Simpson v. Adkins

• Decision Date: 21 March 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27513.,27513.
• Citation: 53 N.E.2d 979,386 Ill. 64
• Parties: SIMPSON et al. v. ADKINS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

386 Ill. 64

53 N.E.2d 979

SIMPSON et al.

v.ADKINS et al.

No. 27513.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 21, 1944.

Suit to quiet title by William T. Simpson and others against E. S. Adkins and others, wherein the defendants filed a counterclaim.From the decree, the defendants appeal and the plaintiffs cross-appeal.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; W. Joe Hill, judge.

Essington, Beebe & Pratt, of Chicago, Roy C. Martin and Carter Harrison, both of Benton, J. G. Van Keuren and Henry H. Harbour, both of Du Quoin, and Feirich & Feirich, of Carbondale, for appellants.

Kern, Pearce & Pearce, of Carmi, Hefner & Harris and Allen K. Swann, all of Evansville, Ind., William G. Eovaldi, of Benton, J. Max Mitchell, of W. Frankfort, and Everett Lewis, of Benton, for appellees.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Franklin county.A freehold is involved.Appellees, William T. Simpson and certain other heirs of Elizabeth Simpson, deceased, who will hereinafter be referred to as the Simpson heirs, and others claiming under them, filed the complaint to quiet their title to certain real estate therein described.The land involved is a strip two rods wide off the east side of the north half of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter, and one rod off the east side of the south three-fourths of the east half of the northwest quarter of section 25, township 6 south, range 2 east of the third principal meridian, in Franklin county, Illinois.

Briefly, it was alleged in the amended and supplemental complaint, that Elizabeth Simpson, the mother of the Simpson heirs, acquired fee-simple title to the east half of the northwest quarter of section 25, on March 3, 1885; that thereafter she conveyed to others all of said tract except the strip on the east side thereof, above referred to; that Elizabeth Simpson died intestate in 1920, leaving seven children; that by her death, each of her children inherited a one-seventh interest in said strip of land.It was further alleged that in November, 1940, five of said Simpson heirs executed an oil and gas lease to L. J. Williams(this lease will hereafter be referred to as the Williams lease); that in March, 1941, the sixth of the Simpson heirs joined in said lease by the execution of a ratification agreement; that said lease was thereafter assigned by Williams to Gordon G. MacLean Crude Oil Purchasing Corporation, reserving an overriding interest therein; that thereafter, Gordon G. MacLean Crude Oil Purchasing Corporation assigned said lease to Conner X. Russell, reserving a certain interest therein.In May, 1941, after Williams had assigned his lease, dated November 29, 1940, to Gordon G. MacLean Crude Oil Purchasing Corporation, the remaining Simpson heir executed a lease to Williams, which it was alleged was obtained by fraud.He later executed another lease to one Hutchens, by whom it was finally assigned to Russell.

Certain other leases and assignments were executed which, in so far as material, will be referred to later on in this opinion.By the complaint it was further alleged that the Simpson heirs were the owners and entitled to all of the oil and gas in and under and that might be produced from said strip of ground; they alleged that a tax deed executed by the county clerk in 1888, purporting to convey the east one acre of the east half of the northwest quarter of section 25, was invalid.They asked that said tax deed and certain other deeds in the chain of title, springing from said tax deed, be cancelled as clouds on their title.They also asked to have cancelled a certain oil and gas lease dated September 6, 1940, from Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Company to E. S. Adkins, which lease was based upon the chain of title springing from said tax deed.They also asked to have cancelled certain other leases, particularly two ‘non-drilling’ oil and gas leases, executed by the Simpson heirs to Adkins, on April 11, 1941.Adkins and the Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Company, together with certain other parties alleged to have or claim some interest in the property, were also named as defendants.

Before the defendants appeared, or were required to appear, an interlocutory order was entered without notice, and without requiring the plaintiffs to give a bond, appointing a receiver of the property.This order was not entered by the judge who tried the case.By that order the receiver was directed to take possession of the property, to drill and operate thereon for oil and gas, and to distribute the proceeds received for any oil or gas produced and sold therefrom, to the persons and in the proportions named and set forth in the order.

The defendants thereafter appeared and filed their motion to vacate the order appointing the receiver.The motion was denied.Upon an appeal to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, the order denying the motion to vacate the order appointing the receiver, and the order making the appointment, were both reversed.The cause was remanded to the circuit court with directions to vacate the order appointing the receiver, and for further proceedings.Simpson v. Adkins, 311 Ill.App. 543, 37 N.E.2d 355.

After the mandate of the Appellate Court was filed in the circuit court, that court, upon notice, entered an order appointing another receiver.Prior to that time, three oil wells had been drilled on the strip of ground in question, by the former receiver.These wells were in operation and producing oil.By the order appointing the new receiver, he was directed to take possession of the property and to continue to operate the wells, as receiver, until the further order of the court.

The defendants Adkins and Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Company, together with certain other defendants, filed a joint answer to the complaint.By the answer the material allegations of the complaint, as to the ownership of the property, were denied.They admitted, however, the execution of the tax deed and the other deeds in the chain of title, springing from said tax deed, as alleged in the complaint.They alleged that said tax deed was valid and that under the chain of title springing therefrom, Chicago Wilmington & Franklin Coal Company was the owner of the strip of ground and that Adkins had a valid oil and gas lease covering the same, executed by said coal company.

The defendants also filed a counterclaim alleging ownership of the strip of ground and the oil therein and thereunder.By the counterclaim they alleged that Adkins was the owner of the oil and gas in and under said strip; that said strip for many years had been occupied and used as a public highway; that the wells drilled thereon, under the Williams lease, constituted a public nuisance, and asked that the same be abated as obstructions on a public highway.They further asked the court to cancel the Williams lease and to confirm title to the oil and gas in Adkins, under his lease from the coal company.

Upon a hearing of the issues joined, the trial court refused to cancel the tax deed, but did cancel all of the other deeds and instruments in the chain of title springing from said tax deed, which were alleged in the complaint to be clouds upon plaintiffs' title.The court further held that the Simpson heirs were the owners of the strip of land; that the lease executed by them to Williams was a valid lease, and that the Simpson heirs and Williams were the owners of the oil and gas in and under the strip of land involved.The court further held, however, that all of the strip of land was occupied and used for a public highway and had been so occupied and used for more than forty years; that the drilling of the oil wells on the highway and maintaining the equipment thereon constituted a nuisance and, by the decree, ordered the receiver to discontinue the operation of the wells, to cap the wells beneath the surface of the highway and remove all equipment and obstructions therefrom within a short day, fixed by the decree.From that decree, this appeal was perfected.The plaintiffs also have perfected a cross appeal challenging that part of the decree ordering the wells capped, the operation of the wells discontinued, and the obstructions removed from the highway.

The record is voluminous.In the view we take of the case, it will not be necessary to relate the facts in detail.Many collateral and evidentiary facts are found in the record.For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to state that Elizabeth Simpson, in 1885, acquired title to the entire eighty-acre tract.Thereafter, on May 5, 1896, she conveyed the north twenty acres, reserving two rods off the east side, which she did not convey.On June 15, 1904, she conveyed the balance of the eighty-acre tract.She excepted from this conveyance, however, one acre off the east side, ‘extending the full length of the’ eighty-acre tract.This left title in her to a strip two rods in width off the east side of the north twenty acres of the eighty-acre tract, and one rod off the east side of the south three-fourths of the eighty-acre tract.The combined length of the two strips to which she retained title was 160 rods.The north forty rods was two rods in width, under the reservation in her deed of May 5, 1896.The south 120 rods was one rod in width, under the reservation in her deed of June 15, 1904.When she died intestate, this strip of land descended to her seven children.Proof of the deed under which Elizabeth Simpson acquired title to the entire eighty-acre tract in 1885, and the deeds showing the portions thereof, which she had conveyed in her lifetime, with the proof of her death and that her seven children were her heirs-at-law, constituted prima facie proof of title to the strip, in said heirs, as alleged in the complaint.

Appellants' first contention is that inasmuch as the complaint alleged the...