although Miss Gillan, the friend with whom Miss Simone was sitting and conversing at the time, says, "I was very badly shaken up," and that there was a "crash." It further appears that Miss Simone fainted immediately after the "crash," and was taken from the car into a drug store, where she recovered from her fainting fit, and was then taken home. It does not appear that she suffered any actual external bodily injury at the time of the collision; and she herself testifies that when she heard the crash she was frightened with the idea that the car had been struck by a steam train at the crossing of the steam railroad at Plainfield street, and immediately fainted. After she got home she claims that she suffered from vomiting, insomnia, headache, pains in the left side, left leg, and back, the pains sometimes going across to her right side; that she remained in bed for nearly three months, was too weak to get up without assistance, and continued to suffer from headaches and the pains above mentioned; had frequent fainting attacks, continued to suffer from insomnia and nervous disorders and weakness down to the time of the trial, and that she has suffered complete failure to perform her menstrual functions. A doctor was called to her on the day of the accident, and attended her subsequently for some weeks. He made a complete physical examination of her, and he does not testify that he found any external injury to her body whatever; and there is no other evidence tending to show any external physical injury. We think it is fairly to be inferred, from all the testimony in the case, that whatever physical sufferings and disorders resulted to the plaintiff's daughter were due to nervous shock brought on by fright. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $400.

The defendant asks to have this verdict set aside (1) because there is no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant; (2) because the plaintiff's daughter was not injured as a result of the accident; (3) because the damages were excessive; (4) because the superior court erred in its rulings in admission of testimony, and in its charge to the jury.

As to the proof of negligence of the defendant company, it is uncontradicted that there was a collision between two cars, both operated by the defendant company, and a presumption of negligence arises from this fact which places the burden of explanation upon the defendant. The question of the defendant's negligence was therefore properly submitted to the jury, and it was for the jury to say whether the explanation offered by the defendant was or was not a satisfactory explanation. The jury, having found for the plaintiff, must have found that the defendant was negligent, and this court cannot properly set the verdict aside on that ground.

As to the question whether the plaintiff's daughter was or was not injured as a result of the accident, there was some conflict of testimony as to certain claims of injury, as to the nature, character, and extent of the actual suffering of the plaintiff's daughter, and as to whether such suffering was a result of the accident, or was due to her previous physical conditions, and it was therefore properly left to the jury to determine whether such injuries as the plaintiff's daughter actually suffered were the result of the accident or were due to other and independent causes. We cannot properly disturb the verdict on this ground, since the jury have found for the plaintiff. Nor do we think the amount of the verdict is excessive, in view of the previous earning capacity of the plaintiff's daughter, and of the length of time the plaintiff has been and probably will be deprived of the earnings, while still bound to support and maintain her minor child. All of the foregoing questions were properly submitted to the jury, and we do not find that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the jury in finding its verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant urges the following exceptions, relating to alleged errors of law of the superior court: (1) That the court erred in admitting a question, which plaintiff's attorney asked of one of the physicians who had previously attended Miss Simone some eight months prior to the trial, asking for his opinion as to the time of her ultimate recovery. The question, as finally framed, was based upon his observation of the case, and was properly admitted, and the doctor answered that he could not tell, so that no harm was done to the defendant in any event. (2) That the court erred in its refusal to charge the jury, as requested by the defendant, as follows: "The plaintiff cannot recover for the effects upon her daughter of fright at the time of the accident, not accompanied by physical injury. * * * If the fright of the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was due to imagining that a steam railroad train had run into the car upon which she was riding, she cannot recover for the effects of the fright, so caused." And erred in charging the jury as follows: "If that fright was followed by a series of physical ills as its natural consequence; if that fright as a cause gave rise to nervous disturbances, and those in turn to physical troubles; and that fright itself was caused by the negligence of the defendant—then the defendant would be liable for the physical results of its own negligence." These rulings bring squarely before this court the question whether there can be a recovery for bodily injury caused by fright when the fright was caused by the negligence of the defendant, where there was no actual physical injury at the time of the accident, but where the fright was followed by a series of physical ills as its natural consequence; where the fright as a cause gave rise to nervous disturbances, and those in turn to physical troubles. This question has not heretofore been determined in this state, and the cases relating thereto in other jurisdictions have given rise to widely differing decisions. The defendant contends that this court should be governed by the rule laid down in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St Rep. 604, where the court says (page 108 of 151 N. Y., page 354 of 45 N. E. [34 L. R. A. 781, 56 Am. St. Rep. 604]), by Martin, J.: "The facts in this case are few and may be briefly stated. On the first day of April, 1801, the plaintiff was standing upon a crosswalk on Main street in the city of Rochester, awaiting an opportunity to board one of the defendant's cars which had stopped upon the street at that place. While standing there, and just as she was about to step upon the car, a horse car of the defendant...