Simonson v. Trinity Regional Health System

• Decision Date: 16 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. C00-3065-MWB.,C00-3065-MWB.
• Citation: 221 F.Supp.2d 982
• Parties: Eileen M. SIMONSON, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

221 F.Supp.2d 982

Eileen M. SIMONSON, Plaintiff, v. TRINITY REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM et al., Defendants.

No. C00-3065-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

September 16, 2002.

Michael J. Carroll, Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, PC, West Des Moines, IA, for plaintiff.

Stuart J. Cochrane, Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, PC, Fort Dodge, IA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, Chief Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................984
                     A. Procedural Background .............................................984
                     B. Disputed and Undisputed Facts .....................................984
                 II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .......................................987
                III. LEGAL ANALYSIS .......................................................988
                     A. Simonson's Disability Claims ......................................988
                        1. Perceived disability claim: 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) ............990
                        2. Record of disability ...........................................993
                     B. Simonson's ADEA Claim .............................................993
                     C. Discharge in Violation of Public Policy Claim .....................995
                 IV. CONCLUSION ...........................................................999
                

This matter is before the court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 9, 2002. Plaintiff complains she was discriminated against in the terms, conditions, and compensation of her employment with the defendants and in violation of state public policy. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges the defendants discriminated against her, and subsequently discharged her, as well as failed to transfer or rehire her because of her age; a perceived disability or record of such an impairment; and in retaliation for her seeking workers' compensation benefits in violation of Iowa public policy. The defendants dispute these allegations and contend that judgment should be entered in their favor as a matter of law and against the plaintiff for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff does not establish that age was a factor in her discharge or that defendants filled plaintiff's position with younger employees after her position was eliminated due to a reduction-in-force; (2) the plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the American with Disabilities Act, nor did the defendants regard plaintiff as disabled; and (3) there was no causal connection between plaintiff's pursuit of her workers' compensation rights and defendants' reduction-in-force and the consequent elimination of plaintiff's positions with defendants, but for legitimate business reasons.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural Background

On August 18, 2000, the plaintiff, Eileen Simonson ("Simonson"), filed a complaint against her former employer, Trinity Regional Health System and Trinity Regional Hospital of Fort Dodge, Iowa (hereinafter "Trinity"), alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623, et seq., the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), chapter 216 of the Iowa Code, and Iowa public policy. Simonson's state law claims are properly before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Prior to bringing this action in federal court, Simonson exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"), which was cross-filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and received right-to-sue letters. Pl.'s Comp., at 2.

A trial in this matter is presently scheduled for October 21, 2002. Ms. Simonson is represented by Michael Carroll of Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll P.C., West Des Moines, Iowa. Trinity is represented by Stuart Cochrane of Johnson, Erb, Rice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, P.C., Fort Dodge, Iowa.

B. Disputed and Undisputed Facts

The following is a summary of Simonson's work history with Trinity and the events allegedly giving rise to her termination and the present lawsuit. Simonson worked for Trinity from approximately January 1972 until her employment was terminated on September 29, 1999. During her tenure with Trinity, Simonson worked primarily as a full-time, registered nurse. However, a series of work-related injuries caused Simonson to be placed under work restrictions prescribed by a physician, and in turn required Trinity to accommodate Simonson.

In January 1994, Simonson sustained an injury to her shoulder that required surgery in April 1994. Trinity modified Simonson's work responsibilities and Simonson's physician permitted her to return to work part-time, with restrictions, and eventually in July 1994, authorized her to work on Trinity's Two North hospital wing conducting new employee orientation and engaging in limited physical activity. Def.'s App., at 070. When Simonson's physician refused to release her to regular full-time duty in October 1994, Trinity nurse manager, Peg Stoolman, and Human Resources Manager, Ted Vaughn, asked Simonson to work full-time on a computer project called PHAMIS. Simonson and Trinity agree this was not a demotion, and Trinity continued to compensate Simonson at the same rate as it had previously, when Simonson was assigned to Two North. Def.'s App., at 070. Simonson continued work on the PHAMIS project until its completion in September or October 1997, at which time she was offered a part-time nursing position in skilled care (Two West). Def.'s App., at 066. However, Simonson was not under physician's restrictions, rather Trinity asserts there were no full-time job positions available in Two North at the time and Simonson acknowledges that there were no full-time job postings for nursing positions in Two North, but contends that when she accepted the PHAMIS position, Ted Vaughn assured her that Trinity's intent was to return her to Two North at the completion of the PHAMIS project. Def.'s App., at 070.

In April 1998, while working in skilled care as a nurse, Simonson alleges she injured her back and was diagnosed with sciatica, but continued working without restriction. However, due to continued pain, Simonson was placed on a twenty-five pound lifting restriction in May 1998, until June 12, 1998, when she returned to regular duty. The next incident, Simonson alleges, took place on June 24, 1998, when she injured her left arm at work and was diagnosed with left lateral epicondylitis. Simonson's physician placed her on a fifteen pound lifting restriction which was eventually decreased to ten pounds, and Simonson finally returned to regular duty on August 29, 1998.

Trinity and Simonson agree that while Simonson was moving a patient in September 1998, Simonson suffered an upper back strain and consequently was diagnosed with a shoulder impingement. After attempting to work without restriction, Simonson was placed on a ten pound lifting restriction that was increased to thirty-five pounds in December 1998. The physician released Simonson to regular full-time duty in January 1999.¹ After returning to work from a leave of absence to care for her husband, Simonson claims she learned that Two West was closing. Thereafter, Trinity employed Simonson in a temporary position as an IDX patient registration clerk, until her termination in September of 1999. Even as a temporary employee, Simonson continued to be compensated at the same rate as she had been when she worked as a nurse in Two West.

Simonson does not complain that Trinity acted in a discriminatory manner or targeted her when it closed Two West, when it eliminated her job on Two West, or when her temporary employment position with IDX was eliminated. Def.'s App., at 073. Simonson concedes that Trinity took these steps for legitimate business reasons. Def.'s App., at 070. In addition, Simonson does not claim that Trinity failed to accommodate her physical restrictions, and to the contrary, acknowledges that Trinity made every effort to follow the physician's suggestions and recommendations. Def.'s App., at 073. Simonson also concedes that Trinity never disciplined her as a result of any work-related injury that she sustained or with regard to her application for and receipt of worker's compensation benefits for her injuries. Def.'s App., at 072.

In contrast, Simonson alleges that because of her history of work-related injuries, she meets the definition of "disabled" under the ADA either because she has a record of impairment or she was regarded by Trinity as having such an impairment. However, Simonson does not contend that she suffers from a physical impairment that substantially limits her ability to perform any major life activity. Further, Simonson asserts that after Two West closed, Trinity reassigned all seventeen Two West employees except for Simonson and Simonson's co-worker, Betty Berning. Trinity maintains that all Two West employees were terminated and subsequently rehired, if at all, only after they made application and interviewed for job openings. Simonson contends that Trinity has a history of reassigning people within the hospital and chose not to reassign her because of her age, despite the fact that there were twelve job openings at the time of Simonson's termination. Moreover, Simonson argues that Trinity's purported reason not to rehire her was not the result of a reduction-in-force (RIF) and she should not be held to a higher standard of proof. Yates v. Rexton, Inc., 267 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir.2001) (stating replacement by younger worker is not circumstantial evidence of discrimination in RIF case and requiring additional evidence of age discrimination). Simonson also alleges that Trinity terminated her employment because she made workers' compensation claims in the past and she was contemplating making further claims at the time Trinity terminated her....