Simpson v. Betteroads Asphalt Corp.

Decision Date18 September 2013
Docket NumberCivil No. 2011-056
PartiesKEVIN SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. BETTEROADS ASPHALT CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

Attorneys:

Thomas Alkon, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For the Plaintiff

Wilfredo A. Geigel, Esq.,

Eugenio W.A. Geigel-Simounet, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For the Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lewis, Chief Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial under F.R.C.P. 50(b) and 59," which was filed on June 11, 2013 (Dkt. No. 90); Plaintiff's Opposition thereto, which was filed on June 19, 2013 (Dkt. No. 92); and Defendant's Reply, which was filed on July 2, 2013 (Dkt. No. 94). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kevin Simpson ("Simpson") brought this negligence action to recover damages for a personal injury allegedly sustained on May 21, 2010, during his employment with NR Electric, Inc. ("NR Electric"), a subcontractor of Defendant Betteroads Asphalt Corp. ("Betteroads"). Betteroads was the principal construction contractor for the Christiansted Bypass, a highway on St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. Betteroads hired NR Electric to lay underground electrical conduit along the Christiansted Bypass.

At the time of Plaintiff's injury, he allegedly was operating a compactor machine to compact backfill in a trench previously excavated to place underground conduits for electrical lines. Plaintiff claims that there was a large stone beneath the surface of the backfill, and that the compactor "bolted," "jerked up," or "buck[ed]" when it passed over the stone, causing Plaintiff "to suddenly lose his balance, twist and contort his body resulting in a severe injury to his back." (See Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 39 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Betteroads "was negligent in not ordering the entire trench emptied, and refilled with rock free dirt prior to ordering any compacting and thus eliminat[ing] the danger described above." (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 17(b)). According to Plaintiff, his injury was "directly caused by [Defendant's] negligence in exercising its control over all details of all work done on the site including work done by contractors." (Id. ¶ 16).

The trial in this matter began on May 20, 2013. Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), at the close of Plaintiff's case-in-chief and again at the conclusion of the trial. Defendant's motion was denied. Following trial, on May 28, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. (See Jury Verdict, Dkt. No. 84 at 1-3; Dkt. No. 87 at 1). In its verdict, the jury found, by a preponderance of theevidence, that: (1) Betteroads retained control over the manner in which part of the work entrusted to NR Electric was performed; (2) the negligence of Betteroads —with respect to the part of the work over which Betteroads retained control—was a cause of physical harm to Kevin Simpson; (3) Simpson was not negligent or such negligence was not a cause of his physical harm; (4) one-hundred (100) percent of the negligence was attributable to Betteroads, and zero (0) percent of the negligence was attributable to Simpson; and (5) Simpson was entitled to damages in the total amount of nine-hundred thousand dollars ($900,000.00). (See Jury Verdict, Dkt. No. 84 at 1-3). Following polling of the jurors, the jury's verdict was recorded as announced. (Dkt. No. 87 at 2). On June 11, 2013, Defendant filed the instant Motion, seeking either judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Dkt. No. 90 at 20).

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Rule 50(b): Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party which previously moved for judgment as a matter of law during trial under Rule 50(a) may renew its motion within 28 days after the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).1 Such a motion may begranted if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the [nonmoving] party on that issue." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

As the Third Circuit has explained, a motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted "'only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law.'" Mulholland v. Gov't County of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987)). Reviewing all the evidence in the record, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a motion for judgment as a matter of law "should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability"); Murphy v. City of Philadelphia Dept. of Recreation, 07-CV-4104, 2011 WL 3652480 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2011) ("[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party"). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, "the Court may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury's version." Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 492; see also Murphy, 2011 WL 3652480 at *2 (noting that the court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions—not those of a judge").

Although motions for judgment as a matter of law "should be granted sparingly," the jury's verdict must be supported by more than a "scintilla" of evidence. See Johnson v.Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003). "The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the unsuccessful party, but whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly have found its verdict." Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoted in Johnson, 332 F.3d at 204). A Rule 50 motion should therefore be granted where "the record is 'critically deficient of the minimum quantum of evidence' upon which a jury could reasonably base its verdict." Pitts v. Delaware, 646 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)).

B. Rule 59(a): Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur

Pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant a motion for a new trial "after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The authority of trial judges to grant new trials pursuant to Rule 59(a) "is large." See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that federal district court judges have the "'discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to [the judge] to be against the weight of the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958)).

The trial judge's Rule 59(a) discretion includes the authority to overturn verdicts for excessiveness, or to reduce the size of the verdict. See id. ("This discretion includes overturning verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner's refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)."); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989) ("[T]he role of the District Court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law, and todetermine, by reference to federal standards developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered.").

III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 50(b): Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Evidence was presented at trial that would provide a reasonable jury with a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for reasonably determining that the Plaintiff met all of the elements for negligence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). "[I]n the Virgin Islands, the Third Restatement of Torts governs negligence claims." Smith v. Katz, Civ. No. 2010-039, 2013 WL 1182074, at *11 (D.V.I. Mar. 22, 2013). Under the Third Restatement, there are five elements of a prima facie case for negligently caused physical harm: (1) duty; (2) failure to exercise reasonable care; (3) factual cause; (4) physical harm; and (5) harm within the scope of liability (historically called "legal cause" or "proximate cause"). Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 6 cmt. b. Testimony and evidence were presented corresponding to each of these elements, including the testimony and evidence described below.

1. Duty

While a hiring party (such as Betteroads) usually owes no duty as to the manner in which an independent contractor (such as NR Electric) performs its work, a hiring party does have a duty of reasonable care as to the exercise of any control it retains over any part of the work. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 56(b). Therefore, to establish a duty, Plaintiff was required to present evidence that Defendant Betteroads retained control over some part of the work it entrusted to NR Electric. See id.

Plaintiff presented testimony by Kevin Simpson that Betteroads would inspect the trench and approve it, and decide whether NR Electric would have to rake the...

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