Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California

• Citation: 196 Cal.App.3d 1192,242 Cal.Rptr. 447
• Decision Date: 10 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. AO35470,AO35470
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: SIMPSON REDWOOD COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant, Save-The-Redwoods League, Intervener and Appellant.

Page 447

242 Cal.Rptr. 447

196 Cal.App.3d 1192

SIMPSON REDWOOD COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant Save-The-Redwoods League, Intervener and Appellant.

No. AO35470.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 10, 1987.

Alson R. Kemp, Jr., Randolf J. Rice, Kevin M. Fong, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, for plaintiff/respondent.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Charles W. Getz, San Francisco, for defendant/appellant.

John B. Clark, James E. Harrington, A. Robert Rosin, Pettit & Martin, San Francisco, for intervener/appellant.

NEWSOM, Associate Justice.

Respondent Simpson Lumber Company (hereafter Simpson) initiated this action by filing a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory relief against the State of California (hereafter the State), seeking title to specified parcels of real property located in Humboldt County in Township 12 North, Range 1 East, Humboldt Meridian. Promptly thereafter, appellant Save-The-Redwoods League (hereafter appellant or the League) filed a motion for leave to intervene (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (a)) in the action, asserting an interest in the old growth redwood forest sought by Simpson in its complaint. While appellant's motion was pending, the State and Simpson each filed a motion for summary judgment. All motions were heard at a consolidated hearing and ultimately denied.

This appeal followed, contesting only the propriety of the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to intervene. Subsequently, we granted appellant's request for a writ of supersedeas staying the trial court proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.

A brief description of the historical context may be helpful, commencing with surveys of public lands in Humboldt County performed by S.W. Foreman and John Haughn for the General Land Office (presently the Bureau of Land Management) in 1882. Specifically, the Foreman and Haughn surveys purported to establish the boundaries of Township 12 North, Range 1 East, Humboldt Meridian (hereafter the "subject township"), which now includes Prarie Creek Redwoods State Park and the property under dispute in this action, together with the boundaries of adjacent townships. The section plat maps and field notes reflecting these surveys were approved by the government in February of 1883, but suspended by the commissioner of the General Lands Office in 1884 and 1886 after an investigation revealed "great irregularities" and "fraud" in the methods used by the surveyors. Apparently, Foreman and Haughn failed to set critical section markers, or did so "promiscuously."

John Gilcrest was commissioned to resurvey all of the township and section lines run previously by Foreman and Haughn, and obliterate all inaccurate corners. He did so, altering some of the boundaries of the resurveyed townships. Gilcrest's survey was officially accepted and approved in July of 1889. He failed, however--apparently for economic reasons--to complete the survey. Consequently, no plat map was ever prepared by Gilcrest which depicted section lines in the interior of the subject township.

Thereafter, the land in the area was periodically patented and sold to private settlers, although not without confusion as to which of the two surveys was to be given priority. Some of the land patents were based upon the original, inaccurate Foreman and Haughn plat maps, while others relied upon the incomplete Gilcrest survey.

In 1923, the State began acquiring property for inclusion in the proposed Prarie Creek Redwoods State Park. Appellant contemporaneously embarked upon a program of land acquisition in the area for the purpose of eventual donation to state and federal parks, purchasing property with contributions from its members and other private donors, who were promised that their contributions would be used to preserve redwood groves within the state park system.

The land so acquired by appellant, which includes all of the parcels to which Simpson claims title in this litigation, was donated to the State in 1932 by way of grant deeds. One such deed, introduced as an exhibit, includes a recital that the land is being transferred to the State "as an addition to or extension of the State Park System." The State's resolution of acceptance contains a similar statement that "said real property is hereby accepted ... for state park purposes and is hereby included in the California State Park System, ..."

With property donated by appellant and acquired through purchases, the State established Prarie Creek Redwoods State Park (hereafter the Park) in 1933. In accordance with pledges given to some of its contributors, appellant also persuaded the State to officially name specified memorial redwood groves--25 of which are on land which Simpson now claims to own--after the donors who made purchase of the lands possible.

Simpson acquired property contiguous to the Park from its predecessor in interest, Sage Land and Improvement Company (hereafter Sage). In 1944, Sage had hired A.B. Bones to determine the precise boundary between its property and the park. Bones conducted a survey relying on the Gilcrest section markers. He used "blazes," and other markings on trees to designate boundaries. The record shows that in conducting its logging operations, Simpson thereafter relied upon Bones' survey, as did the Park. Bones' survey also provided the "base" for subsequent surveys in the area.

Then, in 1978, the Bureau of Land Management performed a "dependent resurvey" of the east boundary of the subject township, and specified adjacent townships (hereafter the "BLM survey") in anticipation of the establishment of the Redwood National Park in that area. The BLM survey resulted in a reconstruction of the original Foreman and Haughn survey to define the east boundary of the subject township based upon extrapolation from discovery of widely scattered section markers set in 1882 by the original surveyors. The boundaries for adjacent townships were determined by use of the Gilcrest and Bones surveys.

As a result of the BLM survey, the federal government claimed land for Redwood National Park--in the subject township--formerly accepted as belonging to Simpson. In response, Simpson filed a quiet title action against the federal government in 1980 in federal district court seeking to invalidate the BLM survey. This action was settled by a stipulated judgment, pursuant to which Simpson acknowledged the validity of the BLM survey in exchange for a conveyance of the land it was already occupying and using in accordance with the Gilcrest and Bones surveys. ¹

The survey controversy resurfaced in 1984, however, when the federal government initiated condemnation proceedings against Simpson to acquire property for construction of a bypass for Highway 101 in Humboldt County. Suddenly, Simpson found the BLM survey to its liking because the south-westward shift of boundaries effectuated thereby would result in a claim of additional acreage for which it would receive compensation in the inverse condemnation case. Accordingly, Simpson filed the instant quiet title action, alleging the validity of the BLM survey and resulting entitlement to the small parcel at issue in the federal inverse condemnation proceeding, and claiming title to the remaining 160-acre strip of land along the northwest border of the park. In denying Simpson's right to the latter parcel of property, the State has asserted the priority of the Gilcrest/Bones survey--the same survey which Simpson previously embraced. The estimated current value of the land at issue is $4 million.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene in Simpson's quiet title action under section 387, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, ² in pertinent part, provides: "Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding." The purpose of allowing intervention is to promote fairness by involving all parties potentially affected by a judgment. (Catello v. I.T.T. General Controls (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1013, 200 Cal.Rptr. 4; Deutschmann v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 912, 915, 183 Cal.Rptr. 573.) The right to intervene granted by section 387, subdivision (a) is not absolute, however; intervention is properly permitted only if the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 891, 125 Cal.Rptr. 915.) The trial court is vested with discretion to determine whether the standards for intervention have been met. (Northern Cal. Psychiatric Society v. City of Berkeley (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 90, 109, 223 Cal.Rptr. 609; Knight v. Alefosio (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 716, 720, 205 Cal.Rptr. 42.)

Simpson argues that appellant's interest in the underlying action is indirect and remote, and so does not justify intervention. It is well-settled that the intervener's interest in the matter in litigation must be direct, not consequential, and that it must be an interest which is proper to be determined in the action in which intervention is sought. (People v. Superior Court (Good) (1976) 17 Cal.3d 732, 736, 131 Cal.Rptr. 800, 552 P.2d 760; Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 308, 314, 196 Cal.Rptr. 871.) The "interest" referred to in section 387, subdivision (a), "must be of such direct or immediate character, that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment." (Knight v. Alefosio, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 721, 205 Cal.Rptr. 42; see also Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939) 13 Cal.2d 661, 663, 91 P.2d 599; Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 314, 196 Cal.Rptr. 871.)

But the nature of the necessary direct interest in the litigation is...